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ABSTRACT
We have chosen four West African states, Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Dahomey and Upper Volta, in order to discuss civil-military relations in
developing countries. We explore three broad areas of questioning.
(l) Are there characteristics common to all developing nations which
increase the probability of military intervention? If so, what are the
final precipitants contributing to the coups? (2) What is the record of
military governments in societies seeking modernization? Are there
specific properties of military life which either benefit or inhibit the
junta'3 ability to govern? (3) Why does a military government withdraw
from overt political control? What are the prerequisites for a return
to the barracks?
First, we note that economic, social, and political factors (in
brief, a crisis in economic development, lack of national unity, and weak
political institutions) set the scene for the military emerging as the pre¬
dominant political force in the state. Moreover, there are final precipit
specific to each case which further explain, the incidence of military
intervention. These include the self-appointed mission of the soldier as
savior of the nation, intervention in the name of the national interest,
and intervention for the safe-guarding of a variety of self-interests.
Secondly, once the military has obtained political power, it faces
the same predicaments the previous civilian regimes had been unable to
solve. Moreover, the internal characteristics of the military restrict
its ability to transform its organization into a government directing socie
economic, and political development. Three major obstacles include its
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lack of legitimacy, lack of political and administrative skills, and lack
of cohesion within the army apparatus. We discuss incidences of each and
methods by which the juntas attempt to overcome or by-pass these problems.
We also discuss the record of the military's economic and financial
policies as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution the military may
offer to developing countries. We find the record is hardly impressive.
Thirdly, we discuss the process of demilitarisation. The military
withdraws from overt political control as a consequence of its failure
to form an effective government. There are three pre-conditions before
the process of recivilianisation is complete. (l) The military must be
willing to return to its barracks. (2) The successor regime must be
acceptable to the military. (3) The creation of a civilian regime viable
without the support of the military. The first two pre-conditions are
invariably fulfilled as the military withdraws from overt political contro]
However, the final pre-condition is not met as long as the conditions
leading to the original coup remain. Thus, the political life of Ghana,
Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta remains subject to military inter¬
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The armed forces of former British West Africa trace their
origins to the constabularies commissioned by trading companies and
colonial administrators during the late nineteenth century. With the
advent of the Ashanti Wars and fears of French intrusion into Nigeria,
the forces from Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia were
drawn together to form the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF).
In French West Africa black troops were first recruited for the con¬
quest of the Soudan. These troops served directly in the metropolitan
army according to the French policy of assimilation. The RW AFF fougat
in Last Africa during World War I and in Burma in World War II; the
French West African forces fougat in Europe and over-seas during the
World Wars and also in Indo-China and Algeria during the wars for
independence. Otherwise, the forces both in British and French West
Africa acted with the colonial civil service in the maintenance of
law and order. These two roles gave a paradoxical image to these forces:
the experience outside his homeland opened the soldier's eyes to
social and political changes taking place in other underdeveloped
areas and he returned home to express these ideas} his punitive duties
with the colonial administration adversely affected his prestige
within the community.
With the coming of independence, the individual regiments of
the RWAFF returned to their respective states to form the nucleus of
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the national armies. In French West Africa, national forces were created
by dividing up the existing regiments of the French army according to the
origin of their personnel. The shift in roles from the agents of an
imperial power to that of the embodiment of national sovereignity was a
delicate move on the part of these forces. Although the role of the army
had heen designated as protector of the new independent state, the armies
in several West African states have over-thrown the civilian political
authorities. The coup d'etat has become an established phenomenon: no
less than twenty have taken place in Africa since 1963. Therefore, a
vital area of study of African politics is the nature of civil-iailitary
relations in these countries. This, at best, is difficult to define,
particularly in societies in which civilian and military institutions
operate within ambiguous areas of competence. However, in order to
understand the role of the armed forces in these states, it is necessary
to examine military governments and their impact on the social, political,
and economic systems of their countries. This thesis is a survey of the
role of the armed forces with & special reference to Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Dahomey, and Upper Volta.
In the following chapters we will investigate three separate
but inter-related areas of questions concerning the role of the military
in developing countries. The first is the question of the causes of
military coups. Are there general characteristics common to all
developing nations which increase the probability of military
intervention? If so, what are the final precipitants contributing to
the coups? Secondly, what is the record of military governments in
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societies seeking modernization? Are there specific properties of
military governments which inhibit or benefit their ability to govern?
Finally, why does a military government withdraw from overt political
control? ,/hat are the prerequisites for a return to the barracks?
A useful point of departure, therefore, in cur study of military
governments is to examine the economic, social, and political backdrop
of the states experiencing military rule. In Chapter II, we will attempt
to discern a basic pattern in the countries under examination here. First
it can be demonstrated that these states were all suffering from grave
economic and financial problems which the civilian political authorities
were either unable or unwilling to rectify. Secondly, these states
contained highly diverse component groups. In short, a sense of
nationhood had not yet developed to offset the centrifugal forces of
ethnic and regional blocs. Those groups who wore politically active
were becoming more and more stringent in their demands to the central
political institutions. Thirdly, we find that the political
institutions of the states were unable to mediate or moderate the
group political activity or to satisfy the demands of the politically
mobilized stratum in the society. Thus, the governments came to rely
increasingly on coercive tactics to rule and to maintain their position
of power.
This broadly describes the pre-coup conditions of Shana,
Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper "/olta. However, these characteristics
could also apply to other African states not experiencing military rule.
It is necessary, therefore, to discuss final precipitants which could
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further explain the incidence of military intervention. These
precipitants are specific for each case and include three categories:
the self-appointed providential mission of the soldier as savior of
the nation; intervention in the name of the national interest; and
intervention for the safeguarding of sectional self-interests. The
first two categories are closely related and were often used by the
military leaders as justification for their intervention. The final
category which includes action to protect or advance the interests of
the military, sections of the military, personalities, or particular
groups in the society are generally identifiable precipitants in each
instance of military take-over. In Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and
Upper Volta, we will find that given the social, economic, and political
backdrop, the military intervened with little or no resistence from the
population for a variety of sectional self-interests.
The limit of our discussion in Chapter II is that it relies
heavily on ex post facto causal analysis. The danger here is the
invalidity of single-cause analysis. The dilemma is the complexity
of multiple causation in that it is impossible to identify and
examine all the inter-relations of a large number of factors. Thus,
what we resort to is the case study in an attempt to show why military
intervention va3 likely to occur in these states. The use of such
case studies as predictive devices is dubious at best.
Once the military achieves political control, it finds itself
faced with the same predicaments the previous civilian leaders had
been unable to correct. This lead3 to our second area of questioning:
5.
What strategic contribution can the military offer as governor of a
developing nation? We will turn our attention to this in Chapter III.
Here the internal characteristics of the armed forces create additional
handicaps affecting its ability to direct social, economic, and
political development.
The first impediment of military government arises from its
method of achieving pover. Its seizure of power is facilitated by its
control over the instruments of violence (whether openly deployed or
tacitly threatened) and by the organizational format designed to carry
out military objectives (i.e. combat and combat preparation). While
this makes it a relatively simple matter for the military to seize
political control, it is rather more difficult for them to govern
relying on the use of force. The military government is illegal.
While legality is an ambiguous question in these states, the military
government still seeks to legitimize its position. There are two
practical reasons for such a policy: (l) rule by force alone increases
the probability of a challenge from any contender who feels he has the
necessary strength; and (2) rule by force alone is not an economical
means of securing obedience of the population on a long-term arrangement.
Beyond this, there was a desire on the part of the juntas to obtain
international recognition for their regime.
However, the very nature of the military impedes its ability
to secure a base of support among the population. The military officer
lacks the expertise in verbal skills, bargaining, negotiation, compromise,
and mass appeals. Instead, he has been trained to operate within an
organized environment with little or no contact with outside clients.
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In his distrust for such political maneuver, the officer is unable to
supply political leadership to the civilian populace necessary in the
formation of stable government.
There are ways, however, employed by the junta in an attempt
to organize public support and to gain legal status. We shall discuss
instances of each in Chapter III. Constitutional proclamations are
issued at the outset of each military government which are designed
to lend an air of constitutionality to the junta, and at the same time,
to guarantee the support of the civil service and the judiciary in the
day-to-day business of government. In other cases, notably in Ghana,
there are appeals to traditional values in seeking respectability.
The ubiquitous commission of inquiry is employed to discredit the
ousted regime, thereby granting the junta acceptability as a popular
alternative, and also involving citizens through their participation and
evidence. Moreover, a series of non-partisan organizations might
emerge to attract public participation meanwhile directing this civic
activity along lines the military feels suitable. Finally, since
opposition does appear, military governments rely freely on standard
forms of coercion^ curtailment of the freedom of speech, censorship of
the press, arrest, detention, exile, and the banning of all civilian
political activity are a monotonous repertoire in the conduct of
military governments.
A second major factor limiting the military's effectiveness
in government is its administrative weakness and its inability to
provide policy-guidelines for the administration of the country.
At first glance, it would appear that the military could form /rell-
ordered bureaucracy for a developing nation. The army in Africa is
often the forerunner in the technological field. Its organizational
format is hierarchial, centralized, ordered on an elaborate system of
rules and regulations, and held together by a highly developed
esprit de corps. Even if this description of military organization were
entirely accurate in regards to African armies, the potential advantages
of such are circumscribed. The character of the military, based on its
function of combat and combat preparation, is not directly transferable
to large-scale organizational planning and management. Although a larger
proportion of officers are currently assigned to staff duties as opposed
to field appointments, their ex perience is meagre in comparison with their
civil servant counterparts.
While the army has proven to be adequate in managing its own
affairs or in maintaining lav and order within a state, its resources
sire over-taxed while attempting to deal with the problems of a
developing nation which include agricultural and industrial planning,
budgetary regulation, economic management and the like. The army in
this situation turns to the trained bureaucracy already established
within the state. This symbiotic relationship is readily formed due to
the colonial heritage and westernized outlook of both the institutions,
hut more importantly due to the seminal role of the civil service in
developing nations. However, there are inherent dangers in this
ELTrBngBzzisntL-* Due "to "t-lic political inadequacies of* "tlie asrogy officers9
the junta cannot provide policy-guidelines for the bureaucrat'3
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activities. Thus the civil service takes on an exceptionally strong role
in policy decision-making beyond their administrative functions. The
position of the civil service is graatly strengthened while in coalition
with the junta. Not only are their demands ub a privileged high-
consumption group a threat to the junta's effectiveness, but their
entrenchment in the role of policy-maker also impedes the future
development of civilian political institutions.
The final problem which the junta faces during its years in power
is the cleavages within the armed forces. This has a decided detrimental
effect on its ability to form a stable government. In order to
understand the causes and effects of the lack of cohesion, it is necessary
to study the composition and career structure of the armed forces in
Ghana, Gierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta.
The development of an officer corps of most African states is
a recent phenomenon. The first African officers were commissioned less
than a decade prior to independence. This rapid Africanization causes
several problems. Since the officer corps was recently formed, it is
small. This restricts its capacity as a government particularly with
the loss of officers during the coup or the shuffling off of questionable
officers to foreign post3. The officer corps is further reduced
with the absorption of officers into governmental posts. There are not
enough officers to "colonize" the civil service, but those who do take
on posts in the military government are split from those still attached
to the army proper, particularly when those still in direct contact
with the army organization feel they are deprived of the benefits
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enjoyed by the junta members. As a result, the small officer corps is
limited in the differentiation and specialization of roles necessary for
political organization.
The second problem of rapid Africanization is the rapid growth
race of the African officer corps since independence. This expansion
has a detrimental effect on the training process of young cadets. Rather
than adopting all the values and beliefs of the modern institutions, tne
army men retain links with their regions or ethnic groups. These men
still judge themselves and others in part by local criteria. This is
manifested by the formation of cliques within the army along regional
and ethnic lines and these cliques may act to protect or advance the
interests of these extra-military groups.
A third aspect of Africanization is the distortion of the age
structure and promotional pattern within the officer corps. The rapid
promotion of African officers to fill the posts left vacant by the
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departing colonial army is blocked within a few years. The frustration
of the junior and middle-level officers compounded by the difference in
training (i.e. those trained locally or who came up through the ranks
and those sent abroad to train) servesas a focal point of instability
particularly wnen this is aggravated by grievances from other sources.
The rank and file of these armies are also marked by a lack of
unity. An etnnic imbalance is evident; the rank and file are
generally drawn from the poorer, more remote areas. Here, as in the
case of the officer corps, the ethnic and regional differences serve
as outlets for a whole array of problems both within the army and within
the wider socio-political context. Thus, neither the officer corps nor
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the rank and file presents itself as a monolithic unit and the internal
splits of the military organization impedes its ability to maintain power
or to govern effectively.
These problems - legitimacy, administrative weaknesses, and
internal cleavages - are characteristic of the military governments of
We3t Africa to varying degrees. They appear to be endemic to military
rule as they stem from the characteristics of the social, economic, and
political environment of West Africa as well aa from the history and
character of the military apparatus. In Chapter III, we will discuss
these problems as they relate to Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and
Upper Volta ana attempt to discern the similarities and explain the
peculiar differences of our case studies.
The economy is a vital area of concern in developing nations and as
such, we will use the military's record in economic and financial affairs
as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution of the military to
development. The juntas are limited in their ability to give overall
direction to the economy first by the low level of administrative skills,
lack of adequate goals or overall policy, and deficiencies in personnel!
and secondly, due to the catastrophic economic situation inherited from
the previous regimes. In all four 3tates, the military has been able
to forestall bankruptcy. However, only in Upper Volta is the military
able to do more than place the economy on a "care and maintenance" basis.
The military's economic policies in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey is
not only detrimental to the long-term welfare of these countries, but it
i3 also an issue seized upon by sections of the civilian population as
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veil as sections of tne army as a focal point for their opposition to the
juntas. In Chapter IV, we will discuss the economic policies of the
juntas in our four case studies.
Our final area of concern in this thesis is the process of
demilitarization of politics. Here we pose two questions: Why will the
military withdraw to its barracks? What are the pre-conditions of such
a withdrawal?
The possibility of military disengagement from overt political
control cornea as a result of three conditions. First, the original, coup-
making group has broken up with growing personal and policy differences
growing among the military leaders. Secondly, there is growing dissent
within the military organization. Thirdly, it is increasingly apparent
that the military regime is unable to deal with the problems of a
developing nation. In this thesis, we will show that these three
phenomena are evident in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and less so in
Upper Volta. The stability brought on by the shock effect of direct
military action against the former regime soon deteriorates. however,
before the juntas do withdraw from political control, three pre-conaitions
must be satisfied. First, the armies must be willing to withdraw and
return to their barracks. This may be a result of the fear of
destroying the reputation of the armed forces in light of its continuing
failure to answer the demands required of a government of a developing
nation or a feai* that the military apparatus will be further dismembered
during its role in political control or a fear of a growing civilian
opposition to extended military rule. Secondly, the successor regime
must be acceptable to the military. It feels this necessary in order to
protect itself from reprisals if friends of the ousted regime regained
power and in order to retain a preponderant voice in the successor
government, thereby guaranteeing the army's privileged position. The
final pre-condition for re-civilianization of politics is the creation
of a civilian regime viable without the support and approval of the
military. In Chapter V we will discuss these three pre-conditions in
relation to the empirical data available concerning the return to
civilian rule. We will discover that the first two pre-conditions are
invariably fulfilleu. However, these pre-conditions lead only to the
withdrawal of the military from overt political control. It is the
creation of civilian political institutions viable without the support
of the military which is a prerequisite for the complete demilitarization
of politics. However, it appears that this pre-condition has not been
met. We will see, therefore, tnat the period of military rule does not
solve the problem which leads to military intervention in the first place.
There still remains the problem of building political institutions which
command the effective support of the civilian population. As long as the
conditions leading to the original coup remain, there is a greater
probability that the military, given a final impetus, will intervene again.
We have chosen four West African states in order to examine the
role of the military in developing countries. This introduction has
been a brief survey of the discussion in the following chapters. we
will follow the course of military involvement in politics beginning with
the conditions leading to soups d'etat through the record of military
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government to the final withdrawal of the military from overt political
control. Perhaps the greatest handicap in this study is the difficulty
of obtaining verifiable information. There is either a proliferation
of data as in the case of Ghana or the paucity of study concerning
Upper Volta. The gap in available empirical data is, unfortunately, too
obvious in thi3 work and frustrates comparative analysis. Furthermore,
we must be aware of the danger of generalizations. flonetheless, it is
hoped that these case studies will provide some useful guidelines toward
a broader theory of civil-military relations in African states.
lit.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND MP M>TIV£8 OF MILITARY INTERVENTION
The last five years or so have been characterised by a spate of
articles, monographs, and books on the role of the military in Africa.
Much of the literature, however, is confined to eitner a general descrip¬
tion of the army or to a catalogue of coups in Africa. There is a growing
realization that although such studies have yielded interesting facts, we
are still a long way from formulating meaningful generalizations about the
military in Africa. Accordingly, what we propose to do in this chapter
is to present a background to the military intervention in Ghana,
Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper Volta in the light of a general discussion
of the economic, social, and political systems of developing countries and
to delineate the similarities or peculiar characteristics of the final
motivations behind the military interventions.
By the early 1960's, France and Great Britain had transferred
political power in their West African colonies into the hands of an
African political elite. The ability of these African leaders to retain
this political power and to create a stable political system depended to
a large extent on their capability to meet the demands of economic
development and national unity.'2' Thus since there appears to be a set of
(l) Ken Post, The New States of west Africa (liarmondsvortn:
Penguin nooks, Ltd., 19o8)r p.91.
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economic and social facts which underlie political events and determine
the pattern of politics, we must first examine the characteristics of
the economic and social structures of developing nations in West Africa.
Then we will proceed to a brief discussion of the trend of politics in thes'
states since independence.
The Economic Structure
The aconoiay of West African states can be summed up in the word
"under-developed", and the consequences of the underdevelopment have had
serious repercussions in the political stability of these states. There
are three sources of the fragile economic situation: the physical or
natural impediments; the colonial system of exploitation; and the
limited alternatives for economic development available to independent
African governments coupled with their inability or unwillingness to
break from the colonial economic pattern.
What ha3 been termed the "curse of Black Africa" reads as an
account of seemingly insurmountable obstacles to economic growth. The
list includes the remoteness of large interior areas combined with the
difficulty of overland movement and problem of navigating rivers from
the sea inland, large areas with restricted productivity due to climatic
handicaps (particularly inadequate and unreliable rainfall), the va3t
extent of poor to mediocre soils, the low quality of natural vegetation,
and the presence of harmful animals, insects, and organisms.'1" These
(l) William A. liance, African Economic Development (dew York:
Frederick A. Fraegar, 196?), p.17.
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problems have led to the under-population of large tracts in contrast to
densely settled "islands" through West Africa, the serious and wide¬
spread malnutrition of the population, and a wide variety of debilitating
diseases. Nonetheless, there has been considerable optimism that these
conditions can be conquered, particularly in view of the untapped reserves
of minerals and energy, the advances made possible with modern agricultural
techniques, ana the wise and dedicated action from Africans and developed
nations, both hast and West."*"
In what manner the African economy would have evolved if left
alone cannot be answered. It was the colonial occupation which
established the economic structure of these states and set into motion a
cycle of poverty in West Africa. Under colonial rule, the economies of
the territories were geared to meet the basic kuropean need for primary
products. Thus, the colonial administration introduced and encouraged
the production of cash crops such as cocoa, palm products, and
ground nuts by African farmers while the import-export trade in the
colonies remained a European monopoly. This development brought
significant changes to the structure of the economy.
The colonial cash crop system in West Africa included several
inherent drawbacks for future economic development. There was an over¬
emphasis on one export for revenue. Those areas suited for cash crop
cultivation or which were mineral rich as well as the trade and
administrative centres were the primary receptors of investment capital
(l) For further discussion of problems of African development
3ee Rene Dumont, False Start in Africa (:iev York: Frederick A. Praegar,
1969), pp. 25-31.
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while the other regions were virtually ignored. This resulted in
uneven regional development throughout the colonies and was to be a
source of friction between the "have-some" and "have-nothings" within
each country. This emphasis on cash crops, moreover, was to the
detriment of food stuff production. Some colonies were no longer self-
sufficient in food and the expensive importation of basic supplies was
necessary. Furthermore, the lack of a food surplus meant there va3 not
a readily available, inexpensive food supply for an urban population.
There was not an agricultural backbone on which to build a manufacturing
sector in the colonies. There was, anyway, little investment for the
introduction of industrialisation, particularly to meet the demand for
consumer goods by the money-earning African. Consequently, this demand
for consumer products could be met only by increased imports. Therefore,
the lack of diversity of production resulted in the increased reliance on
imported goods, both food stuffs and manufactured products. Moreover,
the godds were imported solely by and from the colonial power.
This was also the case for the export of the ca3h crop. The
dependence on one market, the Western nations, left the African producer
at the mercy of world market fluctuations. It was difficult for tnem to
control their economy since the factors influencing it were external and
in the hands of the colonizing nation.
Thus we may characterize the "classical" colonial
economies of West Africa as severely limited in their
range of products, sources of capital and markets, and
as predominantly agrarian, witn production in the hands
— — 4- r» _ ^ 1
ui ^caocuiu ioiiuci
(1) Post, p. 121.
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Although France and Great Britain aimed to increase the development
of their colonies through the post-World War II programmes of the
Fond3 d'Investissementepour le Beveloppement Eccnoaique et Social dea
Territoires d'Qutre-Mer (FIDES) and the Colonial Development and Welfare
Acts, little was changed. At independence, the West African states
remained as producers of raw materials with an iiaport-export dependence
on the West. The new African governments pledged themselves to
economic development but how were they going to increase their countries'
economic rescourcea and their control over ways in which these resources
were disposed?
The search for methods of economic development more often centred
on the adoption of a creed of "African socialism" and on a reverence for
economic planning. Since the group of African entrepreneurs with
capital to invest was limited, the state was to play a role in economic
development and the economic plan was to be a yearly guideline to success.
After the early years of independence had passed, however, these states
found themselves with little indication of economic growth and the growth
indices negated by a rapidly expanding birth rate. The failure va3
largely a reflection of the inability or unwillingness of the
governments to change the structure of the economy or to break radically
with the basic patterns laid down in colonial times.
The nature of the iiaport-export trade wa3 a major obstacle.
There were attempts to diversify .trading partners in order to break
with the monopoly of the old colonial powers, but this was no easy task
while all the import-export machinery was directed to the colonial
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market system. Attempts to induce trade amou6 African states were of
limited success as long as these states were primary producers.
I'Soreover, the dependence on one export product left these states
susceptible to world market prices. fet, since this was their source of
revenue, increased production appeared the only means to increase capital.
More often this led to a flooding of the world market supplies and a.1|||rop
in prices. The African farmer was producing more in order to keep his
income stable or only to see it drop. Poverty and economic stagnation
replaced the early optimism for economic independence.
The answer, it seemed, was the diversification of production,
primarily the build up of secondary economic activities. In order to do
so, all machinery, fuel oil, construction material, as well as expertise,
had to be imported. The result: an exhausted foreign exchange reserve,
an adverse balance of trade, and debt. Attempts to check the deteriorating
economic state through selective tariffs, monetary exchange controls, and
austerity measures were only partially successful.
While much of the blame for the unsound economic situation in West
Africa can be laid at the colonial doorstep, the economic priorities of
the post-independence regimes also contributed to the emerging economic
and financial crisis. Much planning, particularly the massive expenditure
on infrastructure, although a necessary base for furtuer development, did
not yield immediate benefits for the nation as a whole. The misuse of
public funds by government officials for their personal use as well as a
penchant for 3howy projects were common and prolific. Large debts were
incurred with little productivity achieved. On top of this, the
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institutions of economic development and financial control - state
trading corporations, development banks, etc. - led to a greater
bureaucratic muddle, corruption, and more and more of the budget spent on
salaries. And, perhaps of greatest detriment to the population vas the
neglect of the agricultural sector for the production of necessary food
stuffs and the lack of encouragement of small-scale industries in order
to concentrate on large-scale, unproductive and ostentatious schemes."*"
By the mid-sixties, tne political elite were far from being able to
control the economic situation of their countries. The economic morass
vas an underlying feature to the collapse of the civilian regimes and the
taxe-over by the armies who were, however, no more able to answer the
2
demands of economic development than were their civilian counterparts.
The Bocial Structure
At independence, the former colonial boundaries were accepted as the
geographical base for political power. The task then was how to create a
national unit within borders containing multiple diverse component groups.
Although tne degree of fragmentation varied from state to state, it is
possible to examine the nature of We3t African social systems as viewed
a3 a general division between a large peripheral "traditional" sector and
a small central "modern" sector. This is a simplistic conception of the
society within a 3tate, and although useful for analytical, purposes, it
must be noted that there were numerous cross-cutting and over-lapping
(1) oee Rene Dumonx.
(2) Post, p. 133.
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variables which determined the social order.
In the rural area3 of Africa where subsistence agriculture has
survived as the dominant means of livelihood, social differentiation is
largely a function of geographic and ethnic considerations. In many
instances, the value systems are promoted and controlled by the traditional
institutions of kinship and ethnic group rather than by the "modern"
institutions of the state. These institutions, therefore, often act
independent of the sanctions of the central state organization for
effectiveness and legality. Although the central government may claim
areas
to extend its authority throughout these peripheral/, there can be no
doubt that the traditional structure also carries out the regulation of
some economic affairs, personal status, and other political, functions.1
The people in the rural areas have at various times been brought
tangentially into the political conflicts of the centre. During the
independence momentum, parties appealed to the periphery for vote3.
Combined with the rapid spread of universal suffrage, the result was
2
often the politicization of primordial ties. However, the appeal of
political leaders to the people in the "traditional" sector often
included ethnic or regional particularisms and often resulted in a
heightened awareness of ethnic and regional distinctions among the
people in the periphery. This doe3 not mean, therefore, that the central
institutions have gained acceptance in the periphery, but rather that these
peripheral groups may join the competition for the resources the centre may
offer. The central government may receive pressure for demands for a
(1) Aristide Zoiberg. Creating Political Order (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1966), pp. 133-13^.
(2) ibid, p.22.
greater share of the national budget for development schemes or for greater
status devolved to the traditional elite from peripaeral areas acting as
regional or ethnic blocs.
The centre is the 3iaall core of the population comprised of
individuals who propound the "modern" value and beliefs instilled in the
machinery of modern 3tate politics and market economic activity.
Social status at the centre is determined by income and occupation, although
as we shall discuss, "traditional" elements such as regionalism, ethnicity,
and family ties retain their vitality.
Contained in the centre are two groups that may be loosely
categorised a3 the "middle class" and the "proletariat" including the
"lumpen-proletariat"."2" The origins of these groups are found in the
colonial economic structure - the production and export of cash crops and
the administration of the colonies as profitable economic enterprises.
First, a "middle-class" emerged. What would be termed a rural
middle class was found in the areas in which African farmers pursued cash
crop production. Linking these farmers to the large Luropean-controlled
import-export firms was a group of local middle men, the small retail
traders. Furthermore, as towns grew up around the colonial administrative
centres and ports of trade, a group of Africans, taking advantage of new
educational opportunities, entered new careers such as clerking, the civil
service, and the professions (including doctors, lawyers, teachers, and
in the years leading to independence, a new group of upper level military
(l) Roger Genoud, Rationalism and Economic Development in Ghana
(Hew York: Frederick A. Praegar, 1969), pp. 2^-28.
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personnel). These individuals inculcated European beliefs and values
both through the process of Western education and through their career
experiences. However, in spite of the fact that these groups were
nominally middle-class in occupation and out-look, they hardly formed a
monolithic "modern" unit in direct juxtaposition to the "traditional"
periphery. Several ties of a "traditional" nature were strong points of
cross-group identification. First, ethnic and regional identification
both blurred the edges of social stratification based on economic activity
and in other cases, re-inforced "class" demands.1 For example, the
civil service and the military, while internalizing Western norms,
continued to act in part on the basis of family and ethnic links. On the
other hand, ethnic and regional identification tended to re-enforce
divisions based on "class" statue. For example, where one region was the
centre of ca3h crop production, regional and class interests coincided.
Thus, there was often an element of regionalism and ethnicity in agrarian
discontent (eg. the A3haati cocoa farmers in Ghana). Furthermore, those
ethnic groups in whose area colonial, administrative centres developed
and who were thus the first groups to benefit from the educational and
employment opportunities made available in the colonialJsystem continued
to manifest a certain pretention based on a high position within what
can be considered an inter-ethnic organization of social stratification.
These same groups may also unite along ethnic lines to oppose the
influx of other Africans entering the towns in search of employment.
In bierra Leone, however, there is a unique situation with the Creole
population in and around Freetown. The ex-slaves, returning from
(1) Zolberg, pp.70-72.
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Great Britain had. no up-country ties and thus acted as a whole to oppose
any increased role of the indigenous Africans in the "modern" economic
and political activity of the country which would threaten the Creoles'
privileges.
Secondly, a generational split developed among the "middle-class"
Africans. With the opening of educational opportunities in post-World
War II We3t Africa, more and more individuals with educational and
occupational qualifications appeared on the scene. However, after the
rapid Africanization of governmental jobs with independence, both this and
other job markets were restricted and often closed. This new generation
was less affected by colonial norms than by the social, economic, and
political changes in these countries moving toward independence as
opposed to the experiences of the older generation.^" The tensions
between the generations easily spilt over into the political sphere as
demands for security of positions from the older generation conflicted
with the young men's demands for job opportunities and promotion.
In conclusion, we can note that a "middle-class" based on types
of economic activity did develop as a result of colonial rule in Africa.
However, this "middle-class" wa3 divided along ethnic, regional, and
generational lines. The demands of this group which va3 3hapea both by
"modern" and "traditional" criteria were to have important consequences
for the move to independence and afterwards.
(l ^ hi' H *n . Til.
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The colonial system also gave rise to an African "proletariat".
This was a result of tne increased mobility made possible by rail roads
and feeder roads devised for cash crop export and by the job opportunities
made available in the cash crop system. There was large scale seasonal
migration from the hinterland to the agricultural and mining centres and
which has become a permanent feature in West Africa. The transport
system facilitated the African's travel to new urban areas. It was, more
importantly, a drive to earn money and thus to gain access to the consumer
money-earning society that brought individuals from the rural areas to the
new towns. There were profound social consequences of the rapid
urbanization both for the country-side and the city. It hastened the
decline of the rural areas where over-population had not been a cause of
poverty and created the problems of the cities: poverty and unemployment."1"
This African "proletariat" was a small group owing to the lack of
industrialization in the colonies. The individuals filled the low wage
jobs (eg. construction work, menial labour, house boys for the colonial
officials, etc.) or joined the rank of the unemployed.
Wor was this "proleterariat" identified by its economic base alone.
Tribal and kinship links remained strong for the urban labourer. Many
came to cities seeking temporary wage-paying jobs; the young men often
arrived without their families and expected to return to their villages
eventually. Hot only did these men keep close contact with their
"traditional" setting but they would also form associations while in the
city with members of their ethnic groups. Thus, "traditional" values
(l) Basil Davidson, Which Way Africa? (Hamaondsworth:
Penguin Books, Ltd., 1967), p. 85.
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would often take precedence over the "modern" institutions. The fact
that the urban dweller might not accord complete legitimacy to the
central authorities coupled with a growing frustration over the lack of
economic benefits was to create in the urban "proletariat" a potential
political problem, particularly to the leaders of the independent
African 3tate wishing to remain in political control.
The demands of the "middle class" and the "proletariat" at the
centre were sources of political activity and agitation. Yet, as we
have noted, the concept of "class" in the Western 3ense is of limited
applicability in West Africa. A major reason for this is that the
economy remains relatively undifferentiated. While some areas set the
pace by producing cash crops or as the location of colonial administration,
subsistence agriculture remained the principle economic activity of the
large peripheral areas. Those groups emerging with new types of economic
activity were small and the class divisions embryonic. Moreover,
the importance of social stratification introduced with colonialism was
circumscribed by colonial dominance in the political and economic spheres.
Finally, and perhaps most relevant, considerations other than class economic
interests, such as regionalism and ethnicity, while increasingly reinforced
by economic factors, were influential in group identification and often
cross-cut any consciousness of class."1"
If, however, we are to identify and discuss the strata of the
population which were active in the political life of the country, we
would recognize them as emerging primarily from the groups at the centre
(l) Post, p. U3.
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(although the traditional elite also played a substantial role both as
leaders in the peripheral areas and in their relations with the central
political institutions.) To define the groups engaged in political
activity, therefore, is to include those, no matter what class, who were
in contact with the modern values and institutions of the central
authority and who were actively participating in politics in the
government; in opposition groups; in interest groups; and in party affairs.
This group of the centre engaged in political activity is small in
proportion to the country's population and, as such, political conflict is
confined to a small stratum, of society.1
From thi3 politically active stratum of society emerged the
political elite, those actually in control of the political institutions.
Once again it is difficult to equate the political elite with one
economic class because of the vaguely defined class structure and the
incongruence between personal wealth and political power in West Africa
(particularly with the economic wealth of the country remaining largely
in the hands of expatriates). However, the history of sti-uggles for
political power in West African states reveals that although the
national movements were directed more against the colonial power than for
the advantage of one particular group in society, the early political
leaders rose from the professional "middle-class" elements. These
well-educated Africans attempted to protect their privileged positions
in the modern centre but were only partially successful as they did not
hold the uJL*w i.in.SL'b s control ctlis pol it ic Q1 inst itutions in t-lic co2.oni.5ii
(l) ibid.. p.UU.
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system. With the post-War expansion of education, a new group aspiring
to political leadership emerged from rather humble origins - school teachers
clerks, etc."*" These newcomers, with their desire for status and benefits
of political leadership, specialized in mass appeals which, as we stated
previously, included ethnic and other "traditional" particularisms to
bring the various components of the society onto a party bandwagon. As
the prize of the control pf an independent government was to be awarded
to that party which could present the most "national" face, a tenuous
national front was pulled together in the struggle for independence.
However, the very nature of the political, movements - the fact that they
were put together with a disparate coalition of many interest groups -
, . . 2
militated against the establishment of a stable permanent national unity.
Political Trends
Once independence was achieved, the political elite was left with
the problem of governing a developing nation, and, what was to become
their dominant criterion for action, maintaining their elite position.
In the first place, there was considerable difficulty for these leaders
whose political experience had been limited to an anti-colonial conflict
to switch their tactics to the proclaimed modernization goals.
Furthermore, the institutions of government which had been super-imposed
on the country by departing colonial officials were unsuitable instruments
(1) Aristide Zolberg- "The Structure of Political Conflict
in the Hew States of Africa", American Political Science Review. Vol. LXII,
No. 1 (March 1968), p. 75.
(2) Zolberg, Creating Political Order, p.36.
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by which the African political elite could direct development. Secondly,
the elite were basically insecure in their positions of political power.^
They had risen rapidly to their newly acquired privileges and status which
were determined by their position of controlling politics. They wanted
to stay there. However, as politics was one of the few lucrative careers
in a developing nation, given the paucity of other career opportunities,
the political elite confronted constant pressure from rival aspirants for
political power and the benefits of political power. Opposition groups
resurfaced in force after the lull of the early years of independence.
The opposition included demands from the older generation of politicians
who had been defeated during the mass independence movement. Other
"middle-class" groups 3ucn as trade unions, civil service, cash crop
farmers pressed their demands for increased economic advantage. The
military, hy this time, had emerged as a politicized group pushing for
increased privileges and voice in political affairs. The armed forces
as members of the politically active population formed alliances with
other groups for mutual advantage or traded off goals in return for support
from other groups. "Social, political, and economic factors intrude
into the military spheres ... the army exchanges functional autonomy for
lQ
political influence. Meanwhile, the growing frustration of tne urban
worker was giving rise to increased demands for the benefits that only
the political incumbents seemed to enjoy. All these groups' demands
focused on the central political institutions as these were the only
(1) Charles Raab "Ideology, Modernization and Leadership".
Seminar paper presented at Centre of African Studies, University of
Edinburgh, (February 1970), pp. 216-217.
(2) S.R. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), p.211.
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source of rewards in terms of statuB and privileges at the centre.
However, with the deteriorating economic conditions, the political elite
were hard put to satisfy demands from these politicized groups much less
to direct the pace of socio-political change. There was a widening gap
between the leader's ideological aspirations and their capacity to
formulate and implement their policies.
In what manner did the political leaders attempt to deal with the
opposition threatening their positions? More often than not, the political
elite came to rely increasingly on severe negative sanctions for compliance
with governmental policies. However, the government in a high-coercion
system, according to Apter, becomes less accountable for its activities
and consequently political life attains a conspiratorial quality full of
opportunism, corruption, error, and incompetence.1
Although no African rulers have ever abandoned completely
their reliance on the techniques of machine politics to
maintain themselves in office, illustrations of trend
toward the use of force abound and by now constitute a
monotonous recitation of unpleasant but familiar facts of
African political life: intimidation, exile, detention,
or assassination of political opponents, modification of
the electoral system to make competition impossible or at
least very cos -cay to those who attempt to engage in it;
reduction of the independence of the judiciary or creation
side-by-side with it of dependable political courts;
redefinition of loyalty to unquestionable obedience and
sycophancy; the U3e of the military, the police, and of
political thugs to bulldoze dissidents into passivity and.
passives into demonstrative supporters; creation of
additional quasi-military or quasi-police bodies to 0
offset the questionable loyalty of the existing ones.*"
Thus there were no legal means through wnich to channel the
demands of the politically active stratum, there were no effective
(1) David Apter, The Politics of Modernization
(London: University of Chicago lYess, 1965), pp. 237""2L0.
(2) Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in
the New States of Tropical Africa", pp. 76-77.
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political institutions capable of moderating or mediating group political
activity, and there vas no agreement on legal and authoritive methods of
resolving the conflict among the groups. The politically active groups
faced each other nakedly and employed means of direct action on the
political scene which were peculiar to their nature and capabilities
(e.g. the workers strike, the students riot, and the nobs demonstrate).1
These become the principal mean3 of bringing pressure upon the civilian
regime. In reaction, the regime moves further from rule based on
authority to rule based on force.
At this point, the military may become the predominant actor on the
political scene. The armed forces use the ultimate means of bringing
pressure on the regime, i.e. the coup. "It is however, usually a
reaction to or a product of other types of political action by other
groups ... military intervention is one strand in a complex pattern of
2
direct action techniques.
In developing nations, the overthrow of civilian regimes by the
military is thus a response to the escalation of social conflict by
several groups when personal frustrations of the coup leaders coincide with
lines of conflict vithin the society and wnen there is a decline in the
institutions
effectiveness and legitimacy of whatever political/may exist. The coup
is an extreme exercise of direct action against the civilian regime.
By removing the regime, it reduces other forms of direct action. An
immediate after-effect of a coup may be the reduction of the level of
rnnfl -I ft. rtf 1 aoef o p'i —+• a v»w 1 i icti r»r> Af + n«i ^rAiineWWUiiAAW U OkW W W UWiUWWaiXXMUiWAWU V* W1J.V * A
(1) Huntington, p. 196.
(2) ibid, p. 212.
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politics as they retire to wait upon the course of events. The military
take-over will have a temporary stabilizing effect on the political system.
However, the coup can only bring short-term refief. The causes for military
intervention are endemic to the political system. They cannot be remedied
by simply eliminating people. In addition, once the army does overthrow
the civilian regime, the military's relationship to the political system
is forever altered. Institutional and personal self-interest combine
to make the coup leaders fearful of the retaliation they may face if these
civilian political elite are allowed to return to power. Thus, the
incentives to intervene are re-doubled and the array is irreversably
committed to prevent the return of these civilians to complete political
control. As Tbucydides wrote of Athens:
For by this time your empire has become a Despotism
(Tyrannis) a thing which it is considered unjust ^
to acquire, but which can never be safely surrendered.
We have discussed the importance of economic and social factors
which shape the political events in the new states of Africa and which set
the scene for military intervention. In such states, military inter¬
vention takes the form of overtly over-turning a civilian regime and either
installing another civilian regime or itself in its place. however, the
final impetus driving the military further and further into the political
arena is related to specific events in each state. There are several
final motives behind a military take-over.First, "manifest destiny" or
(1) Quoted in Gilbert Murray, Euripides and His Age
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p.53.
(2) S.E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press,
1062), pp. 23-60.
the providential mission of the military a3 saviors of their countries is
an oft quoted justification for the army's intervention. As the army
is theoretically uninvolved with party politics; as it is the symbol of
national savereignity; as it is indoctrinated with the spirit of
nationalism, the army could assume a sacred duty to move in and "save the
nation". It is difficult to prove this as a motive as there is generally
an abundance of evidence to show that the military had other, less
altruistic, reasons for their intrusion into politics.
The second hypothetical motivation for intervention is in the name
of national interest. In this instance, the military takes on a role of
custodian and claims to have intervened to veto specific decisions made by
the civilian authorities. The junta states that it has taken control
temporarily to allow the people to choose new leaders. There may be
difficulty in differentiating between motives of "saving the nation" and
acting in the "name of the national interest". However, in both cases,
once the military is in power, it finds it is "riding the tiger's tail"
and it is increasingly difficult for the army to relinquish its power
until its interests are safe-guarded.
The final group of motives are those of sectional interests.
First, the army may intervene on behalf of a specific group within the
state with which it feels a common interest (eg. the privileged, high
consumption labour unions). Secondly, regional self-interest may play a
part, particularly if the army displays an ethnic imbalance in its
composition or command structure. Another form of sectional interest
is action to protect the corporate self-interest of the armed forces.
3h.
Here the military insists that it has the right to determine matters
affecting the armed forces not only in the area of equipment, training,
and recruitment, but also in domestic and foreign policy. A fourth
and final form of sectional interest is individual or material self-
interest. when the army or a section of tne army either feels a personal
animosity to its leaders (civilian or military) or feels it is relatively
under-privileged in terms of status or remuneration or that these
privileges are being threatened, it will intervene.
It is not always possible to classify the individual coups into
any one category. The motivations for intervention are mixed; a coup is
rarely monocausol. nevertheless, in the remainder of this chapter, we
will discuss the economic, social, and political background of Ghana,
Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta and attempt to show some of the
fiaal precipitants for military intrusion into the political process in
light of our opening remarks on developing countries. We will examine
each country separately and then compare the different situations.
Ghana
The Convention'People's Party (CEP) under kwame dkrunian emerged as
the leading nationalist movement in pre-independence Ghana.1 Although the
CEP never won more than 60 per cent of the vote in a free election after
1951, it wa3 considered to have mas3 support throughout tne country and it
was to the CPP that the departing British relinguisned political power in
1957. After 1957, the only political group with a large following in
opposition to the CPP was the United Party (UP), a disparate coalition of
Ashanti cocoa farmers, intellectuals, and others with individual grievances
against the Jkrunah regime.
One reason that the opposition was restricted to regionalism and
(l) For further information see Dennis Austin. Politics in Ghana
(London: Oxford University Press, 196U) and David Apter, Ghana in Transition
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arguments on democracy and liberty during the early years of independence vai
the lack of economic difficulties. Ghana had inherited
£200 million surplus at independence and the world cocoa prices (the
major cash crop) were at top levels during the late 1950's. The gov¬
ernment's economic program was one of reconstruction and placed emphasis
on the development of infrastructure such as Tema Harbour, the Volta
Dam, and highway schemes. This vast development program was carried
on without having to restrict private consumption. However, after 1961,
the economic position deteriorated and as the opposition re-emerged, the
years of respite for the CPP came to an end."'" The rapid rise of the
cost of living index from 36k in July i960 (based on 100 in 1939) to
386 in December, 19&3> coupled with a minimum wage policy unchanged since
i960, led to a decline in living standards. The shortage of consumer
goods and a rise in the cost of food stuffs by 36 per cent from March
1963 to December 196h added to the economic hardship. A major case wa3
the drastic fall in world cocoa prices to a level in 1965 which wa3 the
3
lowest in 25 years. As cocoa is the major money crop and export item
for Ghana, this not only hit the cocoa farmers hard but also created a
large, disconsolate pool of unemployed. Another reason for the finan¬
cial difficulties by this time was poor planning and management of the
economic projects. First, it was difficult to have long-term planning
since the government income was unreliable. The tax from cocoa sales was
unpredictable because of the fluctuation of the world market price and
income from the other exports of manganese, timber, and diamonds also were
(1) Roger Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana
(New York! Frederick A. Praegar,Inc5,1969),PP 196—197=
(2) Robert £.Dowse, "The Military & Political Development" in Polit¬
ics and Chan»;e in Developing Countries, ed by Colin Leys (London: Cambridge
University Press, 1969), p.23^-5•
(3) West Africa (February 26, 1966), p.213.
variable. Secondly, because Ghana was too dependent on the West for
imports and exports and was not successful in diversifying trade partners,
Ghana lacked an advantageous bargaining position. Thirdly, there was
no central body for economic decisions. Also, after i960, Nkrumah
relied increasingly on the civil service but they did not support hi3
economic policies."'" The result of these factors was a growing gap
between the government's economic aspirations and its ability to direct
the course of economic development.
Meanwhile, opposition wnich threat¬
ened the unity of the state and widespread public disorder emerged.
Hkrumah "resorted to a series of repressive measures, deportations,
2
arrests, censorship, and overt intimidation". ~ Strikes were made ill¬
egal in 1958 and in the same year, the Preventive Detention Act was
passed. By the end of the year, 318 arrests had been made under this
3 . .
act, and it was implemented to arrest opposition leaders such as J.G.
Danquah, one of the oldest and most respected national leaders.
The Republican Constitution of i960 created a highly centralized
state. Under this Constitution, tne head of state was granted several
arbitrary powers of which hkrumah was quick to take advantage. He was
proclaimed President for life in 1962; Ghana was declared a one-party
state in 196H; and in 1969, the Voting Acts Amendment instituted nominat-
(1) Genoud, pp. 12T-1^T»
(2) Irving Markovitz, "The Winter of Discontent", in Africa
Report. Vol. 11, Ho. 2h {April. 1966) p. 12.
(3) Geoffrey Bing, Reap the Whirlwind (London: McGibbon and
Kee, 1968), p. 271.
37.
tion of all legislative candidates by tne Central Committee of tne CPP
and by Ilkrumah."1" In such a manner, hkruaah was successful in elimin¬
ating any official opposition. however, he was psychologically separ¬
ated from the needs and demands of the Ghanaians. This problem was
further compounded by the lackeys surrounding aim who prevented the infor¬
mation necessary for decision making and implementation from reaching
Hkrumah. Moreover, a different type of opposition was developing within
the government's own ranks, particularly after the massive strikes by
organized labour in 19bl. "The CPP became an unmanageable lobby of
the
different pressure groups, with/tussles for power carried on at the
university, in the press, in Parliament, and in government ministries,
as well as in the party itself." There were two causes of the
decline of the CPP as a political party with mass appeal and support.
First, as corruption became more obvious, as ideological indoctrination
wa3 intensified, and as the repressive measures were implemented, both tne
technocratic civil servant and the peasant became alienated from the CPP.
The civil servant resented tne emphasis placed on ideology in policy decis¬
ions. The peasant, wuo is vulnerable to economic fluctuations, suffered
unaer the corrupt and inefficient regime. Tne Ghanaian people who had
3
developed such high expectations were now restless and dissatisfied.
Secondly, not only could the CPP not mobilize mass support, it had ceased
trying to do so. Mobilization of tue masses for development action was
(1) A,A. Afrifa , The Ghana Coup (London:Frank Cass & Co.Ltd.1966).
See Appendix from "bulletin of International Commission of Jurists"(Itec.19^5)p.144.
(2) Ruth First..The barrel of a Gun(London: Tne Penguin Press,1970),
p. 182. "
(3) Markovitz, pp. 1^-15.
never given serious consideration; instead Nkrumah "began to rely more
and more on the civil service. Genoud suggests that a reason for
thi3 was the type of development that the Nkrumah government was emphas¬
izing (i.e. the infrastructure) prevented the people from feeling
a vested interest in the regime. As he states:"Not that the govern¬
ment was not doing anything for anybody; on the contrary, but precisely
because what was being done - and which was important - was done in a
diffuse way, for everybody, through the administrative machinery of the
government and without involving the people through mass mobilization.""^
Such was the situation in Ghana in early 196b. Social unrest
which had increased with the deteriorating economic situation was
further aggravated by the austerity economics introduced in the last
CEP-regime budget; Ghana was being deserted by the West after Nkrumah made
tentative contacts with the East; the Government was corrupt and ineffic¬
ient and relied on coercion to prevent an organized opposition; the CPP
had become a shell of a party; and there was no constitutional means of
changing the regime. Therefore, while Nkrumah was flying to Peking to
offer peace solutions for the Viet Nam War, Colonels Kotoka and Ocran,
Major Afrifa, and Police Commissioner Harlley were able to plan and
execute the coup. There are diverging accounts as to which man was res¬
ponsible for setting the plan into operation, but the army and the police
2 ....
worked together and found it necessary to do so. The main buildings in
(1) Genoud, p. 191.
(2) For further detail see Major-General A.K.Ocran, A myth is
Broken (Accra: Longmans, Green & Co.btd., 1968) and A.A.Afrifa, op cit.
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Accra were captured and CPP and government officials were arrested.
There was little resistance from party activists; the CPP seemed to
disintegrate over-night. "The power vacuum and instability after the
coup correspond to the atomization of power before; they represent, as
it were, its most striking a posteriori evidence."
The coup was quick and virtually bloodless. Kotoka announced
in a dawn broadcast on February 2k, 1966:
The myth surrounding awame Ukrumah is broken;
Kwame Nkrumah has been dismissed from office; ^
the Parliament has been dissolved and the CPP disbanded.
A National Liberation Council (NLC), consisting of military and police
officers, was established to replace the government, and as the Consti¬
tution had been abolished, it was to rule by decree. The following
chart shows the initial emphasis placed on representing all regions
and the major ethnic groups and tne parity of representation given
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(1) Genoud, p.193
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(3) Jon Kraus, "The Men in Charge".Africa Report Vol.11,No.2k,
(April 1966) p.18.
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What were the motives benind the 1966 coup? The idea that the
army was the savior of the nation was used as an excuse. Afrifa later
wrote, "... the coup was necessary to save our country and our people"."'"
However, this was more of a rationalization on the part of the young
officer and tnere is evidence whicn points to other motives. There
were also elements of intervention in the name of the national interest.
The army and the police leaders probably did feel that they were pre¬
venting Ghana from slipping into Communist hands under Nkrumah, partic¬
ularly since the officers were closely linked to the British army's
2
tradition of conservatism.*" however, we propose here that the prime
motivation behind the coup was the protection of the corporate self-
interest of the army.
The civil-military relationship in Ghana had Deen harmonious
during the early years of independence, particularly with nkrumah's
speedy Africanization of the officer corps. however, alter the assassin¬
ation attempt on Hkrumah at Kulungugu in 1962, Hkrumah began to purge
the police and the army, meanwhile setting up nis own security system.
He placed all responsibility for military affairs in his own office
and began to set up CPP party cells within the army ranks. This emphasis
on political loyalty strained his relations with the military. What¬
ever the political reasons, the abrupt retirement of Generals Ankrah and
Otu infuriated the officer corps (it was no way to treat an officer and
a gentleman!) and also started rumours of an impending over-all purge.
(1) Afrifa, p.37.
(2) Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule
in .lew States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case" , in World
Politics. Vol. XXIII, Ho.3 (April,1971) p.^31.
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The two generals were probably dismissed because of their criticism
of Nkrumah's own para-military force, the Soviet-trained and Soviet-
armed Palace Guard. Hot only wa3 this organization seen as a threat
to the effectiveness and autonomy of the regular army, but it was also
better equipped and better paid. Other problems arose over the train¬
ing of cadets in the Soviet Union which would have further diminished
the cohesiveness and command structure with an army of mixed arms and
mixed training. The army officers resented Hkrumah's using the army
to further his political goals outside Ghana. During the Congo oper¬
ation, the Ghana army found itself the object of derision from the Congo
people it had been sent to protect. There was also a lot of political
manoeuvering between Hkrumah and Lumumba involving the army command in
the Congo, which the officers resented. Finally, the Ghana army's
equipment was run down and one battalion faced a mutiny while another
suffered serious casualty losses."*" In all, the Congo experience
was considered a blow to the prestige of the armed forces by the
officer corps. Therefore, when rumours started in the mid-sixties
that Hkrumah was considering sending his army to Rhodesia, the officers
felt that they must act to prevent a further erosion of its status.
The officers believed that Hkrumah was forcing them to "heel" and the
only solution was intervention to protect themselves and their
professions.2




to the overthrow of Nkruaiah.^ When the army's grievances coincided
with the grievances of other social groups, the prospect of military
intervention became more and more probable. In Ghana, the inability
of the Nkrumah regime to create effective political institutions and
mobilise support through such institutions meant that the coup itself
was carried out with little resistance from counter-balancing forces.
Sierra Leone
Since its formation in 1951» the Sierra Leone People's Party
(SLPP) dominated the political scene in Sierra Leone. It was able to
do so largely because of its close alliance with the local chiefs in
the southern and eastern regions of the state, or what is termed
2
Mendeland." This close alliance with the traditional elite had two
ramifications for the SLPP. On one hand, since the SLPP leaders had
close links with or were members of the traditional ruling families and
were thu3 men of high traditional standing, they had no psychological
or economic threat
need/to reject the traditional society. Moreover, even when these men
were merged into the new Western-educated elite, they maintained elements
traditional patterns of behavior through their membership in the
Poro Society, a secret Mende organization. On the other hand, the SLPP
(1) There was also a case of individual self-interest as a motiv¬
ation in Ghana during the abortive April 1967 coup led by Lt. Arthur.
We will discuss this instance in more detail in Chapter III, but the pri¬
mary cause of the planned coup was the frustration that Arthur and other
lower ranking officers felt over slow promotions. See Legon Observer. Vol.
II, No.9 (28 April-il May, 196?), p.23.
(2) Sse Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State
(Cambridge, Mass. iliarvard University Press,1966). See also same author,
"Sierra Leone" in Political Parties & National Integration in Tropical Africa"
ed. by J.Coleman & C.Rosberg (Los Angeles,California: University of Cali¬
fornia Press,196*0 ,pp.90-131.
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relying on the chiefs as the principle channel of communication to
the grass roots level, did not feel the need to build up an autonomous
party structure. Elections within each constituency were fought over
local issues; the candidate had to develop a personal, not a party
appeal."1" This pattern of localism was reinforced by the varying
rates at which the regions were developing. Since the SLPP held the
majority in the central government, most development funds and activities
went to the south and east while the north lagged behind.
During the late fifties and early sixties, the SLPP'3 position
was being challenged. First, there was a shift in the tribal basis of
opposition from the Creoles of the West and Freetown to the northern
tribes. Secondly, there was the emergence of "radical" political
parties which relied less on traditional links for support. The All
People Congress (APC) formed in i960 consisted of men of lower social
2
strata who did not have connections with traditional rulers. However,
while the APC claimed that its opposition to the SLPP wa3 on a class
basis, its main support came from the Temne and Limba tribesmen in the
north. In the 1960's, dissatisfaction over benefits given the north
polarized the country and the APC became more a "tribal" and less a
"radical" party. In the 1962 elections, the majority of its 16
Parliament seats were from the north.
Sierra Leone came to independence in 1961 under the leadership
of Sir Milton Margai of the SLPP. After Sir Milton's death in 196H,
his brother Sir Albert Margai took over the Prime Ministership and tne
(1) John R. Gartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone, 19^7-1967
Toronto:University of Toronto Press, 197°)» PP 260-261.
(2) ibid., p.262.
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leadership of the SLPP. Much of the tension in Sierra Leone after
1964 was due to Sir Albert's tactics in attempting to solidify his
control over the SLPP and to counter-act any opposition.1 His
references to making Sierra Leone a one-party state cost him support
among the SLPP members who feared he would extend his tenure in
office. In 1966, he proposed a draft constitution to make Sierra
Leone a Republic which would give the Prime Minister extensive con¬
trol over the President and the Chief Justice. It alienated the
Creoles, an important source of political support, and moreover, it
tended to increase the popularity of the APC as an alternative to
Margai. The appointment of Gershon Collier as Chief Justice, a
close associate of Margai's, was seen as an attempt to reshape the
judicial system to be more sympathetic to Margai. All of these mea¬
sures were considered to be Margai's means to establish his control
over the SLPP and the government. They were resented not only by the
Creoles and the other non-SLPP groups, but also by the SLPP members.
Meanwhile, Margai was turning his attention to the APC. He
did not carry through the recommendation of the 1963 census that all
northern districts should have increased representation. Furthermore,
he arrested and imprisoned four APC members of Parliament. During the
months leading to the 1967 General Election, Margai redoubled his
attacks on the APC. He refused to allow the opposition parties to
(!) ibid., pp 239-2(2.
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advertise in the Dail.y Mail, the largest Freetown paper. The APC
responded by increasing the distribution of its own paper, We Yone
Margai aimed to label the AFC as subversive by openly linking it to
the abortive coup alleged to have been planned by Col. Bangura earlier
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that year. Finally, Margai endorsed the harassment of the APC;
the officials in charge of the electi ons were told to do anything
possible to keep the SLPP in power. nonetheless, the mid-sixties
was a record of growing APC support and a weakening of the SLPP from
both within and without.
Meanwhile, the economic conditions were in a decline. The
Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) had lost over be U.5 million
(he » 50p.) and was not able to reimburse the farmers for their harvests.
3
Import goods were scarce and prices rose . The IMF was invited to
propose an austerity budget in 1966, but it caused discontent among
those Sierra Leoneans who were forced to tighten their belts as they
watched the corrupt SLPP officials grow fat.
Therefore, in spite of the plans by the SLPP to rig the March
1967 elections, the APC won the plurality needed to have Siaka Stevens,
their leader, appointed Prime Minister. The following chart shows the
results of both the 1962 and 1967 elections. The most obvious feature
of the election results was the great increase of support for the APC
between the two general elections. Although the Independents may
be considered SLPP-supporters (and thus the APC vitory hardly a land-
(1) Chris Allen, "Sierra neone Politics Since Independence", in
African Affairs. Vol.64, No.269 (October,1966), p.3lU.
(2) Africa Report, Vol.12, No.U (April,1967)»p.36.
(3) Sierra Leone Trade Journal Vol.7,No.3.(July-Sept.1967)p.70.
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slide), it was still an outstanding achievement by the APC in view
of the handicaps it faced during the election.
Percentage of Poll, by Province - 1962 and 1967."*"
SLPP OPPOSITION INDEPENDENTS
West 1962 36 31 28
1967 25 72 3
North 1962 30 37 33
1967 25 72 2
South 1962 1*4 - 55
1967 47 12 4l
East 1962 36 19 33
1967 50 22 28
Total 1962 33 23 42
1967 37 45 18
Looking at the chart, one can see a sharp regional cleavage. The
APC captured nearly three-quarters of the vote in the north and west
including Freetown, while obtaining only a tenth of the vote among
the Mendes in the south. The SLPP, on the other hand, held its pre¬
dominance in the south and east but only gained a quarter of the vote
in the northern and western areas. In terms of seats, the APC was
(1) Allen, p.320.
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more broadly representative of the country, except in Mendeland.
Its 32 representatives consisted of 15 Teinnes, 7 from other north¬
ern tribes, 7 Creoles, 2 Konos, and one Sherbo. The SLPP members
elected included 19 Mendes, 3 from other southern tribes, and only 6
non-southerners. The Independents won six of the other seats in the
south and were closely associated with the SLPF1.
Although the elections took place on March 17th, the results
were not announced until the 21st. Reasons for the delay included
uncertainty over the positions of four independent candidates and the
question as to whether to announce the results before or after the elec¬
tion of the House of Chiefs. After Stevens refused to accept a prop¬
osed coalition government, Governor-General Lightfoot-Boston, acting on
the results of the ordinary election, appointed Siaka Stevens as Prime
Minister. Immediately, Col. Lansana, head of the Sierra Leone army,
arrested the new Prime Minister and declared a state of Martial Law.
The short life of Lansana's junta was marked by open reprisals on APC
. . 2
supporters, including plans to execute seventy opposition leaders. On
March 23rd, Majors Blake, Jumu, and Kai-Samba overthrew Lansana. The
young officers formed the National Reformation Council (NEC) and recalled
Colonel Ambrose Genda to head it. Genda, a Mende from the south, was
soon replaced by Colonel Juxon-Smith so that a tribal balance could be
established within the NRC.^" The Council suspended the Constitution,
banned all political parties, and retained Martial Law. Sierra Leone
(1) Cartwright , p.250.
(2) Allen, p. 32*i.
(3) Africa Report,Vol.12. No.5 (May,1967),p.36.
vas under full military rule.
It is hardly likely that the coups led by both Laasana and
the "Three-Majors" vere motivated by a desire to save the nation.
Lansana was deeply involved in the SLPP and the Majors acted in a
more subtle way to prevent the APC from taking power. Also, inter¬
vention in the name of national interest does not appear to be a con¬
crete reason for either coup. A radio broadcast by Lansana promised
that "as soon as politicians can come together, there will be a con¬
stitutional government for the nation,"'1' But, the politicians were
not co-operatintp they did not meet together in Freetown as Lansana
had ordered. Instead, Lansana's actions were aimed at the total des¬
truction of the APC. Blake, when the second coup took place,
implied along similar lines that tne military had acted only to prevent
the nation's collapse and would soon relinquish its control to tne
politicions:
I want to remind you, my dear people, tnat we are
soldiers, and want to remain soldiers, and politics
is not our mission. We will hand over, back to the
politicians, as soon as the situation becomes favourable.
The HRC will do all in its power to bring about a ^
civilian government in the shortest possible time.
However, even if Blake and his associates were honest in their prom¬
ises in March 19&7, the subsequent record of the NRC demonstrated
that these promises vere soon forgotten.
The prime incentive for the coups appears to be sectional in
nature. Regional self-interest vas pronounced. Approximately 50 per cent
(1) Radio transcripts recorded by Humphrey J. Fisher from
Sierra Leone Radio, March 1967. (no pagination).
(2) ibid.
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of the array in 19&7 were Mende from the south. when the SLPP,
which drew much of its support from the south, lost the election,
Lansana, a Mende, acted to prolong a soutaern-based government and
to keep his close associates in power. The three majors were also
Mende and acted to keep government funds flowing into the south and
not diverted to the north as the APC had threatened. They did
arrest their fellow tribesmen, Lansana ana Margai. However, both
of these men had lost the support ana respect of tne SLPP ana their
removal protected the remaining SLPP hierarchy from reprisals.
Genoa, also a Mende, was first appointed head of the ARC but he was
later removed to produce an impression of tribal impariality in the
HRC. This was hardly the case. The HRC renewed the appointment of
many Mende officials prominent in the previous SLPP regime while
maintaining the exclusion of the Temne and northern tribes partici¬
pation in tne government. Finally, the NRC made no immediate
effort to release the Temne Deputy Commander of the Army, Col.Bangura
or the six other non-Mende officers arrested by Margai for the alleged
coup attempt in early 1967.
There were also elements of individual self-interest in the
second coup. The younger officers felt a great personal animosity
toward their commander, Lansana. They also saw him as a liability
in the Mende-controlled SLPP government because of his close assoc-
( n \ rt -» T _— 00)1
\±.) TU.XCU 9 p • OC.1* •
(2) David Dalby, "The Military Take-over in Sierra Leone",
in The Morid Today(August, 19t>7), p.39o.
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iation with Margai who had lost much support and respect from
the party.1
There was a third coup in Sierra Leone which will he discussed
later. However, this April 1968 coup represents a case of individual
self-interest. The men leading the coup against the HRC were
aroused by the fact that the HRC members were growing rich while the
enlisted men and warrant officers saw no improvement in their own
pay or living ocmditions. These lower ranking soldiers felt that a
civilian government would be more easily blackmailed into granting
them pay increases to avoid another military take-over. The APC had
promised to concede these improvements, and thus, the 1968 coup-makers
acted with a measure of material and individual self-interest.
Sierra Leone, in spite of its economic, social and political
problems, was in March 1967 on the eve of becoming the first West
African State to have a change of regime through legal and constit¬
utional channels. Unfortunately the interests of the military,
which was southern based, coincided with the interests of the losing
political party, which was also southern based. The procedures and
institutions of government were not firmly entrenched in popular
support; the military was able to take control illegally and maintain
its position with little resistance from the population.
(1) Humphrey J.Fisher, "Elections and Coup3 in Sierra Leone,
1967" in Journal of Modern African Studies.Vol.17. No.U. (December 1967),
p. 635.
(2) Africa Report, Vol.13, No.6 (June,1968),p.^0.
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Dahomey
Dahomey is, at best, confusing. We have neither the time nor
the space to unravel the complexities of Dahomean politics; what is
offered here is a short discussion of the three elements - the economy,
the political class, and the labour unions - which are involved in
the overall picture and an examination of the coups. In later chapters,
we will go into a deeper analysis of what has happened in Dahomey
since the first coup in 1963.
The backdrop to Dahomey's troubles is the economy. Economic
stagnation is due in part to an overdependence on palm product exports
which are vulnerable to world market fluctuations. The industrial
sector is confined to a few processing plants and is hampered by high
power costs, a small domestic market, skilled manpower shortages,
and a lack of mineral resources.^" The trade deficit grew from app¬
roximately 2,^00 million CFA francs in i960 to 3,300 million CFA francs
in 1962. The situation is further compounded by increasing unemploy¬
ment. Dahomey, unfortunately, is dependent on French aid for her
very existence and this gives "the Quai d'Orsay a bargaining power
of such magnitude that no political compromise at the local level can
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evade the constraints of what amounts to a clientage relationship".
Politics in Dahomey has been a history of shifting coalitions
(1) U.S.Department of State, Dahomey (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Department of State Publications, 1970), PP.3-U.
(2) Rene Lemarchand. "Dahomey: Coup within a Coup", in Africa
Report (June, 1968), p.J+6.
among three power centres - the north, the southwest, and Porto
Novo in the southeast - headed by three perennial politicians -
Maga, Ahomadegbe and Apithy respectively. The unitary const¬
itutional arrangements deposited by the French did not take into
account these regional divisions. Regionalism, in fact, was magnified
during election times. In order to marshal votes, the candidates
relied on regional loyalty. However, since no one region could
maintain power on a national level by itself, any coalition that
emerged was more a product of compromise than of genuine national con¬
cord. The un-workability of the coalition system became apparent in
the years leading to independence in i960.
The political history of ... Dahomey is, in effect,
the permanent conflict between a foreign system and
a local structure, the recurring attempt to animate
the Bahomean societies within an accidental legal
framework.!
After the Territorial Assembly Elections in April 1959» Maga
became Dahomey's first Prime Minister. His victory was largely a
result of the skill with which he exploited his southern rivals.
Ahomadegbe and Apithy were split over differences arising from an
alleged election fraud in Mono constituency. No one party wan able to
secure a majority and the Ahomadegbe and Apithy feud precluded a south¬
ern coalition. Thus, Maga's Rassemblement Democratique Dahomeen
(HDD) entered a coalition with Ahomadegbe*s Union Democratique
Dahomeen (UDD). As the RDD held a slight majority over the UDD,
(l) DovRonen, "Preliminary Notes on the Concepts of Regionalism
in Dahomey", in Etudes Dahom6ens. No.12, Tome 1 (April,1968),p.12.
Maga claimed the office of Prime Minister. The RDD-UDD coalition
vas short-lived. Conflict arose over which party would lead the
state into Houphouet-Boigny's Conseil de 1*Entente, an economic
grouping of Upper Volta, the Ivory Coast and Niger. Maga and the
HDD had taken steps to join this extension of the interterritorial
RDA party alliance, hut since Ahomadegbe's UDD was affiliated to the
RDA, he felt that the UDD should take the initiative for entrance.
Maga refused Ahomadegbe's preference and turned to Apithy's party,
the Parti Republicain du Dahomey (PRD), for support. Therefore, in
the November i960 election, Maga became the first President of Dahomey
in a RDD-PRD coalition government. The UDD and Ahomadegbe were now
the opposition.
Maga's downfall lay in his tactics to secure a hold on national
politics. In November i960, the UDD and PRD joined to form the
Parti Dahomeen 1*Unite (PDU) and established single-party rule, albeit
only on paper. By April 1961, Maga had dissolved and banned the
UDD in accordance with a security bill which gave the government wide
powers in dealing with security threats (i.e. opposition parties)1.
The following month, Maga charged Ahomadegbe and ten other leaders
of the old UDD with conspiracy to assassinate the President. Although
they were sentenced to only five years for this fairly serious (if
implausible) charge, the UDD supporters in the southwest were
growing uneasy over the treatment of their political elite. The
(l) Ken Post, The New States of West Africa; Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968), p.8U.
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restlessness spread to Gotonou and Porto Novo when Theodore
Hessou, the ex-deputy mayor of Cotonou and a close associate of
Ahomadegbe, was imprisoned. Furthermore, the grievances of the south
were augmented when Maga placed northerners in all key posts during
a cabinet reshuffle in August 1963,
By now, the^opposition to Maga was joined by the trade unions
which were made up/of civil servants, teacherst public service workers,
and other white-collar workers. As Lemarchand notes:
Although organized labour comprises a small fraction
of the total wage-earning population of this primarily
agricultural country, is weakly organized, and is
chronically wracked by intra-mural rivalries, it has
nonetheless been the decisive factor behind every
governmental crisis since independence.^
The unions in Dahomey are among the most developed in West Africa
partly because of early educational advantages and their early invol¬
vement in nationalist movemehts. Their importance is also geo¬
graphical. Centred on Cotonou, the commercial, technological,
industrial and educational capital of Dahomey, the unions play a
seminal role in national affairs. Any Danomean politician needs the
support of Cotonou and thus, the unions, if he is to control Dahomey.
Danomey has long exported civil servants to other French
African territories. After these states became independent, there
was massive repatriation of the administrative cadres. Their ranks
have been further swollen by the expulsion of Dahomeans from Niger
in 196^ over the Nette Island dispute and from the Ivory Coast after
(l) Lemarchand, p.H6.
anti-Dahomean riots there in 1962. Many of these returning
citizens belong to the public service unions which have tended to
be the most militant. These civil servants were not only frus¬
trated by what little Dahomey had to offer, but were also more
experienced and cosmopolitan in outlook and expectations.1 The
unions needed the smallest grievance to set them off and Maga supp¬
lied many such grievances although he amalgamated the unions in 1963
to form the Union Generale de Travailleura Dahomeens (UGTD), he nad
little control over them. The unions resented Maga's personal
extravagances (e.g. a §3m. palace), his excessive foreign travel,
and the general level of government corruption, particularly in view
of the chronic budget deficit. The 10 per cent tax on civil service
salaries was a constant complaint. This led to the bitter reaction
to Maga's enlarging the cabinet in the August 1963 reshuffle. The
UGTD adapted the following resolution:
The latest cabinet reshuffle cannot in any way .justify
the austerity measures imposed upon us by the government.
The money spent on these new ministries should ue turned
over to us as a token of gratitude for ail the sacrifices
to which we have thus far consented.2
The uneasiness of the south and the embittered mood of the
trade unions combined to create the pre-coup situation. The final
straw was the Bohiki affair. Bohiki, a deputy from Sokete in the north,
(1) Kay Whiteaan, "The Military Regimes of Togo and Dahomey"
seminar paper presented at London University, Institute of Common¬
wealth Studies (November, 25, 1970), quoted with author's permission.
(2) Lemarchand, p.^9.
was accused of murdering a Gon from Porto Novo. When the National
Assembly released Bohiki and gave him legislative immunity, the move
was interpreted as an indication of regional discrimination. Riots
broke out in Porto Novo against the National Assembly. First,
Maga released Ahomadegbe in hopes that it would pacify the urban
masses and then sent in the army. By this time the unions had
organized anti-Maga demonstrations. When Maga arrested a few union¬
ist leaders, they called for a general strike. In a last ditch effort
Maga offered to bring Ahomadegbe into the government and to recall
Apithy from Paris where he had been sent as ambassador, but the
unions went to the army for support. On the night of October 26th
a march organized by the unions went to the army camp, chanting for
Col. Soglo, head of the army, to step in. The following day there
were demonstrations in Cotonou again demanding the army to take
power. Finally on October 28th, Soglo, appropriately in front of
the Bourse de Travail announced that he had dismissed the National
Assembly. Later on in the day, he established a provisional govern¬
ment with Apithy, Abomadegbe and Maga as his Ministers.
One motivation for the 1963 coup appears to be Soglo's fear
that the nation was falling apart. The army felt it was perform¬
ing its duty by protecting the interests of national security. The
prospect of bloodshed, especially after Maga's supporters armed with
bows and arrows were brought in from the north on lorries, was what
prompted Soglo to move. He was, at least up to 19o3, a non-political
officer who had climbed his way up the ranks. Another motive would be
intervention on behalf of a specific sector of the population, the
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Grade unions. It was, according to observers, Major Alphonse Alley, a close
associate of Soglo, who persuaded Soglo to intervene. Alley,from
the central regions, was in sympathy with the southerners' plight.
This could be a result of his "de-tribalized" outlook as he had
travelled throughout We3t Africa and had been through officer train¬
ing courses with the French army. Alley was popular with the
southern urbanites and it wa3 probably his persuasion that led the
array to align with the trade unions."'" In this way, tne army acted
as a protective agent for middle-class sectional interests.
There was also an element of army discontent with the Maga
regime; this may have provided monives of corporate self-interest.
Maga's former Defense Minister, Arouna Mama, demonstrated hi3 pre¬
ference for the gendarmerie which had created animosity within the
2
army ranks. By ensuring the downfall of Maga, the army would
be in an advantageous bargaining position for its share of privil¬
eges.
Overall, the Dahomey army prior to 1963 was uninvolved in
political affairs, however, once the army had taken a political
initiative, the relationship between the civilian and military auth¬
orities was never quite the same. Nonetheless, the actions of the
military leaders point out that the army had no intentions of remain¬
ing in power after the 19o3 coup. Soglo naively had hoped for a rec¬
onciliation among the Big Three, but when a plot to restore Maga va3
(1) Whiteiaan, p.9. Quoted with author's permission
(2) ibid.. p.10. Quoted with autnor's permission.
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discovered in November, Soglo arrested Maga. Soglo, who did not
yet have the heart of a politician, pushed through the January
196H elections. Ahomadegbe was elected Prime Minister and Apithy,
President.
The dual, executive did not last long in view of the personal
dislike and distrust between the two men and the chronic economic
crisis. The bicephalous government existed as long as it had the
support of the army. In March 196^, the army, under Alley's comm¬
and, was sent in to quell the riots in Parakou, home of Maga, which
had broken out over the no. themers' unease of being excluded from
the government. Chabi Mama, the PDU General Secretary, was held
responsible for the violence between the northerners and the
southerners living there, he was arrested and imprisoned. More¬
over, Major tiacheme, a Fon from Abomey, was appointed military
governor in Parakou. His brutal measures for controlling the
inhabitants there only compounded the problem. x
Meanwhile in the south, tne trade unions were still dis¬
gruntled. They accused the government of doing little to ease
the economic problems, then went on strike to oppose austerity meas¬
ures which included a 25 per cent tax on civil service salaries.
The breaking point came when Ahomadegbe and Apithy turned on
each other over rival claims as to which of the two should appoint
the Supreme Court President. This culminated in an attempted
civilian coup xu I.ovomber 1935. The Partx Ddmocratxous Dahomccn
(l) Lemarchand, p.50
West Africa (December kt 1965),p.1386.
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(PDD)t which had by now replaced the PDU as the only legal political
organization, censured Apithy and appointed Ahomadegbe as head of
state and government. ^ lucre was a pro-Apithy demonstration on
November 29th in forto Novo and the army once again stepped in and
took power.
After 1963, the amy had lost its political innocence. First,
there were elements of individual interests in that Soglo was wary
of the close association between Col. Aho, his old rival, and
Ahoaadegbe. Soglo was afraid that if Ahomadegbe was successful in
his power-bid, Aho would take his place as head of the armed forces.
As a result Boglo supported those officers who were in sympathy with
the Porto Novo demonstrations and unions. In this respect, Soglo's
actions again benefitted the middle-class union members by uphold¬
ing their interests.
Boglo dismissed Ahomadegbe and Apithy and installed a moder¬
ate northerner Tahirov Congacou, a former president of the
National Assembly, as head of a provisional government. Congacou
was unable to establish a working coalition for the government and
on December 22, 19&5, Boglo took over complete political powers for
the first time. He dismissed the National Assembly, abolished the
FDD, suspended the constitution, and declared himself head of
state.^
(1) West Africa.(December U, 19o5), p.13o6.
(2) Whiteman, p.11. »„uoted with author's permission
(3) Robert Cornevin, "Dahomey", in Annee Africaine 1965. p.2l6.
The impetus driving the military further and further into
the political arena in 1965 was a culmination of the motives behind
the previous coups. First, Sogio believed that the army alone
could prevent the nation from disintegrating into rival camps.
Soglo claimed the army's mission was to establish "a new style of
politics under which men will unite around a programme, not around
a group of personalities".1 He later recalled;
... the army did not plot to overthrow the
previous regime. It was virtually forced to take over
responsibility when the constitutional crisis, due to
dispute between Apithy and Ahomadegbe, had reached its
climax and resulted in a real absence of government.2
Remember, however, that the Ahomadegbe-Apithy conflict was merely a
symptom of the political, social and economic malaise in Dahomey,
It was the la3t straw which opened the crisis with the trade unions.
V/e propose that instead of the army acting to prevent the collapse
of the state under such political, economic, and social problems,
it was just these problems which created a politicized army. The
competition between the three regions spilt over into competition
for friends within the army. The trade unions appeared to win the
army's support and thus, the army acted to promote the interests of
one section of the population. When Soglo took power in December
who had
22nd, the men (e.g. Alley)/bached the trade unions and Apithy were
3
in prominence.
(1) West Africa (January 1, 1966) p.3.
(2) West Africa (November 25, 196T)» p.1526
(3) Whiteman, p.11.
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Another motive for the December coup was based in the change
of attitude among the military men. Since the 1963 coup, the army
had benefitted from its privileged position. There were promotions,
pay increases, and other perks (e.g. twenty officers were allowed
to import cars tax and duty-free).1 The army was accustomed
to being involved in governmental decision-making and it wanted to
maintain this position. Corporate self-interest was a motive of
growing relevance.
boglo's regime was marked by internal dissent and socio¬
economic problems. The make-shift legislature and advisory body,
the Coaiite Renovation Rationale (CM) was never assigned any specific
functions and proved incapable of dealing with the problems at hand.
Soglo, in an effort to balance regional representation, gave the
Finance portfolio to Bertin Borno, a northerner and once Maga's
minister of finance. Aho, a proud descendant of Glele, the king
of Dahomey, and renowned for his favouritism of the south, was re¬
placed as Defence Minister by Soglo. However, Soglo's efforts to
2
appease one region only alienated the others.
Soglo was confronted by a growing restlessness among the
middle and junior grade officers. They were displeased over the
corruption, inefficiency, clannisnness of Soglo's regime. In April
1967, the Comite Hilitaire de Vigilance (CMV) lead by Benoit
Sinzogan replaced the CM. The CMV consisted of fifteen middle
(1) Whiteman, p.11.
(2) Robert Cornevin, "Dahomey" in Annee Africaine 1967.PP 19^-207.
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and junior Grade officers and non-commissioned officers. But,
the CMV was divided against itself. The most notable faction
was the Croupe d'Abomey represented by Sinzogan, Benoit Adandegin
and Each&ae, all Fon vho Bided wita Col. Aho in his dislike for
Soglo.* To offset the influence of the Group d'Aboiaey. Kouandete,
a northerner and vice-president of the CMV, pressured Soglo into
giving him the posts of Army Chief of Staff and Alley's Chef du
cabinet. By this time, the CMV was collapsing under the weight of
regional and personal antagonisms.
Neither was the military able to deal effectively with the
chaotic economic scene. When Soglo returned from an aid-seeking
mission to Paris in 1967, he announced that the Dahomeoaa would just
have to tighten their belts. This infuriated the unions who were
still unhappy about the 29 per cent tax on salaries. Although the
tax had never been lifted, it had seemingly little effect on deter¬
iorating economic conditions. The result was a strike by school
teachers for salary claims; it 3pread to otner unions after
Soglo banned all trade union activity. Faced by a general snut down
by workers, Soglo backed down and sent in Alley to negotiate with
the unions. Soglo, however, underestimated the reaction of the
northern officers to the appeasement of southern labour unions. On
Major Maurice Captain Mathieu
December 17, 1967,/Mouand&te and/Kerekou, both northerners, took over
Cotonou, dissolved the already defunct CMV, and established a twelve-
member Coaiite Revolutiortairc- Militaire (CRM) under Kstuandete's leader*




repercussions of his actions. The French government suspended
budgetary aid and de Gaulle was incensed that middle grade officers
would overturn a man he had fSted in Paris only a month previously.
Meanwhile, the unions maintained their demands for the abolition
1 , '
of the 25 per cent tax. Kouandete found himself in a corner.
Thus on December 21st, it va3 announced that Alley would be
head of state, end Kouandete the Prime Minister. Alley was placed
in the top position mainly for his popularity outside military
circles. He was also a Basila from the central regions which gave
him the added advantage of not being identified with any one of the
i
major power centres. He was also 38 by this time and neither a
2
member of the old military set nor the 'young Turks'.
The motivations benind the 1967 coup are mixed. By this
stage, there could be no justification in the name of the national
interest. The problems of Dahomey were too deep rooted for the army
or a section of the army to assume it could clear them up. In fact,
Kouandete's intervention cost Dahomey its vital French aid.
Regionalism, of course, did play a part in the background to
the coup. The northern officers did resent the soft treatment given
the southern trade unions, burprisingly enough, the junta itself
was the least partisan of all. Althougn the coup was led by northern¬
ers, the majority of the CRM members were soutnern officers. This
... 3
demonstrates now difficult it- is to pigeon-hole politics in Datiomey.
(1) West Africa (December 23,19o7)» p.1637 and West africa
{January 6, 1968), pp15-16.
(2) Vest Africa (December 30,1967)»p.1673.
(3) Wniteman, p.13. quoted with author's permission.
This also reflects this composition of the officer corps. Of the
ninety officers, -five are southerners.
The basic motives appear to be individual and corporate aelf-
interest. The younger officers were unhappy with Goglo's regime;
they felt he did not approach rule seriously enough. This was in
part due to the split between the younger officers who had trained
at St.Cyr and considered themselves "intellectuals" and the older
generation who had come up througn the ranks. The jeunes cadres
personally resented Goglo - his corruption, his aeposism, and his
domineering Trench wife.'*' There were also a series of personal
feuda. Aho, wno had disliaed Goglo all along, used the Groupe
a'Ahomey uo neutralize tne CtfV* Si&BOgaa and houandete were in
• • / / ^ / 2
conflict; Soglo was against kouandete and kouandete against Alley.
The younger officers realized that the army was becoming more
and more divided within and attacked from without. Another justi¬
fication for the coup was to prevent this situation from growing.
Alley stated that the army was
compelled to intervene to ensure that the recent strikes
caused by the shirking of responsibility by the existing
authorities did not degenerate into labour disturbances
capable of compromising and even destroying the prestige
of the Dahomean army ...3
However, for all their promises that the army would withdraw early
to prevent further disintegration in the ranks, the young officers
1{
quickly filled all government posts. It was soon obvious that
(1) Whiteman, p.13. Quotea with author's permission.
(2) Afriqus Goatcmporaine {January-February,1968), p.19
(3) Jest Africa (July, 2b, 19by) p.15-16.




Kouandete was a political soldier and it wa3 Alley who finally led
the army hack to their barracks in 1968. We will not presently dis¬
cuss the CRM regime or the handing over of power to a civilian regime
under Zinsou. This will be deferred to a later chapter. It is suff¬
icient to note that it was done in a Byzantine fashion;nor was it the
end of military involvement in politics.
Kouandete replaced Alley as army Chief of Staff in the Sinsou
regime. Alley was infuriated and allegedly planned to eliminate
Kouandete once and for all. In the summer of 19o9» Alley was arrested
and charged with plotting no kidnap and murder Kouandete. However,
instead of sentencing /-Hey for attempted murder, a court sentenced
him for five years imprisonment for conspiracy.^" Alley's trial
marked the end of Kouandete's and Zinsou*s association. Kouandete
was disturbed over the Alley affair and further frightened by other
attacks on his life. These attacks may have been instigated by
♦ • ✓ / • .
political opponents purposely to split kouandate and Zinsou; whatever
the source of the assassination attempts, Kouandete suspected Zinsou.
Kouandete and Zinsou began marshalling loyal forces. Kouandete
acted first and on December 8, 1969, he overthrew Zinsou. But, once
again, Kouandete found himself in trouble. A majority of the officers
aid not want him as head of the government. After a three-day dis¬
cussion, a new directorate emerged headed by a reasonably apolitical
officer, Lt. Col. he bousa. The other two members were binzogan as
s ✓ 2
head oT one • ~ciidax^~cx*iL.e arid ivoviaiiaece wuii u n •
(1) Bess Africa (July 26, 1969), p.876 and West Africa (October
11, 1969) p. 1226. ""
(2) West Africa (December 20, 1969), p.1535.
The motive for this final coup was the self-interest of
Kouandete. The army was deeply divided; Kouandete was merely head
of one faction. He was apparently striking the first blow before
eitner Zinsou or other army cliques could do the same.
As we stated at the outset, Dahomean politics is confusing,
complicated, and eventful. Tnere seems to be three general trends.
First, the economic problems were chronic. Whenever the government
implemented austerity measures to ease the problem, the trade unions
contested the issue and refused to cooperate. The unions strife was
responsible for many of the government collapses. Secondly, the
political institutions were weak and ineffective. There were no
means of channelling popular support and participation on a national
level; instead the three major power centres vied for the control of
the state and for their share (if not all) of the benefits. Thirdly,
the army which began its political career as an arbitrator of the
middle-class unions' interests in 196 3 eventually became a political
force of its own. The army or cliques within the army promoted
their interests much in the same way, but more effectively, as the
other political groups in Dahomey. In doing so, the army reflected
the already existing cleavages of Dahomean society.
6t.
Upper v'olua
Upper Volta is a poor, landlocked, arid, and overpopuiated
country* Of all the countries we nave discussed, Upper Volta
das the least promising future compounded by two major problems:
a barely struggling economy and a aociai setting still vary much
controlled by traditional values and beliefs.
The annual per capita income is $$$ which males Upper Volta
one of tne poorest states of Africa. More than 90 par cent of the
population is engaged in subsistence agriculture; cattle on the hoof
is the largest export, both farming of foodstuffs and cattle raising
are hampered by periodic drougnts and soil erosion. The greatest
money earner is the seasonal migratory worker, one of 450,000 who
bring hone earnings from tue Ivory Coast and unana coffee and
cocoa narvests.1 There is, nonetheless, an important trade union
movement in Upper Volta. These unions, largely made up of civil
servants and other white-collar workers, nave a disproportionate
voice in tne government'a economic policies because of tneir salaried
2
members and location in the capital Ouagadougou, They have proved
to be a source of support vital to any political leaner.
Nearly half of tne population of over four million is .-ioasi
who inhabit the central part of the state. The iiosai mings date
(1) U.S.Department of State. Ut> -er Valta (.«auhington,D.C. t
U.S.Department of ctate Publications. 1970)•?»3«
(2) dee bean Moynaud and Anfese Salah-ney, Trade Unionism in
Africa (London: ..etnuea and Co., ntd: 1967), Chapter II.
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back to the early eleventh century and the eaperor, the Moro Haba
still holds court in Ouagadougou. Although the power of the Moro
Haba vas officially curtailed, he regains a powerful political and
spiritual force aa leader of the largest ethnic group.^ The other
laajor ethnic group is the hobo who live in the western part of the
country around Bobo Diouiasso. They have been the traditional
rivals of the Mossi.*-
Against such an economic and social background Upper Volte's
political history has been passive. Maurice Ya&eogo was elected
the first President in 1952. his party, a local branch of the
RDA was first called Parti Deaocratique Unifi^ (PDU) and later the
Union Democratique Voltaique (UDV). It won 6k of the 75 legislative
seats in the 1959 election. The only organised opposition vas
centred, in the Parti rationale Voltaique (pjiV) neaded by Bazi Boni.
Although the PKV von only 11 seats in 1959, laaeogo outlawed the
party and exiled M&zi boni. Shortly after independence in I960, the
PHY was replaced by the Parti Hepublicaine de la Liberte (PRL), but
3
this party was also banned by lameogo. All official opposition
was driven underground.
Once Yameogo ascended, to political power with independence, he
instigated a long feud with the two soat influential groups in
Upper Volta: the trade unions and the tribal chiefs. 'Phis was
(1) See klliot bkinner. The Hoaai of Upper Volt-ft (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 190^).
(2) K.J.harrison Church, Uavironaent and Politics in nest
Africa (Princeton, H.J.i X>. van Hostrand Coapaay Inc., 1967), p.35.
(3) Guy de Lusignau, French-speaking Africa since Independence
(London: Pall hall Press, 1969), pp.lU8-l*»9.
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interesting in that Yameogo himself had been a union leader and he
owed much to the Moro Baba who had supported the UDV in 1959. The
trade unions came under attach, particularly the Christian trade
union led by Joseph Ouedraogo. In 1962, all symbols of traditional
rank were forbidden and Yauneogo stopped appointing chiefs to traditional
posts on the death of the incumbent.1 But, Yameogo underestimated
the power of the unions and the chiefs. Having lost their support,
he was in a difficult position by 1965 and he prompted, his own down¬
fall by committing a series of tactical errors.
Kis first mistake was his hfuadling of the 1965 elections. By
scheduling the Presidential election in October prior to the November
legislative elections, Yameogo, as the President was able to put up
a list of "yes-men" as candidates for the legislature. This offended
almost everyonei those who had hoped Yameogo would make a fresh start
and those prospective candidates whose names were left off the list.
The legislative elections were boycotted on November ?th as were the
municipal elections on December 5th.
Yameogo's personal life was also a subject of concern in
2
traditional Upper Volta. He divorced his first wife and sent her
back to her village in disgrace. In the meantime, he married the
23-year old Miss Ivory Coast and took her to Brazil for the honeymoon.
The ill-treatment of his first wife lost Yameogo a great deal of
respect among the traditional people; the divorce itself scandalized
(1) Post, p.105
(2) "Haute Volta" in Annee Africaine 1965.PP.273-279.
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the influential Catholic hierarchy in Ouagadougou; the trip to Brazil
infuriated those who were already unhappy about Yameogo's personal
extravagance in light of the deteriorating economic situation.
Yameogo was beginning to govern capriciously. The numerous
cabinet reshuffles created a group of discontented ex-Ministers,
He was charged with nepotism after he appointed hi3 two cousins
Edouard and Denis Yameogo to cabinet posts. His personal extrava¬
gance (e.g. a Mercedes 600 and a country villa) disaffected many of
his former followers. His intemperate attacks on Joseph Ouedraogo,
former mayor of Ouagadougou and head of the trade union movement,
irritated many of the unionists. The unions by now had formed the
Joint Action Committee (J.A.C.) as a common front in opposing tne
government.
Having lost the active support and even the passive assent of
the politically relevant strata in Upper Volta, Yameogo committed his
fatal error when presenting his last budget on December 30, 1966.
The proposed budget provided for a 20 |>er cent reduction in civil
service salaries, a freeze on civil service promotions, and a red¬
uction of civil service family allowances. The J.A.C., under
Joseph Ouedraogo's leadership, immediately called for demonstrations
and a general strike to protest against the budget. Yameogo unwisely
counter-attacked by labelling Quedraogo a3 Communist agent; this
further infuriated the union members.^ The government then declared
(l) George Malecot "haute Volta" in Annee Africaine 1966.
PP. 3^9-358.
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a nation-wide State of hmergency and outlawed tne strike. but,
on January 1st, tiiere were clashes "between tne police and strikers
as the unions pushed forward with their demands that the budget
be repealed. The demonstrators moved to array headquarters and called
for Lt. Col. hangoute Lamizana, head of the army to take power. On
January 3rd, Lsmizana announced that he had taken over "to safeguard
republican and democratic institutions and avoid all bloodshed"."*"
Faced with an uncontrollable situation, Yameogo declared that he was
the "first to rejoice" and would be willing to serve under Lamizaua.
However, on the following day, the army suspended the constitution,
disbanded the National Assembly, revoked the 20 per cent salary cut
in oraer to get the civil servants back to work, and, finally, arrested
2 . .
Yamaogo. Upper Volta was under military rule.
It i3 difficult, with the limited amount of information avail¬
able, to analyse in any depth the motivation benina the coup in
Upper Volta. First, it appears, on the surface, that the coup
was a move to prevent the possibility of bloodshed and open conflict
over Yameogo's budget proposals. The reason for Lamizan&'s action
seems to be his abhorrence of firing on a crowd to safeguard an
unpopular President who seexaed willing to step down: Lamizana wa3
the least political of the military leaders we have discussed, but it
would have been most difficult for him to deny a crowd calling him
3
to power. Secondly, Laiaizana's action benefitted the trade
(1) west Africa (January 8, 1966), p.31.
(2) West Africa (January 5, 1966), p.T0«
(3) West Africa (January 8, 1966), p.31.
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unions. There were similar vested interests in both the privileged
civil service and the privileged, traditionally respected army.
could be said to be
Therefore, the coup / in part/motivated by sectional interests in
siding with the union members.
In all, Upper Volta's economic and political situation had
reached an impasse. The military was able to intervene against the
current regime with the active support of the middle-class unions
and with little resistance from the rest of the population.
*»«***»*
In our brief discussion of the economic, social and political
background of these states, we are aware of basic similarities run¬
ning throughout each state. All -were in poor economic condition
caused both by internal mismanagement and external forces such as
world market prices. The austerity measures proposed to alleviate
the financial problems were either ignored, instigated at the last
minute, or created tremendous opposition from trade union members
and others directly affected. The military governments found them¬
selves faced with these economic problems and were forced to imple¬
ment tighter austerity measures to arrest the downhill trend of
their states' economy. The economic miasma also emphasized the
regional splits within the countries as each area sought it's share
of development benefits. -Aie ccnorxxugt&x. xox-ctso ox regronnxxsm
were pernaps most obvious in Dahomey and Sierra Leone, but were also
apparent in Ghana among the Eve and Ashanti and in Upper Volta
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between the -tosei and Ifobo. Since the goveramontal institutions
of these states were highly centralised, popular demands and
pressures were exerted on the central authority. nut, tne
governmental institutions were weak, corrupt and unable to meet the
demands. Ihere were discernible moves to ae&l with opposition first
by constitutional aean3 mid eventually by coercive measures. Ghana,
Upper Volta and Dahomey (although, only on the surface) were cade
into one-party regimes; Sierra Leone under Albert M&rgai, had made
moves in this direction. Coercive measures included exile or
detention of opposition leaders, using the army to <guell riots and
demonstrations, establishment of security networks to monitor the
actions of those with jgueationable loyalty, etc.
fiie major differences between the ex-Frenca and ex-Lritiah
states was the prominence in the foraar of trade unions as an organ¬
isation whose members shared similar vested interesta. iueir polit¬
ical activity was largely a result of the French practice in allow¬
ing civil servants to form labour organisations, particularly in the
late 1930'a and after World War II. Nonetheless, there were strong
middle-class interests in all states, such as tne Creole in
Freetown and the large cocoa farmers in Askanti.
a
Over all, the picture relates broadly to a model of/develop¬
ing countrywhose weak political institutions are unable to support
the loads or meet the demands of a politically mobilised stratum in
the society anu whose government has tc rely increasingly on co¬
ercive measures to rule.
The final precipitants of the coups vere mixed. Ferhaps the
armies of Dahomey and Upper Volta vere the least politicized before
their first excursion into politics, but almost every coup was motiv¬
ated by various sectional interests. In Sierra Leone, the army
acted first on behalf of the Mende - dominated SLPFj in Upper Volta
and Dahomey, the armies' actions coincided with the vishes of middle-
class privileged labour unions. In Ghana, Dahomey and Sierra Leone,
the armies acted in part to protect their own interests. Finally,
in each coup, there vere elements of personal rivalry and aniciosity.
Tvo important points must be borne in mind. First, whatever
the background conditions and final precipitants of the coup, military
intervention does not 3olve the problems. It is simply a change in
regime and a mechanism of extra-constitutional change. Once the army
takes political powers, it faces the same problems which confronted
the ousted leaders. Secondly, once the army moves into overt
political control, there are internal changes in its professional
1
standards, cohesion, and organizational structure. Moreover, its
contacts with external groups and the precepts on which the tradit¬
ional civil-military relationship was built are forever altered.
The army becomes a political machine itself and this has long term
implications for the army and for the society in which it exists.
(l) We shall discuss the internal characteristics and





A primary characteristic of an army is its control of the
i
instruments of violence. While tae legal right to viae force, real
or threatened, is claimed by the political sponsor (i.e. the govern¬
ment) and the effectiveness and consequences of violence vary accord¬
ing to the political and social circumstances in vhich it is
deployed, it is the army that possesses both weapons end experience
in the management of violence.
The control over the instruments of violence is based on
the technological make-up of the army. Andreski proposes tnat it is
in part the technological basis of the armed forces that determines
its relationship with the society. he writes:
The degree of superiority of the armed forces over
the unarmed populance depends in the first place on
the quality of armament: the machine gun confers
upon its possessor a much greater superiority over
an unarmed crowd than a sword.^
Two points are raised to question the si^paificance of tne military's
technical superiority in the management of violence. First, this
(1) Morris Janovits, The Military in the Political development
of dew Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 196U), p.31.
(2) Stanislav Andreski, Military Urbanisation and Uociety
(London: Routledge and Kegan i'aul, 1'>5U), p.35.
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superiority of the armies under examination here was being
challenged both by the introduction of better equipped paramilitary
organizations as in Guana and to some extent by the antiquated and
inadequate ailitary equipment dumped on these states by Western
donors. Secondly, in Africa, it took very little, a few men and a
jeep in some instances, to overthrow aoat governments, However,
It]he fact that armies in new nations have exercised
much of their political influence without combat
or extensive bloodshed should not obscure the
significance of force as the basis from which they
exercise their political pover.1
It is more than the sheer 'use of force. It is more
importantly the organisational format designed to carry out military
objectives and the experience in the management of violence that
augment a the military's capability for political intervention. I'kua,
the control and speciftlized use of violence are key factors
facilitating military intervention into the political process.
Nevertheless, "while it is relatively easy for tue military
N 2
to seize power, it has no contract to governj it is illegal .
Once in pover, the military junta soon realizes that rule by force
alone is not enough. As uaanali Arendt put it: "Ho government
3
exclusively based on toe aeons of violence has ever existed .
(1)Jaaowitz, pp.31-32
(2) ibid., p.l.
(3) Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: The Penguin Press,
1969),p.50.
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Instead the junta must obtain recognition as the lawful and the
rightful government if it is to maintain control and efficacy.
The military, as a civilian government, must be recognised as having
the moral right to demand obedience from the populace and the
populace, or at least the politically mobilised sector of the
populace, aunt recognise a moral duty to obey the commands of the
government. ^
There are two practical reasons for this. First, rule
by force alone invites challenge from any contender who feels he
ha3 the necessary strength. Rousseau wrote:
If force creates right, the effect changes with
the cause. Every force that is greater than the
first succeeds to its right. As soon as it is
possible to disobey with impunity disobedience
is legitimate: as the strongest being always in
the right, the only tning that matters is to act
so as to become the strongest. 2
hence, there is the phenomenon of successive coups as in Dahomey.
In order for tne military government to safeguard its position
against other claimants for power, it must base its rule on more
than the successful seiaure of £>over. The junta must seek to
exercise the right to govern.
Secondly, rule by force alone is not an efficient or
3economical means of securing the obedience of the population.
(1) S.h.Finer, The Man on horseback (London:Fall Hall
Press, 1962)p.20.
(2) J.J.Rousseau, The Social Contract. Book I,Chapter 3.
Quoted in Finer, pp.17-18.
(3) Finer, p.19.
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Coercive pover may be effective when dealing wita specific or minor
challenges to its position, but it has ineffective ana unpredictable
results in the long-term. Moreover, the military would expend its
resources on threats and physical violence instead of on the task of
governing a developing country. Here again the military junta must
seek the voluntary compliance of the politically active sector of the
population. That is, the military must develop a base of support
outside the military organization.
However, the very nature of the military impedes its ability
to secure a base of support among the civilian population. In relation
to the political class, there is a distinction between military
management and political leadership skills. As civilian leaders may
specialize in verbal skills, bargaining, negotiation, compromise and
mass appeals, the military operates within an organizational envir¬
onment with limited contact with clients outside the military apparatus
or with the pdlitical elite.1 Furthermore, the military lacks any
clear-cut ideology other than a vague conservatism. Although they
may continuously pronounce against corruption, decadence and public




attempt3 to articulate the values, opinions and beliefs of the
society and thus, cannot supply viable leadership to a broad
political base. Sot only does the military shrink from the role
of political organizer, it also regards such activity with a deep
mistrust. It tnen would appear taut there is a decreasing transfer¬
ability of the military officer*s skills to domestic political
activity. 1 But, until the military can count on the probability
of support from the civilian population and supply political leader¬
ship to the civilian population, it will form neither a stable nor
effective government.
Before proceeding to & discussion of the methods employed
by the military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey and Upper
Volta to legitimize their seizure of political power, it is
necessary first to examine briefly the general attitudes of the
people to the coups. In Ghana there was not only little resistance
to the military take-over but also reported outbreaks of open
rejoicing. Whether or not the Ghanaian people are willing to
accept any form of government due to an innate deference to those
possessing power is a point open to debate, but, for whatever reasons,
the HLC was not immediately confronted by dissent and their rule
was generally accepted by a majority of the people at the out-set.
(i) ibid., p.hP
dO
However, Gooay has noted that "the effect of relaxing the general
preas lire toward enforced consensus {as under Ukruaah] ... can be
seen ... in restlessness to discipline of any kind". 1 In Sierra
Leone, dissent was open. dot only did the BLPP grow disgruntled
when the IfRC did not seem inclined to return Margai to power, but the
APC also felt cheated of an election they had rightfully von. This
was a serious problem fear the HKC in its efforts to create a
substantial base of support.
During the earlier coups in D&hoaey, the military had tne
support of the politically mobilized trade unions who had originally
called for the military to step in. losever, the military rulers
proved no more effective in uniting the country behind their leader¬
ship than had been the civilian rulers. Finally, the military itself
split along the tri-partite divisioa of the country and faced opposit¬
ion from all quarters. In Upper Volta, the mobilized population
(particularly the urban trade union members) called for the military
to take over and the army was considered a popular alternative to
Xameogo.
She military regimes enjoyed a brief honeymoon before serious
opposition formed. With this in mind, let us now turn to a discussion
of the methods employed by the military in order to consolidate their
(l) Jack Goody, "Consensus and Dissension in Ghana",
Political Science quarterly. Vol LXXXIII, ho.3 ( September ,1968),p. 3*»5.
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position. Not every regixae followed the saiae format, but ve
will discuss their efforts under the headings of constitutional
aspects, traditional means, commissions of inquiry, non-political
appeared, coercion to discourage and quell it.
institutions, and when opposition/ The first two, constitutional
aspects and traditional means, were attempts to drape their seizure
of power with either legalistic or traditional respectability.
Commissions of inquiry were used to discredit the former regime there¬
by granting the military government acceptance in the public eye in
that it perhaps would offer a better promise of security, welfare,
and law. These commissions also were useful in involving the people
in politics through their evidence and participation. This function
was also to be that of the non-political institutions. By
creating an organization which was deemed to be non-partisan, the
military junta attempted to draw the population into civic activity
meanwhile directing their approach to politics along the lines the
military felt suitable. These organizations often served to promote
those civilian political leaders to which the military was later to
relinquish power (e.g. Busia and the Centre for Civic Education).
However, in spite of the efforts of the juntas to legitimize their
position of power and to create a base of support among the politically
relevant strata of the society, it frequently relied on coercion to
suppress the growing opposition. The military, from the out-set,
relied on the standard forms of suppression including curtailment of
the freedom of speech and the press, arrest and detention, exile, and
and. the banning of all civilian political opposition. The military,
as the civilian regimes it had overthrown, was guilty of assuming that
enforced consensus and the lack of overt opposition equalled unity and
support.
In the following section we will discuss each country separately
and examine the methods the military government employed in its attempts
to gain legitimate status and create support among the civilian popula¬
tion. As we stated previously, individual juntas did not implement each
method listed above. For example, we will discuss the use of traditional
aspects only under the sub-section on Ghana. One reason for this is that
there was a readily applicable traditional custom (i.e. the de-stooling
of chiefs in A3hanti history) to be employed by the junta. however, the
fact that traditional aspects are not discussed in regards to the other
case studies may be a reflection of the lack of available data. Again
we will notice that the use of non-political organizations is discussed
only in the cases of Ghana and Upper Volta. By way of apology, this too
is a reflection of the information available. It is also due to the
fact that we shall only discuss those non-political organizations which
were active over a length of time and which had a recognizable function
as a naans of gaining popular support for the juntas. We will note,
however, that there is evidence to demonstrate that all the juntas used
constitutional proclamations and commissions of inquiry (including the
trial of deposed politicians) as means for gaining the support of
important elements in the society (i.e. the politically active groups,
especially the judiciary and the civil service) and for discrediting the
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old regime. Finally, there are incidences of coercion in each case
as a means to Slamp down on the opposition which inevitably arose.
Ghana
Although, as we have stated earlier, the military government
in Ghana was met with little resistance at the beginning, it took
great care in its attempts to legitimize its position of power.
During the four years of rule, the NLC ran the gamut of procedures to
establish its right to govern, to foster a basis of support from the
civilian populace, and to suppress any opposition to its power.
The first method adopted by the junta was couched in legal¬
istic verbiage. After the assumption of power, the military issued
on February 23th the Proclamation for the Constitution of a
national Liberation Council. This proclamation suspended the
operation of the Constitution of Ghana, but provided for the contin¬
uance of all other laws and all judicial offices in Ghana.
However, the i«LC was "granted the power for such purposes as they
may think fit and in the national interest to make and issue decrees
bk,
, .. 1
which shall have the force of lav in Ghana . The first decree,
made as an amendment to the Proclamation, listed the members of the
ULC. This Proclamation, although "vested with spurious Constitutional
pomposity" was merely a statement of how the ULC would exercise
its power and could be altered without formality. In spite of the
grandiose'constitutional1 language used in the suspension of the old
constitution and the creation of a new one, there was no constitution
in Ghana in the generally accepted sense of the term - i.e. a set of
fundamental rules, anterior to the rulers, specifying who is to
exercise power, and how it is to be exercised. T&ere was only
military power.
however, there ware some practical reasons why the dLG, as
indeed the military regimes in the other countries of this study,
issued such promulgations.
First, although the old regime was reputed to be corrupt,
inefficient and dictatorie4, it was still baaed on lav - the old
constitution - and this as the fundamental lav which governed its
operation gave evidence of its existence as a national state. The
military regime, on the other hand, was based on naked force, "and
any public statement vaich can direct attention away from that
inconvenient fact, and shift it out of eight will be avidly seized
(1) Ghana Today, vol.9, Go.22 (March 9»19d6),p.2.
(2) J.F.W.B. McAuelan, "Nov We Are Six: First Steps in the
Lav of African Commonwealth Revolutions" (unpublished seminar paper
presented in the Centre of .African Studies,University of Edinburgh,1970)p.6.
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upon, hence a Declaration or Proclamation is promulgated which ...
purports to get things off on a new legal footing".^" These
statements with constitutional overtones serve to maintain the idea
of the state.
Secondly, the NLC Proclamation by retaining the laws and
judiciary of the Nkrumah regime was an assurance to the judiciary,
public service, and the people at large that their every day lives
wouldcontinue normally. In initially guaranteeing the public
service and the judiciary of their pay and functions, it was more
likely that these important segments of the population would support
the military. The military needed to acquire and retain the services
of these groups and failure to provide evidence of leadership and
threatening the job security of public servants would open the way for
2
the public service and judiciary to sabotage the new regime.
Finally, there was the question of judicial recognition. If
the military did not obtain judicial recognition and thus resort to
illegal measures in governing, it would be, furthermore, a constant
reminder to the Ghana ian people and the world in general that the military
3
rule was based on force, not law. Therefore, these practical
reasons led the military to issue the proclamations and decrees





Another base of legitimacy is in traditionallm or in the
notion that "this is hov things have always been".'*" In Ghana, as
in most developing nations, there existed a substantial portion of
the population that was still largely organized and controlled by the
traditional value system. Moreover, many of those included in the
"modern" sector of the state (e.g. the wage-earner, the city-dweller,
the literate) still retained elements of the organizational and value
system of the traditional order. Txie centre contained "tradition-
alistic" aspects. Therefore, the xiLC was able to utilize a
traditional and historical legacy in justifying the military's
assumption of political power.
For example, it has been suggested that there was a conscious
effort on the part of the CPP regime to portray Ifkrumah in a position
of chieftancy. Akrumali was even called Osagyefo. an Akan title
for a paramount or all-conquering chief. Thus, after tne coup,
General Ankrah drew an analogy that in ancient Akan-Fanti political
practice, the king or chief was responsible to the people and could
be deposed or de-stooled if he went beyond constitutional bounds.
Ankrah stated:
(l) Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago :
Rand Mclially and Co., 1967), p. 1^3.
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In taking bold steps, the Ghana anaed forces and
the Ghana police service acted in accord with the
oldest and mo3t treasured tradition of the people
of Ghana, the tradition that a leader who loses the
support and confidence of his own people and resorts
to the arbitrary use of power shall be deposed.1
The reliance on neo-traditionaliaa or "primordial sentiment" was
an interesting aspect of the Ghana coup. It was designed to instill
a willingness to obey among the people and to legitimize the military
government.
One of the core common methods used in Ghana was the Commission
of Inquiry. These commissions became both a vehicle for the
repudiation of the former regime and a means of involving the pop¬
ulace ir. the psychological overthrow of the past regime.
Within the first few weeks after the overthrow of ikrumah,
the SLC nad established numerous cososdssions of inquiry into
virtually every aspect of the C?P government. One of the aore
important of the commissions was under the chairmanship of Mr Justice
F.K.Apaloo, a judge of the Supreme Court. This commission was to
investigate the extent of Skrumah's properties and their use. As
Apaloo stated, it was "to question whether the former President was
sincere both to himself and to his country, when he led the country
to believe that both the carrying on of business end the ownership
of large property are incompatible with the socialism he often preached".'
(1) D.E.Austin, "The Ghana Case", in Politics of De-Militarisation
(seminar papers collected by Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London,
1967), p.k6.
(2) Ghana Today Vol.10. So.5 O'Jay k,1966) p.k.
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The Commission found taat Hkrumah's property vas worth in excess
of £2J aiillion at the time of the coup. 1 However, the main
objective of the inquiry was to overwhelmingly discredit ikruaah.
The iLC Decree of Investigation and Forfeiture enabled the
commission to look into the means by which Ministers and Regional
Commissioners of the deposed government and members of the defunct
Parliament and party functionaries acquired their properties and the
extent of such properties. The public was invited to submit
evidence to the Chairman, Miss Annie Jiagge, a judge of the High
2
Court. The objective of this commission was to further discredit
the ex-CPP regime in the eyes of the Ghanaian people.
ine Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances
surrounding tne National Development Corporation (.TADCCO) vas under
the chairmanship of 8. Azu Crabbe, a justice on the Supreme Court.
It examined the organization, ownership, control, management,
operation, ana most importantly, the connection with the CPP of HADECO.
The commission began its inquiries with the suspicion that various
expenditures of hADECO "looked fishy, to say the least." aovever,
Mr. Crabbe was correct in nia estimate. As a result of the commission's
report, CADECO was dissolved by NLC Decree and all its assets and
liabilities were transferred to the state.
(1) he, -on Observer. Vol.11, Ho.3 (3-16 February,1967),p.22
(2) Ghana Today Vol.10, ho.5,(May U,i960),p.3.
(3) Ghana Today Vol.10, Ho.U,(April 20,1966),p.5.
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Other Coaatissions to deal with the alleged corruption of
the CPP and government officials were the kffah Commission to
investigate the Stat© Housing Corporation and the method by which
it allocated houses and rental units; the cosanisaion to investigate
the Cargo handling Corporation and its relation with the CFP; a
coiBJsission under Justice C.G.Acolatse, a Supreme Court Judge, to
investigate the State Diamond Corporation; the Ollennu Commission to
inquire into the practice of issuing trading licenses; and another
cos-mission under Judge Ollenau to examine the financial administration
of the University of Ghana. There were also commissions of
inquiry to deal with the Ghana Timber Co-operative Union and Timber
Marketing board under Mr R.S.Blay, a former judge of the High Court;
the Trade Unions Congress; the erstwhile Publicity Secretariat which
published the Spark and Africa and the World; evidence against those
in protective custody under Justice Lasaey; and land reforms and
agricultural development under Apaloo. There were also commissions
to study the State Distilleries and the Fibre nag Manufacturing
Corporation. 1 Thus, the Commissions of Inquiry was an important
method used by the :ILC to involve the people through participation,
newspaper reports, and word-of-south talk in an indictment of the
CPF regime and thereby giving justification for the presence of
(l) dee West Africa. Le&on Observer. Africa Report. 1936-1963
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the army in the government. One final observation of the
commissions was the fact that the ULC relied heavily on judges, past
and present, of the Supreme and High Courts. hkrumah had under¬
mined the prestige of these men during his tenure; he haul dismissed
many at vill and eroded the independence of the judicial system, How,
the SLC was bringing back the judges into prominence. This lent an
air of impartial respectability to the commissions and legitimized
theia and the regime as veil. Key legal personnel were Akufo-Addo,
Chairman of the Constitutional Commission and later President of
Ghana; R.S.blay, Speaker of the Constituent Assembly; and M.A.
Ollennu, later Speaker of the Ghana Parliament. The relationship
between the judiciary and the military rulers was to be an important
element in the process of re-civilianination.
Another method used by miliary governments in attempting to
create a base of support is "to attempt to fill the vacuum of
political institutions by the creation of non-political or at least
non-partisan organizations ..." *" This was aptly demonstrated in
the case of Ghana. One such supposedly non-partiean institution
established by the 3LC was the Political Committee. This group
was to advise the JLC on political questions. Axutrah descrioes
2
the members of fcue Committee as men of "the right sort of expex-ience"
(l) 3.P.Huntington, Political Order iu ChanRing Societies
(London» Xaie University Press, 1969),p.2^5.
V'est Africa (July 30, 1966},p.3^7.
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which actually meant that they, like the NLC, were anti-Nkrumah
and pro-West in their political ideals. In fact, over a
third of the members, including the Chairman, Kofi Busia, had once
been a part of the United Party in opposition to ftkrumah. 1 Also,
eight of these men formed their own political parties after the ban
on political activity was withdrawn in May 1969.
The Centre for Civic Education was another attempt by the
NLC to enlist popular support for a non-political organization.
Established in June of 1967, the Centre was to provide education in
, . .... , ,2
democratic rights and responsibilities to it3 voluntary membership.
Again, Dr Busia headed this institution which led to the criticism
during the 1969 elections that he had been groomed by the NLC as the
next leader of the government.
The NLC also reconstituted the Ghana Youth Council and the
Worker's Brigade. These were all part of the massive attempt to
consolidate support behind the NLC. however, as we shall see, the
military leaders were eventually forced to revive party politics. The
lack of attendance at the Centre for Civic Education and in the other
organizations that were essentially non-political and non-partisan
exemplified the futility of governing in a political vacuum.
'The preceding has been an account of the various means
employed by the NLC in an attempt to legitimize their regime and to
(1) Ministry of Information,; A New Era in Ghana (Accra!
State Publishing Corporation),p.21.
(2) Reprint of General Ankrah's speech of June 7,1967 in Legon
Observer Vol II,No.13(23 June-6 July,1967), pp.I and II.
(3) Note that the problem of unemployment wa3 a major reason for
retaining the Worker's Brigade.
enlist popular support. However, the NLC, as any regime, faced
opposition. The NLC was often guilty of authoritative and
repressive measures in dealing with such opposition, let us now
examine the record of the NLC's reaction to dissension.
One way to quiet opposition is to curtail the freedom of the
praus and freedom of speech. In Ghana, Decrees 92 and 93 were
instruments to this end. NLCD 92 passed in October 1966, prohibited
the publication of rumours; NLCD 93 empowered the police to arrest
anyone 3uspocted of publishing rumours and to detain such people without
bail. These deerees were later amended by NLCD 131 which listed
vague crimes of subversion which could be tried by military tribunal.1
There was a great deal of criticism of these decrees. The Logon
Observer declared that tney were "anti-liberal and anti-democratic"
and that "Decree 93 vas just as bad if not worse tuan the Preventive
Detention Act of 1953". Seven people were tried under Decree 131
within the first weeks of its existence, and tuese decrees were a
serious threat to anyone wishing to oppose LLC decisions. Xae HLQ
refused to repeal or amend the law in spite of the immense criticism
from the Court of Appeals, the Bar Association, and tue public
3
generally. Finally, on April 29, 1966, the first two decrees
h
were abolisned," but they remained as a blemish on the NLC's record.
(1) logon Observer. Vol.IV, No.22 (2h October-6 November,1969)p.l.
(2) Legon Observer. Vol I , l?o.8 (l^J October 19*66),pp.2-U.
(3) Lg,-;on Observer. Vol.IV, No.22 (2l» October-6 November,1969)p. 12.
(U) Africa Rep°rt . Vol.13, No.6 (June,1963) p.37.
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Another decree which underwent much criticise before it
was repealed waa the Newspaper Decree. This prohibited the instigation
of any action for defamation against the owners, publishers, or
editors of government-owned newspapers without tne agreement of the
Attorney-General. 1 The NLC tried to maintain control of the
citizens partly througn control of the press. Although the NLC
actions were unjustified restrictions of the press, it did not unduly
abuse its power in these natters. There were only a few instances
in which the NLC exerted its arbitrary control in this area.
a former District Organizer of the disbanded Ghana Young Pioneer Movement
One such instance was the sentencing of Atu-Measah /to three
years imprisonment for publishing defamatory documents against the
2
NLC. Again, when the begon Observer openly criticised the delays
in courts, the editor Yaw Twumasi, a lecturer in politics at Legon,
3
was fined for contempt of court. bhortly afterward, the Legon
Observer printed an apology. however, the most vigorous clash
between the junta and the intellectuals was over the ill-fated Abbott
Agreei^eat. The NLC had agreed to allow Abbott^ an American phar¬
maceutical company, a monopoly within Ghana. As a result of the
uproar over tnis agreement, the four editors of the Daily Graphic,
tne uhanaian limes, and the livening, news were dismissed.
(1) Africa Report Vol.13,No.6 (June,19bS)p.37.
(2) bggon Observer. Vol.11 No.5 (iiarch 3-16,1967),p.22.
(3) Africa Heport. Vol.13, No.h (April,1968) p.9.
»fest Africa (January 6, 1968),p.22.
Following this action, the Commissioner of Information, Mr OBei-
Bonsu resigned in protest.
The ilLC chOBe the wrong issue and method to be tonga,
but these developments ... have demonstrated the limits
which the military will tolerate disagreement with
government decrees, and in particular, sensitivity to
out-spoken intellectuals. 1
In spite of these events, the press in Ghana regained some
of the freedom it had lost under ukrumah and the J3LC did attempt to
create a fresh image of the press. In this, note the establishment
of a Press Council to preserve the freedom of the press and such
activities as Freas Week, held in Accra to glorify the newspapers*
2
role in society in spite of the harassment of the press.
The curtailment of free speech, control of the press, and
the suppression of rumours were hallmarks of military rule in Ghana.
However, a large percentage of the population was not directly
affected by the authoritarian nature of the military government. As
long as the people did not disturb the civil oruer, they were left
alone. "Only those who are already politicizeu feel the pressure
3
of the oligarch's desire for consensus." Those people who did
feel this pressure often resisted the junta. One means of dealing
with those who did not conform was by detention, imprisonment, or
exile.
(1) Africa Reix>rt.Yol.l3.hTo.U (April,i960), p.9
(2) Africa Report. Vol.13, No.3 (?Iarch,1968), p.32.
(3) Edward ShiIs, "The Military in the Political Development
of hew States", in i'ac Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,
cd. by J.J.Johnson (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1962),r
Note Shils was discussing the military in general, not specifically about
Ghana.
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In Ghana, both the army and police were given powers to detain
politicians and administrators who had CPP affiliations, including
those in Rkrumah'a Own Guard Regiment. !4any of these were released
during the first few weeks. As stated before, anyone could be placed
in protective custody if he was considered to be subversive. Although
the hLC did not abuse their power to the extent Hkrumah had with his
Preventive Detention, large numbers of soldiers and civilians w ere
arraigned after the abortive coup of April 19&7. 3y June of that
year, 550 were still in prison. 1 The HLC found a convenient
method of ridding itself of those officers it did not approve of by
appointing them to overseas embassies, but more of this will be
discussed in a later section.
Thus, Ghana'8 military government faced overt opposition and
since there were no institutions for the legal and peaceful expression
of dissent, opposition often took on a violent nature. The NLC
reacted with arrests, detention, and exile of those individuals
involved in opposition movements which had so characterized the CPP
regime it had ousted.
Sierra Leone
The coup in Sierra Leone which was instigated by the arrest of
Siaka Stevens by Brigadier Bansana on March 21, 19^7 and concluded with
the arrest of Lanaana by Maoors Blake, Jumu, and Kai-Saaba on March 23
(1) Let-on Observer. Vol II, So.11,(26 May-6 June,1967), p.23.
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was perhaps the least justifiable and popular of all the coups
discussed in this study. As ve stated previously, both the
supporters of the APC and SLPP felt cheated. Therefore, the
military regime faced a serious problem in its attempts to legit¬
imise its position, to foster a base of support among the civilian
population, and to suppress opposition to its power.
The first method employed by the military government in
Sierra Leone involved constitutional matters. As a justification
of the military-takeover, Lansaaa had claimed and the three majors
concurred that Governor-General Lightfoot-Boston had acted unconsti¬
tutionally in appointing Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister, and that
this action had resulted in the break-down of law and order within
the state. 1 Lid the Governor-General by appointing Stevens as
Prime Minister before the full results of the election were known
abrogate the Constitution? S.5Q (2) of the constitution provided
that "whenever the Governor-General has occasion to appoint a
Prime Minister he shall appoint a Member of tne mouse of
Representatives who appears likely to command tne support of the
•1 2
majority of the Members of the House . Although the Governor-
General was normally to act upon the advice of the ministers, S.6M1)
(1) Radio Sierra Leone. March 1967= Transcribed by
numphrey J. Fisher (No pagination.)
(2) "The Sierra Leone Constitutional Crisis", The
Parliamentarian (July,1967),p,197.
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expressly stated that he shall act "in accordance with his own
deliberate judgement". 1 Thus, the Governor-General was to make
his own assessment in determining who was likely to command a
majority in the House and he was entitled by law to appoint Stevens
as Prime Minister. Lansana insisted that Lightfoot-Hoston should
have waited until the election for the Paramount Chiefs was completed.
However, it had become a convention of the Constitution that th e
chiefs supported the Government headed by the leader of the largest
group of ordinary members of the House. On March 17th, the largest
group was the APC. Although election petitions had been placed
against five SLPP members, the Governor-General could not be expected
to wait for these petitions to be heard before appointing a Prime
Minister. Therefore, by both political necessity and legal right,
the Governor-General was entitled to appoint Siaka Stevens. More¬
over, even if the Governor-General had been wrong, there were other,
non-military, means for reversing his decision either by a challenge
in the courts or a vote of "no-confidence" in the House. The
military's claim that Lightfoot-Eoston had violated tue constitution
2
was fallacious.
On the day of three majors' take-over, the new junta
issued a proclamation which suspended parts of the constitution and
authorised the junta to suspend other parts at any time. However,
96;
"a suspension of part of a constitution by authorities that have
no such power accorded to them by the constitution amounts to an
unconstitutional action"1 and as such, poses the same problems
of illegitimacy as does a complete abrogation of the constitution.
This proclamation established the NRC and granted it all lav-iaaking
powers. It was, in effect, to be the "constitution" of the
military government.
There were, as in Ghana, practical reasons for these
proclamations dressed in constitutional overtones. First, since the
former constitution had been cast aside, it was necessary to contrive
3ome legal basis for governing. The old regime had been based on a
constitution which governed its operations and gave evidence of the
existence of a new state. Until there was a new legal footing, the
rule of the military was based on force. The proclamation served
to lead an illusionaiy air of constitutionality to what tne 3RC vas
doing.
Secondly, the IIRC was anxious to retain the loyalty of the
civil service. 3y retaining the lavs that regulated the civil
and guarantee the jobs and pay
service, the junta hoped to provide leadership/to this important
segment of the population. Throughout the broadcasts of the Sierra
Leone radio service, the 3RC beseeched the civil service to remain
(l) McAuslan, p.2,
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at their posts and continue their work as uau&l. 1 Thirdly, the
NRC needed judicial recognition. By retaining the judiciary and
assuring then of their conventional role, the SRC was able to obtain
their support. Recognition by the judiciary vas an important means
to draw attention away from the forceful origins of the military
government. Thus, for these practical reasons, the formal legal-
looking proclamation vas utilized by the BRC to legitimize its rule
and to obtain the support of vital segments of the population.
The HRC also made extensive use of the commission of
inquiry. Although Major Blake openly declared that "...the army
does not propose to take cognizance of the past, to mount exhaustive
inquiries into the liberty and possessions of individuals ..." ,
the A'RC turned to the use of coEimiasions of inquiry for the purpose
of discrediting the past government and procuring the participation
and support of the people of Sierra Leone.
On April 17, 1967, a commission headed by Supreme Court
Judge S.J.Forster was appointed to investigate corruption in minis¬
tries and public corporations since 1961. The commission, with
great effort and precise detail, investigated the assets of many
former ministers, including Prime Minister Albert Margai. The
final report is a general indictment of the ex-government. The
(1) Radio Sierra Leoae Broadcasts
(2) Humphrey J. Fishor, "Election and Coups in Sierra Leone"
1967, Journal of liodera African Studies 7, Bo.U (December,1969),p.635»
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Report rendsi
The political leaders vho brought a politically
rich-abova-average country of tae continent to a
standstill and returned her well-nigh to jungle-law times,
were inexcusably guilty of grave moral lapses ...
It was not possible to build a stable government
because of primarily, a fundamental lack of basic
educational qualifications in many ministers and
secondly, of a marked similarity vita Dr Faustus
in their sense of values. 1
This commission is most vitriolic in its condemnation of Margai.
Labelling him a "modern day 'lachiavelli", the commission devotes a
large portion of its final report to displaying the methods Margai
in
used/the office of Prime Minister to unlawfully obtain large sums
of money and other "sweets of office". There are even accusations
that Margai and some of his ministers were involved in illicit
2diamond smuggling.
The findings of the Forstar Commission were submitted to the
uRCm The junta, in turn, ordered that Margai snould not only pay
the state a total amount of be 771,037.11* (l "be * 5Op.) but also
3
return his Cadillac saloon car. The HRC also ordered twenty ex-
ministers to pay the state specific amounts ranging from ie 52,957»80
which Mr R.G.O.King illegally obtained as overseas allowances,
property purchases, and other assets to -be 61.00 which Mr 3.J.
Jusu Sheriff obtained a3 an allowance for attending political rallies.
(1) Report of the Forauer Commission of Inquiry on assets of
Lx-Ministers and ax-Deputy Ministers (Freetown: Sierra Leone Government
Printer), p.Mt.
(2) IMl* PP* 59-66
(3) ibid, p.67.
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Under the RRC (Forfeiture of Assets) (no.2) Decree, tnese ex-
ministers had thirty days to pay their fines or taeir property would
be confiscated. ^ It is fairly obvious that the RRC did not propose
to re-gain the lost money. The objective was to plaee the former
regime in utter disrepute.
Another commission of inquiry appointed on May 8th by the
HRC was for the investigation of the Freetown City Council and
"to make recoiimendations with a view to a more efficient and effective
2
system of administration of the Freetown Municipality". It was
under the chairmanship of Mr Justice Percy R. Daviea. A general
appeal was broadcast for information, either oral or written, and
during the course of the hearing, T3 witnesses were brought before
the Commission. The report of the Commission concluded that the
Freetown Council was both corrupt: "They were a group, like some in
the former SLPP, who saw that much could be wrung from political
power and organised themselves on gangster lines to exploit the
people" , and ignorantt "We regret to report that tne majority, if
not all, of the former Councillors who appeared before us impressed
us as people of the lowest type of education .... They had not
the foggiest idea of what they set themselves out to do and were
»%
altogether incapable of following any matter to a logical conclusion.
(1) ibid.. p.68
(2) Report of the Fercy-Pavies Commission of Inquiry of the
Freetown City Council from the 1st January to 23ra March.19o7 and





A third commission of inquiry was headed by Mr Beoku-
Betts to investigate tne operation of the bierra Leone Produce
.iarketing Board (JLPMn). ^ As the other commissions, this oae
went into great detail to uncover and display the corruption and
inefficiency of tue SLPP government. Tneae commissions also made
open appeals to the people (e.g. "The salvation lies in the people
themselves.")~ As in tue Ghanaian case, the .iunta employed these
commissions to repudiate the former regime and consolidate the
regime's position within the country.
The ARC used both constitutional means and commissions of
enquiry in attempting to legitimize their seizure of power. However,
opposition to the military government become a serious problem, and
the NRG relied on repressive measures right from the beginning in
dealing with dissent.
The IRC dealt quickly with tae press. On March 25, 1967, all
uewspaxjers were banned for one week except for the government-owned
naily tiail. Within a snort while, tne Press Law was enacted. Tnis
decree nade it punishable by five years in prison for direct or
indirect references to political parties in Sierra Leone, defamation
of the members of tne MHO, or publication of any report, rumour, or
(1) Africa Report. Vol.12, No.7 (October,1967),P»56.
(2) Percy-navies Commission. p.U
xv>3.
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faJL3e statement to bring an JRC member into disrepute. The MRC
also held the right to suspend any paper for six months. *
In May 1967* another decree ordered that the threatening of the life
of any member of the h'RC vaa punishable by death. There was also
a ae 2000 fine or five years in jail for anyone aaxing false state-
2
mencs against tne MRU. These decrees proposed to limit the free¬
dom of expression and of the press in Sierra neone.
All political parties were dissolved and political activity
vas strictly prohibited. Other organizations, considered
disruptive elements, were banned such as the Settlers' Union and
3
the Aborigines' Rights Society.
The i-iKC also instigated massive arrests of all politicians
and others associated with Margai. Siaka Stevens and Albert Margai
were both arrested. When these two men were released, they were, as
were other potential trouble-makers, sent out of tne country.
In Sierra Leone, the military attempted to legalize its
assumption of x>ower and to find a base of support. It was not totally success¬
ful in these efforts. lacing opposition, the dRC instigated several
repressive measures against tne press, political activity, and
individual freedoms. These measures, too, were to prove unsuccessful
in tne long run.
(1) Africa Report. Vol. 12, no.6 (June, 19o7)» pp.^3-^.
(2) Africa Report. Vol.12, do.7 (July, 1967), pp.H8-h$>.
(3) Radio Sierra Leone Broadcasts.
Dahomey
The successive military regimes in Dahomey vere no more
successful in uniting the country behind taem than nad been the
civilian governments. There were efforts on the part of the military
juntas to legitimize their seizures of power. nonetheless, a
tradition of violent political opposition developed in Dahomey during
the past decade.
The 1963 and the November 196p coups in Dahomey were not total
military take-overs, but tuey still involved serious constitutional
questions. In 1963, Soglo dismissed the national Assembly and
repealed the constitution. However, instead of issuing formal pro¬
clamations establishing a military government, he appointed the big
three political leaders of the country - Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga
- aa his tnree ministers. The old constitution was to be replaced
by a new constitution which was drawn up by a Constitutional Committee.
Thus, this brief excursion by the military into politics wets only
to fill in vacuum until the new constitution was drafted and
elections held, leading to the Aixomadagbe-Apitay coalition government.
After the November 1965 coup, boglo immediately turned power over
to the President of the National Assembly, Congacou. He justified
this by pointing to Articles 17 and 35 of the 1S6U Constitution vhica
specified that the President of the National Assembly would assume
leadership of the government in the event that the Prime i-linister and
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President were unable to fulfill their duties. however, since
the constitution had been partially abrogated by the dismissal
of Apithy and Ahoaadegbe, the appointment of Congacou as the
executive vaa, in essence, an unconstitutional act.
Congacou's provisional government was short-lived. In
December 1965, Coglo completed his take-over bid by suspending tne
constitution and dissolving tne National Assembly. he created his
government on December 23rd which was declared to be official by
a formal decree in January i960. Another decree set up the Comifce
de nenovation rationale (CM) on Cnristaas Eve 1965. The CM
program included reform of tne administration and tne drafting of a
2
new constitution. however, in spite of the official proclamations
and the poposals of a new constitution, this military government was
not based in law and its rule was regulated only by arbitrary decrees.
The fourtn coup in 1967 began, on December 17th with the
dismissal of Coglo &tae disolution of tne Coaite ilil.it aire de
Vigilance which had replaced the old CRD. The ComittT Revolutiouaire
Militaire was created by the "Proclamation du 17 deceiabre". There
was at this time no constitution in Dahomey and the proclamations
and decrees, draped in legal terminology, were means to draw attention
away from this fact.
(1) Rene Lemarchand, "Dahomey: Coup within a Coup".Africa
Report. Vol.13,Ho.6 (June,1968),p.50.
(2) Chroaologie Politique Africaine (Hovember-Deceinber,1965),p.^«
(3) Anude Africaine (1967),pp.19^-207.
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The final coup in 1969 resulted in the overthrow of Zinsou
and the annulment of the 1968 Constitution. The new military
directorate headed by de Souza claimed "charter legitimacy" by
conferring on their regime "all powers traditionally pertaining to
the head of 3tata". This claim, however, was not based on any
constitutional guidelines. Yet it was a transparent attempt on
the part of the .junta to legitimize its position of power.
Therefore, the military in Dahomey has utilized constitutional
methods to legitimize its intrusion into politics either by pointing
to specific articles in the constitution to justify their action as
in the November 1965 coup or the issuing of formal declarations of
legitimacy. We have previously discussed the practical, reasons
for such actions. These included: (l) to provide new legal footing
for the military government and to maintain the idea of the state;
(2) to guarantee jobs and pay to the civil service and
judiciary so that these segments of the population would support the
new government; and (3) to obtain judicial recognition.
In Dahomey, the commission of inquiry was used by whatever
government was in power to discredit those out of power. Our
evidence is scant, but the information we do have access to points
out that commissions were set up to examine cases of embezzlement
of public funds. For example, in November 1963, a commission
(l) West Africa (January 3, 1970),p.2^.
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was charged to look into the accounts of Maiga's ministers. On the
basis of the findings, M. P&ule Darooux (ex-Minister of Commerce),
M. Bertin Borna (ex-Minister of Finance), and Ga3ton de Souza
(Borna's Secretary) were charged with misappropriation of public
1
funds. There were also plans to bring Maga to trial althougn
these never materialized.
In early 196*4, there were serious riots in Parakou in
which twelve were killed and 80 soldiers and civilians injured.
There were accusations that tnese disturbances were pro-Maga and a
commission of inquiry was established in April 196*4 to examine these
2
rumours. Consequently, Chabi Mama, & stauncn Maga supporter,
and Boki Maga, the ex-president's sister, were charged with subversive
activities. Mme. Maga was acquitted, but Chabi Mama was sentenced
to twelve years' imprisonment and five years' exile. He was
released in 19o5 and became Minister of education under Einsou. ^
Under Alley, the commission of inquiry was also a tool
used to discredit former regimes and thus to justify the military*3
assumption of power. A Military Correction Committee was established
in March 1968 to deal with embezzlement of public funds. All previous
ftest Africa (doveaber 23, 1963), p.2*4
<2) "»st Africa (April *4, 196*4),p.371.
(3) Armcc Afixcaiuc (l98?)» p.209
(U) West Africa (May 13, 1969), p.5*49.
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trials were declared null and void, and those accused were to be
1
re-tried. Other commissions vere established to discredit
Soglo's supporters. Major Louis Ch&3me, Soglo's quartermaster,
was sentenced to one year in jail for embezzling 13,000 CFA francs
(£200) and L,500,000 CFA francs (£3000). Also, the Prefet of
Borgu, Mono and the director of the General Broadcasting Company
2
were dismissed following commissions of inquiry.
Since events occurred so rapidly and chaotically in Dahomey,
many of the commissions of inquiry which were set up did not have
time to bring forth evidence against specific people and often the
next regime would overturn previous verdicts. The commissions,
as in Ghana and Sierra Loone, were set up to expose the corruption
of the former regime, to lend credence to the new government, and
perhaps also to imprison and impoverish potential rivals amongst
the old crowd.
The past decade of Dahomean politico ha3 been characterized
by numerous anti-governmental riots, assassination plots, and
accusations of subversive activity. The military governments reacted
with such repressive measures as censorship, arrest, exile, and
imprisonment of the dissidents. We have previously mentioned the
riots at Parakou which led to the arrest, imprisonment, and exile
of Chabi Mama. The riot itself was harshly put down by the soldiers.
(1) West Africa (March 30,1368),p.kQrj
(2) West Africa (March 16,1968),p.322
lbo.-
There vas an assassination plot discovered in 1963 which
aimed at the removal of boglo and tne re-establisument of Maga as
President. This led to the arrest of Maga, press censorsnip, and
the detention of naif a dozen Maga supporters. In a broadcast,
boglo said:
uatched by a haudful of blind and brioed
irresponsible persons, the plot was designed to
upset all that has oeen done, to establish the
former state of things, in order to impose in
Dahomey the silence of the tomb. -
Soglo later released Maga, Dhabi Mama, and the old ministers Darboux
and horna in oraer to prepare the conditions for national recon¬
ciliation. This was in 1965, and it appears tnat by that time
boglo understood that the opposition movements could not be dis¬
couraged by the arrest of the leaders.
nonetheless, the arrests aid not stop. In 1965, bdmund
boussou,lobo, honere Ghoumansou, Tueopile Paoletti, and Jules Guezo
. 2
were detained on cuargea of subversion. i'hey were eventually
released in I&67 by presidential decree. In I966, the ex-Foreign
iiiniater of Ahooadege's government, Gabriel hozes, was arrested for
3
possessing subversive tracts; later that year, Moise Mensah,
.iinister of Rural Development, and hicepuore Soglo, Minister of the
A-couomy , were dismissed because of disagreements over tne government's
(1) west Africa (December 7, 1963),p.l3T5
(2) Annee Africaine (1967)
(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (January-February,1966).
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budgetary policies. ^ The military regimes also attempted
to remove individuals considered untrustworthy by the government.
In 19fS7» Benoit Adandejan, a former member of the CMV, was detained
2
for political crimes which included embezzlement; in 1968, Innocent
Adotevi, prefect of Atlantique, and Dr L.Amlon, Director of Public
3
Health, were tried on charges of misuse of public funds.
The military governments in Dahomey were unsuccessful in their
attempts to legitimize their seizure of power or to build up a base
of support throughout the country. Although they tried to suppress
opposition by arrest, detention, exile, censorship, dismissal, or
the use of troops against tae civilian populace, not one of the
military governments was able to maintain the control of the central
political apparatus for any length of time. Clubs had become trumps
in Dahomey.
Upper Volta
When the trade unions called for Lamizana to take control of
the government in early 1966, the move was generally popular. The
junta in Upper Volta was to justify its position of power essentially
by the issuance of formal declarations of legitimacy and by a
thorough discrediting of the Yameogo government. Yet, even though
the military rule wa3 initially accepted by the population, it was
(1) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December,1966).
(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September-October,1967),p.25.
(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (January-February,1968).
also to face serious dissent.
The first method used by Lamiaana was to issue a declaration
granting the military political authority. On January 5th, he
created the government of which he was head of state and in charge
of a cabinet composed of both military men and civilians. By
including civilians, the junta hoped to draw attention away from
the fact that rule was in the hands of the military.
The government was reinforced by the Conseil Superieur des Forces
Arxnees, a group of senior army officers and gendarmes. 1 Lamizana
repealed the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. We
have discussed the reasons for auch formal declarations in previous
sections. However, although these declarations lent an air
of constitutionality to the military government, taere existed in
Upper Volta no fundamental legal guideline for tae military rule.
Another method U3ed by the military junta in Upper Volta
in order to legitimize their rule and to build up a base of support
among the civilian population, was the creation of a non-political
institution. The Coaite Conaultatif vas created by decree on January
13, 1966.
Les membres civils de ce comite aeront choisis
en raison de leur connaissance des problems et de
I'estime dont ils jouiosent dans 1*opinion generale.
Ce comite <jui aura une vocation essentiellenent consultative
sera teinu constamment inform^ de 1*action gouvernement&le
et aura a donner son avis sur les decisions a iatarvenir.
(1) Annee Africaine 1966. pp. 3h9~35<3.
(2) Cnronologia Politique Ifricaine (January-February,1966.)
It consisted of Ul members including 10 officers, five members from
the trade unions, and well-known civic figures such as Joseph
Oudreago, Mm Ouezzin Coulibaly, and Or J. Conombo. HuM influence
this body had on the decisions of the military government is not
documented; however, it probably provided a public opinion gauge for
the junta. Since the politically mobilized population of Upper
Volta is small and concentrated in the urban centres, the need for
a non-political organization to channel demands from a wide range
of individuals and groups was not as acute as in Ghana. Also, the
majority of the politically mobilized population were members of
trade unions,and tnese unions were allowed to operate and formed
an institution to articulate their demands,
a major tactic used to legitimize tue military take-over
was the trial of President lameogo. The trial was a point of con¬
fusion during the early years of military rule. Laraizana refused
to free Yameogo, who had been under house arrest since the coup, or
to bring him to trial for misappropriation of public funds. Lamizana
turned to the military council for advice; they were against his
release (only by a small majority) while feeling tnat a trial would
belittle the office of Presidency. The RI>A, Yameogo'a political
party, called for his release but stipulated that he was not to
return as party leader. The oppositionjarty, the ML8, wanted
to see Yaaeogo punished, but the party leader, Ki-Zerbo, opposed
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the motion. Finally, there was strong and gonuine opposition among
the Moasi to a trial. 1 Thai, the feeling of txie country was
mixed.
The controversy as to whether or not to try Yameogo centred
on several issues. First, Lamizana was wary of stirring up old
political grudges by such a trial, Yaaeogo was still reported to
have support among the Mossi at Koudougou althougn the RUtA had
expelled him from the party. Moreover, Houphouet-noigny, the
President of neighbouring Ivory Coast, had expressed his support for
l'ameogo. Secondly, there was concern over the health of the ex-
President. he had attempted suicide twice, the last time during
the OGAM meeting in 19b8 as a call for sympathy. The issue was
finally settled when the arm/ announced in 1968 that it would return
power to the civilians in 1970. Those who feared Yameogo's return
2
to power wanted a trial to decide the issue.
A special tribunal convened on April 28, 1968 to try Yameogo
on charges of embezzlement and misuse of public funds. he was
accused of embezzling 7^1,01*1,123 CFA francs (£1.2m.) and was
sentenced to five years imprisonment. He also was fined 51m. CFA
francs (£86,000) and ordered to pay the government damages amounting
to 117.5m CFA francs (£300,000).3
^l) Africa Confidential, do.7 (March 29, 19b7)»p7.
(2) West Africa (May 3, 1968),p.512.
(3) 'West Africa (May 17, 1968),p.568.
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The special tribunal established to try Yameogo also was
charged to try those accused of crimes against the state security and
other political crimes. Later in 1968, it found the former
Defence Minister Michael Touzouma guilty of embezzling 76,000 CFA francs'3
and former Speaker of the National Assembly Sergnon Kone with two of
2
his junior officials guilty of embezzling £150,000. Here as in
our other c&3e studies, these trials were a means to discredit the
former regime. But, in Upper Volta, the security precautions and
secrecy surrounding the trials point out that Lamizana feared that
any political controversy created with the trial would result in
violence.
Although it vas true that the military regime in Upper Volta
was not faced with opposition from a large politically mobilized
population, the junta still met with some serious threats of dissent.
In September 1966, there were riots in Koudougou which led to the
arrest of six people and the suppression of all political party
3
activity. During that year, Lamizena ordered the arrest of a
number of "anti-patriots" and dismissed Comraandant Maurice Samon
because of his affiliation with th«3e people.'1 By 1967, a special
court vas set up to try those aocuaed of subversive activities.
(1) West Africa (November 22, 1968),p.lU2U.
(2) west Africa (December 6, 1968),p.lH83.
(3) Cnronolouie Politique Africaine (September-October,1966),p.23.
(H) ibid., p.23.
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The gravest threat to Lamizana'a rule ooeurred in
September 196? when a plot to assassinate the President was uncovered.
Thirty-eight were eventually tried for their plans to provoke demon¬
strations in order to incite the trade unions and to gain sympathy
from a section of the army. Lucien Yameogo, a treasury official
was sentenced to twelve years' hard labour for leading the plotters
and thirteen others received sentences between three and ten years'
prison. These included Herman Yameogo, son of the ex-President,
Felicity Yameogo, his first wife, Bergnon Koae, and Maueaa Sarvadogo,
of the National Assembly. ^
A form of repression found in Upper Volta was censorship of
the press. The press was subject to governmental approval during
the state of emergency which lasted until June 1966. However, there
appears to have been less interference in the press of Upper Volta.
hot only were the political i>arties allowed to issue their own
papers when they reformed in 1969 but also newspapers formed the
2
Syndicat National Autosome de la Presse.
Thus, although the military government in Upper Volta
attempted to legitimize their rule and gain a base of support,
opposition emerged in often violent forms. The military, in turn,
reacted with various repressive measures.
(1) West Africa (June 1, 1968),p.6h8.
(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (July-August,1969)•
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In conclusion we have discussed the problems entailed as the
military regime sought both to legitimize its seizure of power and to
create a base of support among the civilian population. A brief survey
of the methods employed include the use of legalistic promulgations to
justify their abrogation of the constitution, an appeal to the
traditional value system, the use of commissions of inquiry to discredit
the preceding regime, and the creation of non-political institutions.
In all four cases, the military juntas issued legalistic
proclamations which sought to justify their abrogation of the
constitution. These proclamations performed three functions
(l) to draw attention away from the fact that the military government
is not based on naked force alone and to get the junta off on a new
legal footingj (2) to acquire and retain the services of the
government bureaucracy and judiciary by guaranteeing them their jobs
and payj and (3) to obtain judicial recognition and thus show the
population of the countries and the world in general that the junta
was nominally legal. The proclamations issued by the juntas in
Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta usually established
the military directorate and set down the method of ruling, i.e.
by decree.
Only in Ghana do we find an example of appealing to
traditional and historical precedents. Here the overthrow of the
Gaagyeio was iikeneJ to the ue-atooiing of chiefs. Although the
removal of Nkumah distressed few Ghanians outside those enjoying
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CPP patronage, Ankrah's use of this analogy is an interesting feature.
In Ghana and Upper Volta, we find the juntas establishing non-
political organizations. These included the Political Committee, the
Centre for Civic Education, the Worker's Brigade, and Ghana Youth Council
in Ghana and the Comite Consultatif in Upper Volta. The function of
these organizations was to involve the population in "political"
activity along lines the military felt appropriate and also to provide
the military government with an opinion gauge, although generally this
was an "elite" opinion. The lack of support, attendance, or enthusiasm
for these organizations demonstrates the futility of governing in a
political vacuum.
Another means of seeking legitimate status used by all military
juntas was the commission of inquiry or the trial of deposed politicians
(as in the case of Upper Volta). It was hoped that the population would
feel involvement through giving evidence or merely the publicity given
the findings. Moreover, the commissions and trials were also used to
discredit the old politicians, thereby giving the military greater
justification for their intervention. To discredit these politicians
was also useful in lessening the probability of their return to power
once the military withdrew from politics and thus guaranteeing that the
military would be free from reprisals from the politicians they had
removed from office. A final by-product of the commission's revealing
the gross mis-use of public office was a resulting cynicism of the part
of the population to all public authorities. Thus, it was important
for the military junta to appear above suspicion or else face the same
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charges levied against the politicians. Unfortunately for several
military juntas, they did not take this precaution. Therefore, we
will find a growing opposition to these juntas, notably the 1JRC in
Sierra Leone and Soglo's regime in Dahomey, on charges of corruption,
nepotism, and inefficiency.
Finally, in all four countries, opposition appeared. The
military relied increasingly on coercive measures such as arrest,
detention, and exile which had so characterized the very regimes the
military had ousted. The juntas were to make the mistake of assuming
enforced consensus meant national support and unity.
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Administrative Problems
We have discussed previously the military's experience in the
management of violence and how this facilitates its intrusion into a
state's political life. There are further implications of the
technological make-up of the army which at first glance would appear
to give it certain advantages as an administrative body, particularly
on a short-term basis, but which in fact are inherent disadvantages.
First, the military is often a pioneer in the technological
field and doe3 possess certain advantages in the relatively pre-
technological society in which it exists. "Willingness to develop
and maintain a modern army compels even small primitive armies to
promote a trained cadre equipped with technical know-how, rarer in
other sectors.""'" Special skills are emphasised in military life.
Those which are particularly relevant for a developing nation include
engineering, communications, transport, and logistics.
Secondly, the dependence upon technology entails a higher
degree of specialization and differentiation than normally associated
with institutions in developing nations. The administration of a
technical sub-culture requires a refined organizational format.
Ideally, the military organization is hierarchical with a tightly central¬
ized command. Obedience to superiors (i.e. discipline and following
orders) is the dominant basis for activity and is further ordered by an
(l) Moshe Lissak, "Centre and Periphery in Developing Countries
and Prototypes of Military Rule", Studies in Comparative International
Development. Vol. V, Wo. 7 (1969-1970) (Wew Brunswick, Hew Jersey:
Rutgers University Press), p. 1*45.
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elaborate system of rules and regulations.1 Finally, the military
establishment is tied together by a highly developed esprit de corps,
loyalty, and morale. Although the armies in the countries under discuss¬
ion in this study deviated from the ideal, the hierarchical structure and
faculty for quick decision-making in an emergency is an advantage on a
2
short-term basis.
Hovever, although the military's administrative skills may give
benefits in the early days follovingtthe coup, these potential advantages
are circumscribed. First, the character of the armed forces is derived
from the requirement that its members aire specialists in violence. The
key to military organization is to see it as an expression of the unique
3functions of the military, namely, combat and combat preparation.
"In general, military experience which emphasizes a simple calculus of
violence is not directly transferable to large-scale organization planning
or management."^ There is little evidence (except in Upper Volta) that
the armies under examination here are either willing or capable of
converting their organizational superiority and special skills for
social and economic development.
Secondly, these armies are small and have a low proportion
of staff offices. Although there is an increasing number of officers
assigned to staff as opposed to field duty and they are presently trained
in advanced techniques of personnel management and otner administrative
(1) 3.E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Fall Mali Press, iy&2) p.6.
(2) W.F. Gutteridge, "The Capabilities and Dispositions of the
Armed Forces" in The Politics of Demilitarisation(London: University of Londc
Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1966), p. 13.
(3) Morris Janowitz, Sociology and the Military Establishment
(New York: RusBell Sage Foundation, 1965), p. 2^.
(4) Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of
Hew nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 196U), p. k2.
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skills, the experience of the officers is limited in comparison with the
experience of administrators in civilian occupations."1' There is a
restricted opportunity for the officers to test their administrative
skills. The army, therefore, is proficient in the administration of
its own self-contained unit and would also have little difficulty
performing "law and order" functions in the country. However, a state
in which the economy is expanding and developing and in which the
society is becoming more specialized and differentiated requires the
existence of a trained bureaucracy. In such a situation, the military
administrative skills are over-taxed when trying to control and accommodate
a wide range of activities including agricultural and industrial develop¬
ment, budgetary regulatory functions, economic planning and the like.
The army ceases to be able to administer by its own resources. It seeks
2
colla soration with the civil service organization already in existence.
A symbiotic relationship between the military and the civil service
is readily established. First, they are both country-wide and literate
3
among a largely illiterate population. Secondly, both are within the
most Westernized sector of the society. As inheritances from the
colonial period, they often share similar viewpoints evolving from
colonial traditions: not only the emphasis on law and order and the use
of bureaucratic machinery for control rather than development but also
a basic distrust of politicians. They share similar vested interests.
/ ^ \ r J w » ■* ). r-
\±/ ijxaauov, p. ah?.
(2) Finer, p. 17.
(3) Robert E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development"
in Politics and Change in Developing Countries, edited by Colin Leys
(London:Cambridge University Press, 19&9), p. 229.
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Finally, therefore, the civil service is generally pleased to see the
backs of the politicians which only the military has the power to remove
and to work in close accord with the military in administering the
country, a function only the civil service is capable of performing.
There are some inherent dangers in the bureaucratic - military
coalition arising first from the policy weaknesses of the military and
secondly, from the nature of the bureaucracy itself.
As we stated in the first section of Chaper III, the military is
lacking in political skills. Thus, it cannot provide policy guidelines
for the civil service. Apart from their basic distrust of political
activity, the military leaders are limited in their ability to provide
political guidance by several other factors. First, the central staff
planning of the armed forces is restricted. "The absence of extensive
3taff planning limits the officers' experience in high ministerial
responsibility, strategic planning, or innovation either organizational,
economic, or political".'*" Moreover, due to the young age of officers and
the rapid rate of promotion during the early year3 of independence, many
have spent most of their careers taking orders and carrying policy
instead of giving orders or making policy decisions. They lack the
experience necessary for national policy-making activity. Secondly,
the officers are severely hampered in giving direction to economic
development. "For one thing, military leaders infrequently understand
the myriad and subtle problems involved in the business of giving rational
(l) Janowitz, The Military in trie- Political -'evelopment of
hew Nations, p. 42.
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and coherent fiscal and financial leadership to the community.n^"
The military is not development minded; the economy is generally put
2
on a "care and maintenance" basis.Thus, the country stagnates vhile
demands for development increase. Thirdly, as we have stated earlier,
the military junta rarely puts forth an ideology or blue-print for
development. It often lacks long-term goals other than the removal of
corrupt, inefficient politicians. Thus, the military can provide only
a framework in which the civil service can act unimpeded by political
interference. It is less able to act a3 a national policy maker.
In view of the military's inability to provide political
leadership, the civil service in these states take on more and more the
role of deciding and formulating policies. While the bureaucracy in all
political systems ha3 some degree of involvement in policy-making, this
involvement is exceptionally high in developing countries in which the
political institutions are weak vis a vis the civil service inherited from
the colonial "administocracy". ^ While in coalition with a military junta,
the civil service gains a disproportionate amount of power.
This heavy reliance on the civil service both for
day-to-day administration and for the composition
of various special committees ... has considerably
strengthened the position of senior bureaucrats and
reveals the pathetic programmatic weakness and sus¬
ceptibility of the presiding military in fields of
decision.
(1) Joseph La Pelombara, "An Overview of Bureaucracy and
Political Development" in Bureaucracy and Political Development edited
by Joseph La Polombara (Princeton, Sew Jerseys Princeton University
PreBS, 1963), p. 32.
(2) Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of
Sew States", in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,
edited by J.J. Johnson (Princeton, New Jersey:Princeton University Press,
1962), pp. 58-59.
(3) Gutteridge, p. 11.
(is) For further discission of the role of the civil service in
developing countries see Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries;
The Theory of Prismatic Locietv (Boston; Houghton - Mifflin, Co., 196h).
(5) Roger Murray, "The Militarism in Africa" New Left Review. No. 38
(July - August, 1966), p. 50.
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Moreover, this poses severe problems for future civilian regimes in
their attempts to limit the political role of the bureaucrat. The
lack of balance between policy-making and policy-implementing
institutions will impede the development of a 3table political system.
Furthermore,
without firm political guidance, the bureaucrats have
weak incentives to provide good service, whatever
their formal pre-entry training and x^rofessional
qualifications. They tend to use their effective
control to safeguard their expedient bureaucratic
interests - tenure, seniority rights, fringe benefits,
toleration of poor performance, the right to violate
official norms - rather than to advance the achievement
of programme goal3.
The civil service not only fails to accomplish the administrative goals
set for it, but it also resists any changes which may affect its position
of power. ThuB, it becomes a powerful interest group protecting its
privileges.
In the following section, ve will discuss how the military
regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and Upper Volta came to rely
on the bureaucratic machinery in operation for running the affairs of the
state and thus, how much of the political and executive decisions rested
in the hands of the civil service. Also, we will discuss the difficulty
which the juntas were under while facing a civil service which manifested
powerful group interests, particularly the civil service trade unions in
the ex-French states.
(l) Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development:
A Paradoxical View" in Bureaucracy and Political Development, edited
Joseph La Polombara, p. 129.
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Ghana
In Ghana, the HLC immediately fell back on the civil
service. Beyond those points mentioned earlier, there were two add¬
itional factors facilitating this accommodation. First, the civil
service in Ghana had long resented the treatment it received from
M&rumah. In particular, it was dissatisfied over the formulation
of policy along ideological lines. Secondly, "unlike every other
institution connected with the previous regime, the bureaucracy
» 1
remained unscathed .
At the time of the 1966 coup, there were 32 ministries over
which were superimposed a number of supra-ministerial secretariats
and offices directly responsible to iikrumah. The ULC undertook to
re-organize and streamline the bureaucracy. The Administrative
Committee, including several senior civil servants, was established
to make recommendations with regard to both central and local
administrative machinery and to advise the ilLC on all matters relating
to central and local government. * Acting on tne advice of the
Administrative Committee, the HLC reduced the number of Ministries,
including the Office of the hLC, to 18. Members of tne hhC were
o
assigned the responsibilities of these ministries. ** In June,1967,
the MLC took its first tentative step toward civilian rule by dissolving
(1) Dowse, p.2h0
(2) A hew Bra in Ghana (Accra! State Publishing Corporation),
pp. 9-12.
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advisory departments and replacing them with lk civilian commiss¬
ioners who acted as quasi-ministers. 1 Those matters which
remained under direct control of the HLC were defence, finance,
interior, and culture. At this time, a 31-member Advisory
Committee was organized under Busia and was to act as a national
"clearing house".
Regional and local administration were also reorganized on
the advice of the Administrative Committee. Regional and
District Committees of Administration were established and the number
of administrative districts was, in the process, reduced from 168
to vr.2
In all, fourteen national advisory committees were intro¬
duced by the HLC, including those on External Affairs, Agriculture,
Economies. These, as the Administrative Committee said,
consisted "mainly of civil servants, and it is they who have been
3
wielding effective executive power in the country". As Afrifa
stated: "I think the confidence we have built up in the civil
service can be measured from the membership of public servants in
the advisory commissions of the HLC." 4 However, as reported in
1968, "leaning heavily on the experience of top civil servants, most
(1) Africa Report. Vol.13, Ho.4 (April,1968),pp 33
(2) A Hew Era in Ghana, p.11
(3) Dowse, p.2k0.
(k) Legon Observer. Vol.11, Ho.7 (31 March-13 April,1967),
Supplement p.vi.(Speech by A.A.Afrifa given March 20,1967).
tat,
retained from NhrUtah's staff, the ILC has become accustomed to
decision making by administrative fiat."1
The NLC also appointed several other committees to
examine the general administration. The Public Cervices Structure
and Salaries Commission under C.C.Mills-Odoi, the Judge Advocate
of the Ghana Armed Forces, made numerous suggestions for the
de-centralization of the administration. Also aui Expediting
Committee was established as the "first serious effort made in the
country in the direction of creating an institution to check
2
undesirable conduct on the part of public officers . Thus, one
of the major results of the coalition between the military and the
civil eervice was to remove political interference from the bureauaracy
and re-create its independence. Moreover, the bureaucrat's hole in
policy-making was increased and their position strengthened patently.
Sierra Leone
In Sierra Leone, the MRC announced on March 25, taat "...
the Council wishes to take this opportunity to assure all civil
servants that it will not tolerate victimization of any officer
Li.e. civil servant] for any past conduct in political matters
Thus, the JRC also realized that it would need to rely
on the civil service in order to administer tne country.
(1) Africa Report. Vol.13,Ho.4 (April,iyoo}
(2) "West Africa. (June 1,1968) p.62h.
(3) huBiparey J.Fisner, "Elections and Coups in bierra Leone,
1967w Journal of Modem African btudiea. Voi.7» uo.h (Jecem£>er,1969)p.63
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The NRC streamlined the aciainis-cration by reducing the number of ministries
from fourteen to nine.1 The civil service, vita the National Economic
Advisory Committee appointed by the iiRC, directed the day-to-day affairs
of the country as well a3 the economic recovery programme.
The military also relied heavily on the civil service for policy¬
making. This can be seen in the fact that although the military had
intervened to prevent an AFC election victory, the policies advocated
. . 2
curing military rule were very close to those proposed by the AFC.
A major reason for this was tnat much of the civil service were either
pro-APC or at least anti-SLPP. Although Peter Tucker, a Margai
supporter, was retained as general-secretary to the junta and as head
of the civil service, he had lost much of his influence due to his past
record with tue Margai regime. Thus the investigations into the affairs
of the Sierra neoue Produce 2-iarketing Board (SLPMB), the Freetown City
Council, and Margai and his Ministers which had been proposed by the APC
were carried out under JRC rule. Moreover, the economic policies,
particularly the austerity budget analhe re-vanping of the SLPMB had
been called for by the APC. however, note that these economic p>licies
had been also recommended by the IMF as conditions for the needed
emergency aid. Therefore, with much of the policy-making in the hands
of civil servants vao were largely pro-APC, the policies put forth
during the military rule resembled those of the APC. It is important,
however, to remember that the LRC was unwilling to hand power ever to
(1) Sierra Leone Trade Journal. Vol. 7» ho. 1 (January-March
1967), p.2.
(2) Chris Allen, "Sierra Leone Politics Since Independence"
African Affairs. Vol. uL, ho. 269 (October, li>68), pp. 235**266.
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APC politicians and the two committees set up to review the process of
re-civilianization, the national Advieory Committee and the Civilian
Rule Committee, were biased to the South and East and filled with Margai
supporters.
The military was wary of creating difficulty in their relationship
with the civil service. Evidence of this can be found in the handling
of the Forster Commission of Inquiry. The vigorous questioning into
the affairs and assets of ex-politicians of the iiargai government
brought up the discussion of whether or not civil servants should be
subject to Bimilar procedures. It was assumed that if civil servants
were called before the Commission, more rigid rules of evidence would
be applied than usual in a commission of inquiry. The fear was that
loose allegations might jeopardize civil servants' standing in their
work.^ In order to protect the reputation and prestige of the
civil service, bureaucrats were generally immune to interrogation by
commissions of Inquiry.
Thus, the reliance of the military upon the civil service for
advice and policy can be seen in the policies put forth by the civil
service and in the unwillingness of the junta to examine closely the
affairs of civil servants. The bureaucracy in Sierra Leone expanded
more so into the role of policy-maker under military rule there.
(l) West Africa (Augusu 19, i9bf), p. 1U73.
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Dahomey
The civil service in French-speaking African states differ
from their English-speaking counterparts in that it vas legal for
them to engage in overt political activity. Hot only vas there
closer collaboration betveen the senior civil servants and the
political elite, but the French system of bureaucracy standards
also allowed the civil servants to form unions as powerful
pressure groups. The unions, and the public service union was
the most militant in Dahomey, had a seminal role in determining who
would or would not/...
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be in power. The civil servants in Dahomey, moreover, presented a
special problem. Undoubtedly many were well-educated, but there
were too many of then. After the independence of French West Africa,
large numbers who had served in the French territories returned to
Dahomey demanding positions. Also, many young Dahomeans pressed for
civil service positions since it was one of the few avenues of employ¬
ment open in a country which had a small private sector. Thus, there
was a constant demand for employment while those already in the
bureaucracy jockeyed for security of tenure, promotions and the main¬
tenance of their traditional privileges. There was little else to
fall back on outside the government. iiot only did tne civil service
with the other unions have an inordinate amount of power in political and
economic maters, but they expected to maintain this power because
of the colonial inheritance of an administrative government. It is
with this backdrop that we must look at the relationship between the
juntas and the civil service and the reforms which Dahomey's
governments tried to enforce for the past decode.
Soglo's first military government was launched in 1963 when
the unions called for JSaga'a overthrow. Among their grievances was
the 10 per cent tax on all civil service salaries. The civil
service remained unaltered under Soglo's short reign although new
ministers vera appointsu to head the various departments. Soglo
stated:
132.
Pour la premiere foi3 les ministre oat etc
choisi a en raison de leur competence a 1*exclusion
de tout autre critere : le ministre de 1'education
nationale est un professeur, celui de 1'agriculture
est un inge'nieur agronome ,celui de la sante un
medeeiu . .,^-
Also, Soglo repressed the 10 per cent tax on civil service salaries
2
in the January 196k budget. Whether or not this would have
pacified the public service unions is debatable for when Ahomadegbe
and Apithy were installed in the bi-cephalpus executive they reinstated
the tax and increased it to 25 per cent. This was part of their
austerity program which was drastically needed in view of Dahomey's
economic crisis. Nonetheless, the workers went on strike in July
1965 and Soglo returned to politics that November. Congacou, to
whom political power was handed, set up an interim government of
technicians. Still, the strike continued and Soglo finally
took over complete political power in December.
At that time, the civil service in Dahomey accounted for
over 60 per cent of all government expenditures. Thus, in August
1966, Soglo announced several bureaucratic reforms. There was to
be a blockage of new recruitment, a ceiling was placed on civil
5service salaries, and family allowances were cut. These measures
prompted a general strike in October, but Soglo stood hia ground.
(1) Le Monde (June 30,1963)
(2) West Africa (May 23, 196*0,p.575.
(3) West Africa (July 10,1965),p.763.
(U) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December,1965)»p.
(5) Annee Africaine (1966),pp.263-271.
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Not only did he call in troops to put down the strike and dismiss many
who had participated in the strike, hut he also instigated furtner
measures to restrict the civil service. In November 1966, he ruled
that all civil servants were to he held accountable for deposits and
funds to the Council of Ministers."'" This was a feeble attempt to
reduce the level of corruption. Soglo also took tentative steps
toward restructuring and decentralizing the bureacracy. hack minister
was now held directly responsible for all administrative functions,
some of which had previously been the x-esponsibility of the Ministry
of Civil Service. The individual ministers thus held a tighter
2
control over their employees. Moreover, a commission was set up
consisting of union and governmental officials to study the organisat -
3ion of the unions, including the public service union.
Soglo met fierce opposition from the unions to his austerity
and re-organization program. The unions demonstrated in December 1967
and demanded the abolition of the 25 per cent salary cut, a refund to
the workers, and the re-employment of those wno were dismissed after
k . .
the 19o6 strike. Alley was sent in to negotiate and it was rumoured
that Decree 36, which banned strike activity, was to be repealed.
/ ✓
According to some sections of the army, Soglo had sold out. Kouandete
(1) West Africa (November 19,1966),p,13^0.
(2) West Africa (Kay 13, 1967), p.6k0.
(3) Chronologie Politique Africaine (November-December,1967)
(U) 'West Africa (January 6, 1968) ,p,15_l6.
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took control in December 1967. However, because of Alley's popul¬
arity, he was chosen to headthe latest junta. The military government
tried again to restrict the preference given to the civil servants.
The 25 per cent tax remained in effect and the civil servants also
lost their free accommodation and other perks, such as the use of
official cars for private business.1 In March, the junta clamped
down on the civil service again. Alley publicly warned them that
they would be suspended for two days without pay each time they were
late for work. The government, he said, was concerned about
unproductivity and the "don't care" attitude among trie civil servants.*"
Furthermore, the military would spot check the governmental offices
for any offenders. The unions continued to express their dis¬
pleasure with limited strike action, but refrained from any major
protest since it wa3 soon obvious to them that the measures were
generally ineffective.
rfnen Sinsou entered the presidency in July 1968, he also
attempted to solve the civil service problem. In May 1969, he
proposed to reduce recruitment into the bureaucracy by expanding
job opportunities in the private sector. lie kept the 25 per cent
tax and reduced family allowances. Thus, in May and June, the
(1) Jnronolo,;ie politique Afrlcaine (oeptemoer-Occober,
1967), p.35.
(2) West Africa (April 9, 1963), p.295.
(3) West Africa (November 5, 1968), p.ll62
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civil service vent on strike. It ended pending negotiations over
family allowances. However, the decision of the Council of Ministers
was to reduce further the allowance from Zh to £1,3 per child.1 To
offset a strike over the decision, diasou issued a decree which
enabled the government to requisition public service workers in case
of a call for strike action.
Although the unions did not actively instigate the 1969
coup, Kouandete seised power against a backdrop of union unrest
and dissatisfaction. Under the last military regime, the civil
service because further entrenched when Zinsou'a ministers resigned
en masse and houaadete replaced them with senior civil servants who
were in direct charge of the ministries.'"
Upper Volta
In Upper Volta, as in Dahomey, the civil service as members
of trade unions were highly politicized. Their violent reaction to
the salary cuts proposed by T«i—OfTi led directly to the 1966 coup.
Lamicana, therefore, was aware of the disproportionate power of
the civil service, he was caught between trying to maintain union
support and attempting to solve the country*a pressing economic
(1) West Africa (July 5, 19C9)$p,JBB.
(2) West Africa (December 27, 1969), p.1591.
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problems which were aggravated by the unions' monetary demands, lie
appeased the unions by alloving them to operate, albeit 'non-
politically*, but he also pushed through severe austerity measures
including a 15 per cent tax on salaries over 10,000 CFA francs which
mainly affected the civil servant and a compulsory patriotic tax
on all wage incomes. By 1969, Lamizana had cut the salaries
of some civil servants as much as 25 per cent and expected the civil
2
servants to farm a sraall garden under the "Full Stomach" program.
Hot only did Lamisana need the political support of the
civil service, but he also needed their assistance in running the
country. The civil service remained virtually intact although in
the 1967 budget there were plans for streamlining it as an econom¬
izing measure. There was also some discontent among the junta at
the state of affairs in the bureaucracy. In August 1966, habere,
the Minister of Public Works, called for reform. He stated that the
civil service was rife witn favouritism, inertia, and waste even
though they received over 50 per cent of the national budget. He
proposed to recruit new men chosen on the "objective" criteria of
productivity, out-put, and efficiency and also to restore tae
principles of authority and subordination. Whether or not he
succeeded is not documented. However, the formal organizational
(1) Ghronologie Politique Africaine (November-December,1967).
(2) New York Time3 (April 20,1969).
(3) Chronologic Politique Africaiae (July-August,1966),
pp.18-19.
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structure of the civil service vas altered vhen the system of
secretariats vas replaced by ministries in 196?.1 There were
both officers and civilians in charge of these ministries, but the
key department, Finance, remained under the leadership of Lt. Marc
Garango.
Lamizana also instigated reforms in regional and local
administration. Municipal councils were replaced by special admin-
i3trative delegations in early 1966. Also, the cereles. left over
from the days of French rule, were replaced by seven departments
headed by a prefet. The departments were divided into 32 arron-
dissements under soua-prefets .and between 120 and 190 communes. The
prefets. sou3-prefets. and mayors were all nominated by military
3 •
decree. Lamizana also returned many of tne administrative
prerogatives back to the traditional chief in the rural areas.
.lonetneless, Lamizana was bedevilled by civil servants
who abused their responsibilities. In May 19b7, there were reports
that governmental scuoolmaaters were interfering in legal problems
suca as land dispute settlements. Also, government medical officers
were accused of acting like village chiefs and gendarmes. Lamizona
broadcast to the nation that he was appalled by the "political
motives which cannot be tolerated". ' but, by this time, the
(1) Ann6e Africaine (196?),pp.278-206.
(2) Cnronolo/: ie Politique Africaine (January-February,1966)p.hO.
(3) Ohronologie lolitique Africaine (May-June,1966),p.27.
(U) West Africa (May 22, 196?),p.5^0.
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civil and public service were deeply entrenched in political
functions.
t**
In conclusion, the general trend in these states has
been first, the reliance by the ruling military junta on tne civil
service and secondly, the problem of the civil service acting as a
pressure group. In Clnana, the civil service regained much of
its independence and influence which had been lost under dkmmah.
After the return to civilian rule in 1969, many who have been famil¬
iar with Ghana remarked now very much tne new regime resembled
the "administocracy" of the Gold Coast. Although there have been
several recent moves to curb the power of the civil service, it
would appear that its close relationship with the HLC regime amplified
and confirmed its powerful position. In Sierra Leone, tne military
government attempted to streamline the civil service in order to
make it a more efficient body for governing. The military was to
rely on the civilian bureaucracy to an increasing extent since so
many of the army officers were imprisoned or sent overseas and,
finally in 1966, the warrant officers, who had little administrative
experience, were to rely on the civil service almost totally. In
Dahomey, the history of its multiple military and civilian
governments is marked by the imposition of ineffectual reforms and
restrictions on the civil service, and tne increasing role of the
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civil service tecliuiciaa in tne governing of the state. The bureau¬
cracy possessed two powerful assets: first, tneir strength as a
pressure group through their union combined with their alliance
with otner unions and secondly, their presence ia the government
as the only instrument of power to have remained intact over the
past decade. They could determine wnich man would govern and how
that man would govern. Apparently, the civil service maintains its
preponderate power tinder the present civilian regime and it is
most likely that whenever civil service and military grievances
coincide, the present government will lose its control. In Upper
Volta, the civil service will play an important role in directing
the type of government which will replace the military junta and
will most assuredly retain much of its present power when the
soldiers return to the barracks. Let us note, however, that the
military regime in Upper Volta faced less complex administrative
problems than the army in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey. Upper
Volta is the least developed state in our study; there were fewer
social groups and forces to co-ordinate. The army's administrative
structure was more adequate in taking over the civilian functions.
Nevertheless, Lamizana found it both expedient and advantageous to
U3e the civil 3ervi.ee apparatus already in operation.
Finally, each of these states will be confronted with the
problem of a bureaucracy which has wide-ranging decision making
and implementation powers. The civilian regimes which follow the
lto.
military juntas will be hampered in their attempts to control the
political role of the civil service.
lUl.
Dissent Ultuin the Array
Cohesion is the capacity for collective action and a feeling
of group solidarity; lac*, of cohesion implies unstable and fragmented
involvement. Cohesion is a major determinant of the strength of
any social institution and as such it will be an important criterion
by which to evaluate the capacity of an African army as a government.
Thus we au3t examine the degree of cohesiveuess of the African
armies which depends, in part, both on the social composition of the
armies as well as their organisational and career experience.^" In
the following section, we will discuss the African officer corps
and the rank and file of the armies and attempt to determine the
causes and effects of unity or the lack of unity within the military
apparatus.
The Officer Corps
The composition of the officer corps in Guana, Sierra j-.eone,
Dahomey and Upper Volta is an important factor in the understanding
of civil-military relations in these states i'or it is these men
who conduct the actions of the rank and file and who are in direct
contact and conflict with the civilian elites. We must not under¬
estimate the significance of their level of coiiesiveness and some
clue may be found in their origins,
(l) Morris Janowita, The Military in the Political development
of hew hations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19bU),p.70.
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In Ghana, the Africanization of the officer corps began
in the early 1950's. The first to he commissioned were dCO's in the
educational service and included G*i««r=».is Arkran, Ocr&n ana ^otala.1
Cadets were first sent to britiau military colleges in 1953 and even
after the opening of the Ghana Military Academy at Teahie in I960,
the most promising young cadets were sent to Gandhurst. Education
was o. prime determinant of officer candidate selection and thus, the
majority of the officers are from the southern regions, reflecting
the greater educational opportunities there. After independence,
tnere was pressure to Africanize the entire officer corps, To
attract secondary school and university graduates, the haaie salary
for a newly commissioned lieutenant was £663 p.a., which compared
favourably with the salary given new civil service recruits. The
number of Ghanaian officers increased from 27 id 19&5 to over 700
ten years later. In Sierra Leone, only 9 of tne 50 officers were
2African at the time of independence. by 19t>7* there were
65 African officers and only 10 expatriates. "The existence of a
small Creole population of the Freetown area in juxtaposition with
a medley of tribes (especially the rival Mende-Xemne groups) nas
never made military recruitment a simple question". Selection
of officers was based on educational requirements and the Creoles
(1) William F.Gutteridge, "Military Elites in Gnana and
ligeria", in African. Forum Vol.2, Go.l (Summer, 1966),pp.32-3*.
(2) Africa Keporu. Vol.9,Go.1 (January 196U),p.i7.
(3) Africa Confidential.do.6.(March 17,1967)»P»3.
1U3.
and to some degree trie Meade shared the advantage. due re was also
the monetary incentive; new JLeuteuanta were acarted at a salary of
£720 p.a.
In French treat Africa, France began to make special arrange¬
ments for officer canoxantes under the Aessortiasanta dca
1-jrri.toires Fuu.r--r. "nec-nse tua Freneu were wording within
the unity of a single ar«y, they were able to male a single plan
for all their French-speaking African territories. Freparatory
military schools were organised and an African officer training
academy, L'Leole General declare, was established in Chad in 1955""
5o. The overall program called for the creation of 13 colonels,
20 lieutenant colonels, 59 enefs le batallion3. li*2 captains, and
172 lieutenants and sub-lieutenanta. The emphasis placed on
Africanization was largely due to the imminent retirement of nearly
half of the 75 African officers during the 1950*s, by 1900, the
French antsy contained 193 African officers altnougn tae majority
2
were junior in rand."" At independence the officers returned
to the respective countries to form the command staff of the
national armies.
There were several adverse effects of rapid Africanization.
First, since tue African officer corps is a recent phenomenon, it
(1) J.M.Lee, African Armies and Civil Order (London1 Ghetto
and Windua for The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1939).p.35*
(2) ibid.. p.39.
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is small.1 This restricts its capacity to govern as the loss of
only a few officers, the elite, weakens the authority structure of
a small array. The array can rarely sustain the loss of officers
during the coups and the shuffling off of "questionable officers"
to diplomatic posts overseas. The absorption of the military elite
into governmental administration posts will reduce the officer corps
ana also split those officers who are still involved with the day-to-
day military routine and those who are now involved in the nation's
politics. Moreover, a small officer corps will be limited in its
ability to develop and maintain a differentiated set of roles within
the military establishment whicn are necessary for effective
, , p
political control.
The officer corps under examination in this thesis were all
plagued to varying degrees by these problems stemming from their small
size. In Ghana, the hLC rid itself of those officers who had held
positions in the CPP or who were believed to have sympathies for
Hkrumab. For example, Major-General hatnan Aferi, hkruman's Chief
of Staff, was appointed ambassador to Mexico, "an appointment he is
3
said to have accepted with some reluctance." After the abortive
(1) African armies are small. J.M.Lee,p.5,gives the following
based on 1961 estimates.
Array size Air lorea Size Aavy Ji-^e African officers
Ghana lU,000 1,000 1,000 700
Sierra Leone 1,200 - 50 65
Dahomey 1,750 18 - 30
Upper Volta 1,700 15 - 53
(2)A.R.Luckham,"A Comparative Typology of Civil-Military Relations"
Government and Opposition.Vol.6, io.l,(Winter,1971) ,pp.3-35.
(3) William F.Gutteridge.fhe Military in African Politics (London:
Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1969),p.113.
1^5.
coup in April 1967 during which General Kotoka was killed, the
Commander of the Aruy, Major-General C.C. Bruce, and the Commander of
the Davy, Hear-Admiral Hansen, were assigned to W&aoingtoa and
London respectively. hot only did tnia remove several experienced
officers, but it also suggests that there was a growing split between
those officers who remained the active heads of the regular
forces and those in the ruling junta, The commanding officers were
held responsible for the actions of their subordinates.
In Sierra Leone, the officer corps was reduced when rival
officers war® either posted outside the country or otherwise removed
from the 3cene. Colonel Ambrose Genda, vno at one time had been
. 2
recalled to lead the HKC, was appointed ambassador to Liberia.
Bar.sana, the instigator of the first coup, va3 sent to Waauington
a& Defence Auvisor. Bight officers including colonel Bangura who
vera alleged to uavc plotted against Margai in January 19o7 were
3
cither retired or awaiting orders on "special duties". uowever, the
situation reached its crisis when the entire officer corps was in
prison, exile, or retired after the Warrant Officers' coup in 1968.
At this time, the Sierra Leone army was forced to requisition British
officers to fill in the gap.
In Dahomey, there was a game of musical chairs going on
between the officers in power and those posted overseas, in exile,
(1) no (.on Ouserver, Vol.11, ho.10 (12-25 May,1967)»p.22.
(2) Africa Report, Vol.12, ho.7 (October,19b7),p.56.
(3) Africa Report, Vol.12, ho.6 (June 19b7),p.^8.
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or under arrest. Boglo joined the other ex-presidents and vice-
presidents in Paris after he was ousted in 19&7• Kouandete placed
Alley, his persistent rival, under arrest in 1969 during the Zinsou
reign. he later arrested Sinzogan and placed other officers
under surveillance in January 1970 during the dramatic confrontation
among the members of the Military Directorate."*"
In Upper Volta there is no evidence to suggest that Lamizana
removed fellow officers who may have rivalled his position. through¬
out this section, we will notice that the officer corps in Upper
Volta retained its cohesiveness to a greater degree than their
compatriots in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey. We propose that one
reason for this phenomenon was that these men were operating in a
society in which there were relatively few politicized groups and thus
there were fewer strong external pressures that might divide the army.
Furthermore, the Voltaic army retained its sense of military discipline
from its long involvement with the French army.
The small size of African armies has affected its ability to
rule in that it weakens the authority structure within the military
and inhibits the formation of differentiated and specialized role3
necessary for political activity outside the military. However,
although these armies are small, they have grown at an unrealistic
rate since independence. A second problem of rapid Africanization
has been that the rapid expansion of the armed forces meant that there
were "few people experienced in colonial methods to hand on
(l) Kaye Whiteman, "The Military Regimes of Togo and Dahomey"
unpublisnea seminar paper presented at the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, (November, 1970) p. 16. Quoted with author's permission.
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a seu3e of tradition to new recruits."1 Th« anglophone countries
were particularly affected by this. For example, Ghana's aray
O
increased "by 10. U per cent between i960 and 1967. The result of
this rapid expansion wan that the socialization process which the new
officers underwent during their military training, and active partic¬
ipation in the army was Incomplete. The problem becomes more apparent
when we consider the motives for the young officers' entrance into
the army. These men wera drawn largely from the rural areas;
they were the sons of farmers or minor civil service officials. As
Gutteridga 3aid about the Ghana case: "An army officer at present is
more likely to be the son of a peasant cocoa farmer or post office
official than of a professional man who will probably have educated
hia son for the bar or the civil service or a similar occupation
of established prestige." The officer candidates view tne aray
as a path to social mobility and security. It is a strong career
choice for the young men froa tne hinterlands aa it gives expression
to personal ambition. however, although the officers received
their training and served in Western inspired institutions, they tend
to think of themselves more in terms of local criteria of success
and position than in terms of metropolitan professionalism.^ As
Etzioni states: "Background factors such as social origin, early
(l) Lee. p. 101.
(2; ibiu., p.105.
(3) William F. Gutteridge, ffiie Armed Forces in dew States.
(London: Institute of Race Relations,1963),p.M.
(1+) Lee, pp.99-101.
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socialization, extra-organizational membership which precede partic¬
ipation in the organization influence the degree of coaesion and
direction of involvement in the organization".1 In the African
setting, it is generally evident that tue operations of even the moat
modern institutions are governed by norms which stem from both the
new and residual sets. The implication is that the officers who
and interests
are still linked to their traditional society's norms/will form cliques
along ethnic and regional lines. This will have ramifications prior
to military intervention when sections of the officer corps will
move to protect the interest of their regions (e.g. Sierra Leone and
Dahomey). Moreover, and of greater interest to our study, these
regional and ethnic splits witnin the officer corps will limit the
ability of the ruling junta to act as a corporate unit.
In Ghana, the first sign of rivalry among the military rulers
came with the dismissal of Air Marshall Otu on accusation of sub¬
version in early 1968. He was detained although no evidence was
3
brought against him and finally released in late 1969. On April
2, 1969, General Ankrah was forced to resign from tne LLC after ne
was found guilty of accepting bribes for political purposes. Then
on May 5th, tne J'LC announced that Junoo, Commissioner of Police and
& member of the JLC, would also retire. Junoo had issued a statement
impugning the accuracy of the JLC notice which listed the names of
(1) Aaitai Ltzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organiz¬
ations . (Hew York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 196l),p.lU6.
(2) Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in
the Jew States of Africa", American Political Science Review.Vol.jDCXI.
Ho.1.(March 1963),p.72.
(3) hegoa Observer. Vol.IV,Jo.22 (27 October-6 Jovember,1969)»P-21.
(U) heron Observer. Vol.IV,Jo.10 (9-23 May,1969),p.11.
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the politicians alleged, to have bribed Ankrah. The BLC declared that
this was a breach of the Oath of Secrecy and justification for
Hunoo's resignation.1 The composition of the HLC had cnanged. Both
Hunoo and Ankrah were Ga; after their removal, the HLC appeared to
many to be dominated by jive. This was to have a decided effect
on the elections prior to the return to civilian rule.
In Sierra Deone, the military remained split along ethnic and
regional lines. The Mende-Creole co-operation aggravated the Menae-
Temne split there. In Dahomey, the officer corps eventually came
to mirror the tri-partite division of tne country. In Upper Volta,
there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the officer corps
split along ethnic lines. There were, however, rumours of dissent
within the army and Robert Coeffe, the Secretary of State for Defence,
2
was sufficiently concerned to issue statements denying the rumours.
It appears that the army acted as a whole to bolster the traditional
aspects of the society as seen in the re-instatemeat of the powers
of the i^.oro Naba, the itossi ruler. However, other tnan the case
of Upper Volta, the original ruling military elites were beginning
to show signs of disintegration. This breakdown of tne ruling
junta impaired its ability to rule effectively.
Another aspect of rapid Africanization was that it distorted
the age structure and promotional pattern within the officer corps.
"The promotion system is designed to deal with ... iatargenerational
(1) ibid.
(2) Chronologie Politique Africaine (September-October,1966),p.33.
cleavage by regulating tue flow of officers through the ranks and by
holding out to new recruits the promise of a successful and orderly
career."1 However, the promotional pattern in new African armies
is unstable. The rapid rise in rank of African officers to
replace the departing colonial officials enabled many of them to
obtain relatively responsible posts at an early age. A few of these
officers developed unrealistic expectations concerning tueir role and
2
this produced fantastic ambitions. Furthermore, once the
officer corps had been fully indigenized, promotion at the senior
level was blocked. Added to the ethnic and regional splits,
trie frustration of the middle and lower ranking officers prohibited
the development of a cohesive officer corps. This was particularly
evident where either there was a small gap in age, experience and
rank between persons in command and those in subordinate positions
or the higher echelons of officers had come up through the ranks as
opposed to the younger Sandhurst or St.Cyr trained officers. Thus,
the officer corps is divided both along generational lines and
between those officers wno trained locally and those who trained
abroad. These cliques, in turn, become focal points of instability
when aggravated by grievances and conflicts derived from other
sources."
(1) Janovitz, p.71«
(2) A.R.Luckham, "Tne ttigeri&a Military: Disintegration or
Integration?" in Higerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to tue




The moat aerioua display of inter-generational discontent;
in tne Gilana officer corps was the abortive coup led by Lts. Artnur
and Teboah in April,1967. The Reconnaissance Squadron under
Lt. Arthur capttired Flagstaff House, Oau Castle, and the radio
station before the movement disintegrated. nevertheless, before
those involved were arrested, there was considerable confusion
both in the army and tne nation.* Several motives for the coup were
mentioned during the trial. There were rumours of inter-tribal
conflict since all the officers killed were nwe, but there is little
evidence to support that the coup was an Asnanti-Faati plot. Also,
claims of GPP backing were discredited. The basic motive was tne
young officers' frustrations over promotions and pay especially in
view of the NLC members' rapid rise in rank. The inter-generational
conflict within the army was most aptly demonstrated by Arthur'3
plan to shoot anyone above the rank of colonel.
The 3LC dealt quickly and harshly with the rebels. Several
were given jail sentences of UO years. Arthur and Yeboah were
publicly executed on May 9,1967. 'The NLC spoilt the international
image it had been carefully cultivating. The shocked expression of
the Sunday Times editorial was typical of world reactions "It was a
major justification of the coup against Nkrumah that his rule in
Ghana had become despotic and brutal ... But one thing he did not
do was to stage a double execution by machine gun before a crowd
(l) Legon Observer Vol.11, No.9 (23 April-May 11,1967)»p.23
General Ankrah Stated: 'The Ghana Army as a whole remains loyal
to the NLC."
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of 20,000 people."1 21m SLC withstood the storm of criticism. It
was, however, deeply troubled by its sluggish reaction in organiaing
effective resistance to a poorly co-ordinated and minor challenge
to its authority. Thus, in early 1968, a Defence Council was
established and charged with advising the Executive Committee of tne
dhC in all natters of defence and security. Meaavaile, increased
emphasis was placed on training in communications and weaponry.
Finally, the JLC moved to investigate tne young officers* grievances.
In Sierra Leone, Juxon-Saitn had taxea precautions to counter
an effective challenge from his officers by posting some "suspicious"
officers overseas and dismissing and arresting otaers. Therefore,
the discontent was centred among the Warrant Officers and JCO's. The
19b7 coup which we discussed in Chapter II was sparked by tae
grievances of the rank and file.
Inter-generational disputes were rampant in Dahomey. Soglo
was disliked by the younger officers because tney saw hia as a
rather simple-minded soldier who had come up through the ranks. The
senior officers, in turn, did not trust tne young "intellectuals" who
had trained at St.Cyr and aad no operational experience in Indochina
or Algeria. The rift between the older and younger generation
officers became a serious threat to tae government doglo had
established after tae 19b5 coup. At tnat time, boglo nad set up
(1) Duauaq Ixmuu (.4a* ih,iyi/f)p.iu.
(2) Africa deport. Vol.12,no.6 (June lyo7)p.k4
(3) Africa he port. Vol.13,Jo.5 (May ,1968) ,p.38
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a makeshift legislature, the Comite ae Renovation rationale (CM),
however, in early 19&7, ooglo faced increased criticism of his govern¬
ment and pressure was on him to set up a military vatcuuog to supervise
the activities of the civilians and older officers on the CRS. In a
letter presented to him by a commission of officers, the grievances
were formally aired. It read:
The people of Dahomey are left in complete
ignorance of who really governs. Is the country
riiled by civilians, by those very elements who disclaim
all political responsibilities? Is it ruled by a
handful of high-ranking officers who can no longer
seriously claim to represent the army? Or is it ruled
by the soldiers and junior officers - who will eventually
be held answerable for the unfortunate consequences
of the errors made by the present regime?1
The report also criticised the corruption and mismanagement,
clannishness, cabinet rivalries, and the total inability of the
government to come to grips with the economic crisis. In response
to tne report, doglo replaced the CM with the Coiaite Mlitaire ae
Vigilance. This va3 essentially the voice of tne younger officers
and brought into prominence for the fir3t time kouaudate. The 19b7
coup led by houondeto, as we discussed earlier, was largely a result
of the inter-generational conflict in the bahomean army*
Kouaadete as spokesman for the jaunes cadres led the dispute
against Alley who was to become the voice of the older officers.
As we shall see in the final chapter, this feud set the background
(l) Rene jjemarcnand, "Dahomey: Coup Within a Coup", Africa
Report. Vol.13, ho.6 (Juno 19b0), p.52.
for the attempts of the Alley regime to return power to a civilian
government in 1968 and for the emergence and collapse of the Zinsou
regime from July 1968 to December 1969.^
Therefore, the Danomean army was deeply divided and its lack
of cohesion limited its ability to govern effectively. The
internal disputes of the army mirrored the problems of the country.
Le Monde nwuriud the disunity in the army: "Heme dans le caa
du Dahomey, 1' affrontanient entre factions militaire se revel® stoins
brutal, des oppositions profondea existent entre les nouveaux promus
atcolea de guerre et les soiaats sort is du rang, entre cadres
/ 2
dforigine ethniques differentes ...M~
In Upper Volta, there has been little evidence of inter-
generational rivalries. A generational split may develop as Upper
Volta moves toward civilian rule. The younger officers favoured
the MLS, a more radical, anti-Catholic party; its papers are read in
their mess. The older generation of officers favoured the more
3
traditional, conservative RDA. Tue army had maintained its
traditional hierarchy and strong internal discipline but tnis may be
destroyed if certain officers were to embark on political adventures
to serve their own ends. Laraiaana i3 aware of this, and during the
first moves toward ra-civilianisation, he has attempted to keep seme
political power in the hands of the military so that he might promote
(1) Whitenar., p.lH
(2) Le Monde (December 19, 1967),p.J.
(3) Interview with Mr. Kaye Whiteman (March,1971).
the best qualified officers himself.^
we hare seen how the officer corps in tnese states are divided
along regional, ethnic, generational, or training-experience lines,
•iot all of these dimensions pertain to all countries; in fact,
it appears that Upper Volta is an exception on most counts. A further
source of the absence of cohesion in these armies is the lack of
successful operational experience. They have rarely had the oppor¬
tunity to teat their combat skills. The armies of British and French
colonies did have some combat experience in World War II, but since
only a few of the men were officers at the time, this had little impact.
Soglo and Lamizana fought in Algeria and Indochina, but the large
majority of their fellow officers had never served outside their count¬
ries. The Ghana army, which did send a contingent to the UW mission
in the Congo, returned with a poor combat record. It was, in fact, tueir
function in internal security matters tuat furtner reduced the level
of self-esteem and ataauards of cohesion.
We will conclude our discussion of the officer corps in
these states with a brief examination of their level of profession¬
alism. Here there are difficulties in applying Western norms to
the African situation. nonetheless, professionalism is defined as
the possession of a distinguishable corpus of specific technical
knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group cohesion, a
(l) He Honde Weekly paction (^May 13, 19T0)
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complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern
adapted to its own aims, a career structure of its own, and. a dis¬
tinct place in the society in vaich it exists.1
Fir3t, the military profession does include a specific body
of technical knowledge and doctrine - that is, the specialization
in violence. But not only have we shown in the first section of
this chapter that such knowledge is at a relatively primitive stage
of development in comparison to traditional Western armies, but
also this knowledge and the organizational and skill structure built
around it are not readily transferable to viable and effective
political leadership. Secondly, ve have shown tnat the officer
corps is divided into numerous ethnic, regional, generational and
educational background groups. The formation of various pear
groups may be a result of the integrative and socialization function
of army life, but these same groups, when reinforced by other
2
grievances, tend to disintegrate the officer corps. ihus, the
officer corps does not represent a cohesive unit. Thirdly, the
military does possess a complex of organizations peculiar to
itself, but once it enters the political arena, the boundaries
between the civilian and military organizations are segmented.
Fourthly, the career structure of the army, because of rapid African¬
ization, has tended to split the officer corps not only along
(1) Sir -John hackett. The Profession of Arms (Lee Kncvlcs
Lectures) (London: The Times Publishing Company Ltd., 1962).
(2) Luckham, "The Nigerian Military: disintegration or
Integration?" p.73.
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generational lines but also between those men in direct contact with
the ranis and file and those who have assumed government adminis¬
trative duties. Finally, the army in Africa has not yet established
a distinct place in the society in which it exists. During the past
decade, its rale has been an increasing involvement in the political
process culminating in the overthrow of its civilian sponsor, the
government.
Joes the issue of professionalism enter into our discussion
at all? 'ihere are those (eg. Finer and Luckhaa) who propose that
it is the lack of professional standards which leads the military
to intervene in politics. Others (e.g. Gutterioge and Janovitz)
have maintained that it is in fact that very professionalism which
has taken the army into politics. And still others (e.g. Van
Doom) who deny that professionalism has anything to do with it at
all, but instead it i3 the lack of institutional controls throughout
the society and the military that results in coups d'etat. In
this study,however, wa are assessing the ability of the officer corps
to govern. It appears that a low level of professionalism,partic¬
ularly tne criterion of cohesion, hinders the army in its role as
governor. Unable to maintain unity within the army, the ruling
junta is circumscribed in its efforts to provide leadership for a
developing country. As ve shall see in the final chapter, the
disintegration of the original conspiratorial clique precipitates
their withdrawal from political power.
The Rank and File
The composition of the rank and file of African armies also
gives rise to incoaesiveness. In tinana, the colonial pattern of
recruitment had no fixed ethnic or tribal quota, Traditionally, the
recruit was an illiterate Moslem from the north since he van considered
to be more reliable and disciplined for duty in tae more populated
areas. In 1961 this ethnic imbalance vas still obvious - nearly 60
per cent of the recruits were from tae northern Territories. In
Sierra Leone, recruitment campaigns were carried out once or twice a
year whenever it was necessary to refill the ranks. As long; as the
Creole who looked down on military service refused to enlist, the Mende-
Temne rivalry reinforced and consolidated the major tribe. The French
recruited from the so-called martial races and these recruits were
generally from the more backward and remote areas. Although these
states have now instituted a policy of basing recruitment on tribal
quotas and educational requirements, the ethnic and regional imbalance
adversely affects the numerical and political balance of the military
organization. These cleavages still exist in spite of tne training
process which these fcroups undergo. Theoretically, as the new
recruits are brought together under training conditions, a process of
ra-socialisation takes place. These men, removed from traditional
links and separated from tue rest of society, are provided a high
degree of psychological security by the military system as they undergo
159.
this rapid acculturation. The result is a "modern man" who aas been
taugnt not only tecnuicai know-how but also the importance of citizen¬
ship.1 nowever, as in tue case of officer candidates, tae integrative
function of tae military is not complete in developing countries
since the "amount of socialization required by organizations depends,
of course, on the degree to vhich organizational behaviour differs from
H 2
the behaviour tne participants have learned elsewuere . The etnnic
and regional cleavages exist among tne rank and file in spite of the
training process. "Armies in new states are particularly vulnerable
to the problems stemming from etonic and religious heterogeniety,
because the army itself is associated with specific ethnic groups and
because the norms of the military may lead to an insensitivity to
these ethnic/religious values. And these are not mutually exclusive
possibilities." These cleavages make it possible for outside
pressure groups (eg. tribal associations, political factions) to seek
alliances vitn segments of the military vhica cause problems of control
for tne regime and serve to make tne military a major foaus of political
conflict. Finally, tne ethnic and regional differences become outlets
of expressions of tension for a wnole range of problems within the arty
and also within tae wider political context. It was only in
(1) hucien Fye, "armies in tne Process of Political Moderniz¬
ation" in The Hole of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, edited
by J. J". Joanson (Princeton; hew Jersey; Princeton University Press,
1962),p.S3.
(2) Etzioni, p.l83.
(3) H.Bienen, "Public Order and Military in Africa", in Tae
Military Intervenes. Edited by ii.iiienen (tiev Xorkt Russell Jage
Foundation, 1968),p.177.
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Sierra Leone that we have evidence to show that sections of the
military outside the officer corps became a political force independent
of the leadership of the officers. This situation came to a head when
the LCO'a and Warrant Officers over-threw the Juxaon-Cmith regime.
This was not so much a result of ethnic conflict (although the Warrant
Officers were to bring the AFC into power) but rather a generational
conflict and a personal dislike for Juxson-Lmith whose junta enjoyed
the fruits of power while the rank and file received few benefits
under URC rule.
#*##*#»#****
In conclusion, we have seen in this section what the problems
of cohesiveness are in the new armies of Africa. These problems are
reflected both in the officer corps and in the rank and file or
between the two groups and stein from ethnic, regional, experience, and
generational differences. The effects of disunity upon the military
government limit its ability to rule effectively. When a large percentage
of time and energy are expended on the control of the army itself, the
junta is hard-put to solve the pressing social, economic, and political
problems facing the country. The army itself becomes a hot-bed of
intrigue with different sections of the army conspiring to overtarow
the present military government or at least placing additional





Thh ECONOMIC POLICIES OF MILITARY GOVLRHHEdl'S
When the military assumes direct political power, it is called
upou to give direction to the economic system of the state. An
effective gauge for measuring the success or failure of military regimes,
therefore, is to review their strategic contribution to the management
of the economy.1 There are basic limitations of the military in
supplying economic leadership to the country. As ve discussed in the
previous chapter, these limitations include a low level of administrative
skills and training, the lack of adequate goals, and deficiencies of
personnel. Furthermore, the military governments inherited catastrophic
financial situations from the civilian regimes they had overthrown.
In the following chapter, we will note that the record of
military regimes is unimpressive as measured ay over-all economic
development. The military proved incapable of ruling in any sense
wider than putting tue economy on a care and maintenance basis.
Although the juntas in these states were effective in preventing the
total collapse of tae economic systems, their inadequacy in directing
economic development became apparent. First, "if a generalisation
is possible, it is tu&t the wider tne sphere of economic involvement,
(1) Morris Janovitz, Tne Military in the Political development
of dew nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964),p.73.
(2) 8.L.Finer, Man on horseback. (London: Fall Mall Press,
1962),p.16.
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the less effectively is the military able to perform.The military
operates with limited effectiveness in directing specific projects,
but in tasks of managing vide sectors of the economy the military
suffers from limitations inherent in the profession. Secondly, the
more complex the economy, the less success will the military have in
its attempts to direct economic development. In a primitive society,
the economic development of such countries vould be veil vithin the
capabilities of the army. "The more primitive the economy, the
easier it is for the armed forces to administer it by purely military
«2
means and measures. However, as the economy expands, as the
division of labour becomes more extensive, as the secondary and tertiary
services develop, the junta must rely on a trained professional
bureaucracy, technicians, and the like for the management of the economy.
We will examine the record of the military in their handling
of economic affairs such as industrial and agricultural development,
the budget, external trade, etc. With the use of the available
statistical data, ve will attempt to delineate a general trend in the
economic policies of the military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Dahomey and Upper Volta.
Ghana
In Chapter II, we discussed the financial situation in Ghana
prior to the 1966 coup. The export of cocoa is Ghana's major source
(1) Janovitz, p. 30.
(2) Finer, p. 15.
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of income. Nearly ^0 per cent of the cocoa on the world market is
contributed by Ghana, and thus, any increase of production of cocoa
resulted, in a decrease in world market prices rather than increased
revenue for Ghana. As such, Ghana is highly dependent on fluctuations
in the price of cocoa which the government cannot control to its benefit.
The drop in the price of cocoa in the early i960*a was a major factor
underlying Ghana's economic and financial ills.
In order for Ghana to achieve an adequate growth rate, it is
necessary to -increase not only agricultural production ana productivity,
but also agricultural diversification. Moreover, it is necessary
to increase food production both for domestic use and export. However,
under Hkrumah there was perhaps undue emphasis on the expansion of
infrastructure and industrialization at the expense of agricultural
development. While the transport and power facilities, particularly
the Volta River Project, may yield benefits in the future and are a
strong base for future development, much of the investment in state
enterprises was ill-advised. Furthermore, excessive expenditure on
prestige projects, the expense of a swollen bureaucracy for the
management of state economic projects, and the poorly arranged
financial agreement with both the Hast and West all contributed to
the financial problems facing Ghana in 1966. ^ There were
enormous problems: inflation,/...
(1) All statistics from West Africa (1966-1969). Africa Report
(1966-1969) U.N. Statistical Yearbook 196$, hegoa Observer (1966-1969)
and Bank of Ghana Economic Bulletins.
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and & spiraling coat of living; the imbalance of tne government
budget; unemployment; and the massive external debt that vaa tied to
an unfavourable balance of payments account. Drastic action vas
imperative to arrest the downhill trend of the economy. Ironically,
the xihrumah regime had proposed such actions. In presenting tne last
budget only a few days before the coup, Mr Amoaxa-Atta tiJhrumah' s finance
Minister, stated: "Failure to make exchange controls even stricter
than they might have been might result in a financial crisis of
such magnitude that it would be difficult to crush".^ The cost of
development had been high. Foreign exchange reserves were down from
£170 million in 1957 to £5 million in September 196? and probably
nil by February 1966. Moreover, the situation had been aggravated
by the loss of £30 million in foreign exchange due to the fall in
world cocoa prices. Amoaka-Atta estimated that 29 per cent of the
export earnings would be necessary to finance the national debt in
1966, a fact echoed by the iiLC.
The C?P 1966-67 budget, therefore, set out strict austerity
measures. The government expenditure vas estimated to be £169
million by December compared to the £19^ m. budget for the previous
year. Government revenue was estimated to be £115 m. The £70 m.
deficit vas to be made up of £90 is. from a new motor vehicles
registration fee, a proposed 3jt per cent rental tax, and £9 *• loan
(l) West Africa (February 2(5,1966),p.2U6.
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from the World Bank. Other remedial measures recommended by the
IMF had been introduced including a reduction of cocoa prices paid to
the farmers and rationalization of the licensing policy. however, the
major problem was excess of government spending over revenue and this
had "obviously not been tackled or in Dr.Kkrumah's eyes, even
realised."1
The HLC found itself in the midst of economic chaos. The
first four months after the coup have been termed the "emergency phase".
During this period, the HLC with the help of their Economic Committee
headed by the able economist E.N.Omaboe struggled to insure the supply
of essential commodities (with aid from Canada and the U.S. PlA8o)
and to restore the confidence of businessmen in the Ghanaian economy.
Other steps were taken to review uneconomic ventures. Fourteen
embassies were closed, the Ghana Airways and Black Star Line were cut
back, and the dredging of the Tema harbour and the second phase of
the Accra-Tena Highway were postponed. Mast pressing, however,
was the country's balance of payments situation combined with the
enormous debt which was estimated at £200 m. at the time of tae coup.
The IMF was called in to give recommendations for a general overhaul
of the economy. It agreed to lend Ghana £13 m. to uelp cover the
immediate balance of payments difficulties. Bong term, low interest
loans were also forthcoming from the U.S., U.K., and other Western
(1) ibid.. p.231.
(2) General Ankrah, "The Future of the Military in Ghana",
African Forum. Vol.2, No.l, (Summer,1966),p.6.
nations. A London Conference was held to examine the ra-aneduling of
the debt and similar negotiations were carried out with other
supplier nations. The highest priority was given to the re-scheduling
of debts and by 1969 the HLC had paid HQ 220 m.1 of the HQ 88© m. debt
accumulated by that time.
let, from hindsight, the HLC eould have adopted a more
positive and realistic approach to these supplier's credits,
for it is common knowledge that Ghana was overcharged or
actually diddled on a number of contracts.^
Instead of de-faulting portions of the debt as zaany had suggested, the
3
NLC followed the notion that a "gentleman always pays his debts".
Moreover, since the NLC had to borrow HQ llhia. to keep projects going,
tie total indebtedness at the end of their rule was HQ 1,003m. or HQ
125 per captia in a country which nas a per capita income of Nj2 211.
In June 1966, Afrifa, Minister of Finance, announced a major
economic proposal that dealt with the thirty-seven state-owned
corporations. Seven of these were to be turned over to the private
sector and eleven were to be adapted to joint state-private ownership.
Even Mr Amoaka-Atta had implied that something had to be done :
"...the performance of the state-owned corporation ... is a sad commen¬
tary on the efficiency of the management when compared to the performance
of Joint State-Private enterprises".*1 Many of these projects
(1) 1 HC » hip.
(2) Legon Observer. Vol.IV,No.21 (10-23 October,1969) ,P»H.
(3) Robert M.Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule
in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case", World
Polities, Vol. XXIII, Ho.3 (April,1971),p.U26.
(U) West Africa. (July 2, 1966),p.735.
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were poorly conceived ana located ana, inaeea, Hue record of tae eighteen
to be released from total state control was not laudable. The Marble
Worhs had lost 1526,000 or 10 per cent of its total assets; the ooatyarus,
£87,000 or hO per cent; the Film Industry, £133,000 or 20 per cent; the
Cannery Corporation £95,000 or 150 per cent. In view of their financial
condition, it was difficult to find private investors to take on these
enterprises. By 1966, three uad been converted to private ownersnip,
three to joint ownership, and nineteen were merged with the Guana
1 ...
Industrial holding Corporation by aLG Decree. inere was criticism
that tne IILC had turned over many of tne firms to overseas investors.
hot only did the ILC de-nationalize those industries tuat nad a higner
probability of giving profits to attract foreign investors but it also
2
offered additional tax incentives to the foreign investors.
In July 1906, the HLC announced the first of many austerity
budgets. hue estimated government expenditure of £lu7 a. and revenue
of £123 m. plus capital receipts of £23 m. left a deficit of £18 m.
however, the £33 s. debt repay.:ient due that year nad been included in
the government expenditure sine. It was uoped tnat £18 m. could be
re-scheduled anu the budget would be balanced. at tne end of tn&t
fiscal year, real expenditure was J# 266.9 m. and revenue only UJ2 230.9 m.
The real deficit 01" hyi id a. was made up by loans to leave a recorded
(1) Inst /-.frim. ( larch 30, 1968)p.735.
(2) Price, op cit.
168.
deficit of Hp 18m.
The immediate effect of reduced government spending was a
substantial increase in unemployment. Although there were plans for
more labour intensive projects sucn as roaa construction and low-cost
housing, this budget did not offer the incentives for the appropriate
labour that was needed.1 By the end of military rule, over 100,000 work¬
ers had been considered reaunuant and one out of four workers were
2
registered as unemployed. Unemployment was one of the graver issues
with wnich the NLC proved incapable of aandling. It remains so today
and nas had severe repercussions.
The 1966-67 Budget was also aimed at helping tue standard of
living. The tax on foodstuffs imported from other African countries
was eliminated and the duty on petrol was reduced to assist the trans¬
port of food within Ghana. The cocoa farmers were exempted from
income tax on their cocoa sales. In fact, the proposed tax system
was designed "to spread the tax net more widely to cover every able
3
bodied person who is gainfully employed and who is eligible to pay tax.
The major criticisms of the first l*uC budget were tnat it
relied too heavily on the private sector for development and that it
va3 based too rnucii on hindsigat. la all, it was for staoilization;
it was an attempt to balance the budget by decreasing expenditure,
not increasing taxation, perhaps impossible under the circumstances.
(1) Get.on Observer. Vol.I,ho.3 (August, 5*i96o),p.3
(2) Colin ueguia, The Observer. (February 1,1970),p.2. Bote also
that unemployment was partially a result of tae population increase
and the flow of school leavers onto the job market.
(3) West Africa. (July 30,1966),p.855.
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To stop inflation, the MLC attempted to reduce expenditure
on imports by holding down the demand through fiscal, monetary, mid
licensing policies. Also, in July 1907 » the cadi was devalued by
thirty per cent. Although tnia would eventually raise the cost of
living anu reuuce real income, devaluation was the major policy for
reactivating the economy. Sais policy was designed to stimulate export
productioni tne producers of export goods receivea 30 per cent more
local currency althougn their goods earned the same in foreign currency.
These policies had some success. One measure of this was tne fact
that the bank loan rates fell from 7 per cent in i960 to 5a per cent
in early 1968. "The rapidly rising price level which was a marked
feature before the change in government in 1966 has now been brougnt
« 2
into control .
It was with this back-ground that the hLC announced its budget
for 1967-68. Government expenditure was estimated at £196.6 at., up
£29.6 m. from the previous year. Government revenue was estimated at
&IM.35 m. * up £19.39 it was hoped that with more foreign aid and
tax adjustments to maximise revenue, the receipts would total £92.39 »•
which would mean & surplus of £100,000. however, at the end of the
fiscal period, expenditure had equalled hp 399.2 m. and revenue only
up 29^.1. much of tne hp 69.1 deficit was made up tnrougn loans, but
it was still larger than the deficit in the 1966-6 7 year. The
(1) henry Ord ana I.niviagstione, .in Inurouuciloa to West. African
Leonardos. (London: beineoaan,1969) ,p. 391.
(2) Africa Bgjgort, Vol.12, Jo.7, (October,1967) ,p.^9
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economy had been stopped, on its drastic downhill run, but then it
began to stagnate. At the end of 1967* the GDP was increasing at a
rate of 2.4 per cent, out tnia was due largely to tue good weather
conditions for food grain. however, the GOP had fallen by 0.6 per
cent at currant market prices.1 With the population increasing
at 2.6 per cent a year, tne growth rate of the economy was actually
retrogressive.
In view of these circumstances, the 1968-69 budget was signi¬
ficant for the new policy assumptions behind it. Government expend¬
iture was estimated at US 1*29.3 a., government revenue was estimated
at US 31*0.1* m., leaving a deficit of US 88.9 a. There was general
sympathy for tne under-privileged groups which was reflected in the
clear intention to tax luxury goods while easing the burden on the lower
income worker. Jevertheless, the 1LC did not follow up this policy.
A 5 per cent import duty on essential commodity goods such as sugar,
milk, flour, and rice was imposed in February 1969 which further aggra¬
vated the shortage of foodstuffs." In this budget, tnere was also
new emphasis on the rural sector. Tax concessions were to be granted
to industries locating outside the Accra-Tema area ana US 6 m. va3 set
asido for water development, however, as in all the 1ILC budgets,
there was insufficient emphasis on agricultural development. The
(1) Observer .Vol. Ill, Ho.23 (3-21 Jovambsr,196S) ,p.25.
(2) hegon ubaeryor.Vol. IV, ho.6 (lU-27 March, 1969)* P*7.
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i&LQ had never proposed a definite policy for agricultural development
other than establishing the Agricultural Advisory Committee and over¬
hauling the state farms. meanwhile, tne agricultural sector was in poor
shape. The increase in food production had slowed to 2 per cent per
annum. fhis was not sufficient to keep pace with the population growth
much less to provide the agricultural backbone necessary for industrial
development.
Overall, tue nbC's economic policies were a mixture of success
and failure. It was successful in preventing the total collapse
of the economy by slowing inflation, rationalising economic practices,
and re-scheduling the debts. However, the economic policies worked
to the advantage of the bourgeois , the civil servants, the larger
cocoa farmers, and tne wage labourers,wnile ignoring tne poor
farmers ana otaer impoverished groups. The stabilisation budget did
little to combat the massive unemployment and resulted in lover
living standards aau curtailed development in both agriculture and
industry. The economic policies also benefitted the Western capital¬
ist nations: the more lucrative state enterprises were turned over to
foreign investors and these investors were given added incentives to
move into tne Gnanuian economic sector. Finally, the handling of the
debt met with criticism. The debt places a crippling burden on the
(l) "oscrt vCVijo| vne **ixxxtary miu ii-*sve^opment , xn
Politics and Change in Developing Countries, ed. by Colin hoys,
iOadon: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp 2hl-2h2.
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economy for the next decade.1 In all, the NLC tended to be less
development minded and less nationalistic in its economic program. Its
basic contribution va3 to forestall bankruptcy.
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone had not had a satisfactory pattern of growth and
there appears to be fev encouraging prospects. Agricultural
development in the country, which is principally one of subsistence
agriculture, was stagnant and the several projects to increase
rice production, the staple food, had failed. Efforts to rationalise
production of palm products, the major agricultural export, were
disappointing. The Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB ) was
grossly inefficient. It was necessary to import basic food supplies
and in both 19Sk and 19^5, the import of food products exceeded the
value of all agricultural exports.
Diamonds are major source of revenue in Sierra Leone. However,
the smuggling of diamonds was a constant problem. Iron ore deposits
had been discovered and were being exploited although much was of an
inferior quality, and Sierra Leone also possesses the world's largest
known deposits of titanium oxide which are as yet unexploited. However
in spite of its wealth in mineral resources, Sierra Leone remains an
agricultural country and most efforts at improving the agricultural
sector were limited. Sierra Leone was in financial distress by
(l) Price, p. U25. The seemingly insoluble debt also lea to
the downfall of Busia in January 1972.
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1966.1 The provisional figures for trade in 1965 showed imports at
^ 2
fe 76.6*1 m. and exports at tie 53.7 m. This adverse balance of trade
of he 18 si. was a marked deterioration from the b 3 m. loss in 196*1.
This was aggravated by an increase of fe It m. imports of capital goods
and a fee 7.6 in. drop in exported diamonds. Moreover, the foreign
exchange reserves had fallen from £l*i m. in 196*1 to £8 m. in 1966.
• . 3
The civilian government had been living beyond its means.
However, the budget of the SLPP government presented in June
1966 was a last minute attempt to prevent total bankruptcy. This
IMF-inspired budget proposed that imports would be drastically cut
to the base essentials. Estimates were prepared on an austerity basis
and development was to be concentrated on measures to reduce unemploy¬
ment. The recurrent expenditure was estimated at fee 32,800,000 plus
fee 1,237,000 for the railroad. Revenue was estimated at fee 38,31*1,000
against the revised estimate of fee 33,630,000 for 1965-66. Although
(1) All statistics from West Africa (1966-1969), Africa Report
(1966-1969) Sierra Leone Trade Journal (1966-1969) and UN Statistical
Yearbook, 1969.
(2) 1 fee - 50 p.
(3) Africa Report, (June 1967), p. *17.
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export revenues had failed by jbe 1 a. due to the closure of markets
in neighbouring countries to which bierra Leone goods were re-exported,
it was hoped this would be covered by an additional oe lj a. from
new taxes. These taxes were duties on imported venicles, cars,
alcohol, matches, nails and other commodities tu&t were also produced
on the domestic market.
however, the IMF recommendations and budget were not followed
and the economy continued to deteriorate. "had we been able to oarry
out these stabilization maasurea in the government budget and in the
affairs of the SLPMB, taere is little doubt that our position would now
show some improvement ... But, we did not do tnis ..." x
The economy was in a precarious position when the military
came to power in 19&7. 'The first move by the JIRC was to set up tue
economic Advisory Committee of senior technical people whose purpose
was to co-ordinate fiscal and economic policies. It was also
proposed that there be increased co-operation between tne Bank of
sierra Leone and those departments of government dealing with financial
matters. A national Development hank was established to mobilise
local capital resources. These problems of co-ordination and
co-operation had never been solved by the i-iargai regime and tnis had
been a major cause of tne chaotic economic situation.
(♦) bierra --.cone -rude Journal. Vol.0, no. 3, («July-^eptenoer,
19-3), p.79. '
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Tiie AtRC budget for 1967-66 envisaged a program "for the
1
public sector of our economy ... of considerable severity." The
first proposal dealt vith the SLPMB whose liabilities amounted to
fae 4.5 *U The operation of the SLPMB was to be confined to marketing
export goods. Several of the plantations vhicu were losing an esti¬
mated ae 1 m. per year were to be closed down. This resulted in the
laying off of 2,000 workers, but the buuget provided that taese men
could continue to work on the land which was to he handed back to tae
chiefs or converted into local co-operatives. The plantations whicn
had been economically viable were transferred to the Department of Trade,
Industry and Agriculture. The producer price of cocoa,palm kernels,
and coffee were revised downwards and ginger and benniseed were removed
from the buying schedule. Finally, the internal organization of the
3LPMb was to be revised.
Tne Sierra ueone Rail Road was to be phased out on advice from
the World Bank. It was hoped that tnose workers who would be
declared redundant could be absorbed into road expansion projects. Tne
Rice Corporation activities were to be confined to marketing and mill¬
ing. The production and expansion programmes were transferred to the
Department of Trade, Industry aad Agriculture.
The tax increases proposed in the RRC budget included a kO
per cent duty on imported motor vehicles and taxes on imported goods
(1) ibid.. p.71.
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were duplicated by Sierra Leone producers. The export duty on diamonds
was increased froia 7a per cent to 10 per cent.
Finally, a Business Ramos Registration Decree made it compul¬
sory for anyone in trade or business to register. The purpose was to
counter tax evasion. There were also efforts to improve tue collection
of taxes, another weak, point in the MarSai regime.
The RRC was successful in putting Sierra Leone's economy back
on the road to recovery. The devaluation of the Leone helped to
reduce imports while improving the country'3 position in foreign trade.
The SLPMB vas re-established, largely tnrough the efforts of the Leoku-
Betts Commission of Inquiry. Yet, the farmers never quite regained
*
total confidence in the noard. The liRC also inaugurated tne Rational
Development Bank which could perform a useful function in future devel¬
opment. Also, the foreign reserves were up from he 10.5 a. in
November 1967 fc"5 17.3 m. in June,1968. however, tue RRC was
incapable of further sound economic management. First, tnere was
evidence of faulty judgement in the budget proposals. The closing of
plantations resulted in serious unemployment. The increase in diamond
duties was reflected in an increase in diamond smuggling. Diamond
purchases were at aa 17.3 m. in 1967-1968 as compared to be 2k.k m.
the previous year. Secondly, the RRC was not able to follow up its
economic proposals. As an example, it did not succeed in closing
uown tne bankrupt railroad. Finally, the unstable political situation
added to the doubts by the international community of investors of
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Sierra Leone's economic viability. As Forna, Minister of Finance at the
return to civilian rule, stated:
... The deviation from civilian rule had also had a
detrimental effect on international confidence in our
economy because of the doubt created of our ability to
pursue, without interruption, sound policies in the ^
fields of economic development and financial management.
Dahomey
Dahomey has suffered from a curonic economic crisis throughout
2 . .
the past decade. One indicator of this is tae unfavourable trade
balance. Relying on the export of palm, products as the chief cash crop,
Dahomey is extremely vulnerable to both world market fluctuations and
adverse weather conditions (e.g. the 1962 palm crop suffered from poor
3
growing conditions). Figure 1 shows tae deteriorating trade balance.
A further factor compounding tae trade problem has been the
over-reliance on French markets. In tae early sixties, France was res¬
ponsible for 77 per cent of imports and 83 per cent of exports by value.
(1) Sierra Leone Trade Journal. Vol.8, Jo.3, (July - September
1968),p.79.
(2) All Statistics from West Africa (1963-1971)» Africa Report
(1963-197J)» Chronoloftie Politique Africaine (1963-1970)* L'Annee
Africaine (1966-1970)« Annuairc Jtatistiqaes 1967 (published by Ministere
du Flan et ae la Prospective, Republique du Dahomey); Aspects Lconomicjues
(published by Ministere des Finances et des Affaires Lconomiques,
Republique du Dahomey); bulletin ..conomique et Otatistique (published
by Ministere des Finances des Affaires Lconomiques et du Flan, Repub¬
lique du Dahomey; and Journal Qffieiel de la Republique du Dahomey
(15 March,1968),15 October,19b9, and 15 August,1970).~
(3) Palm products accounted for 79 per cent of volume and 73
per cent in value of all exports.
(!+) Chart compiled from statistics in Aspects mconorniqueB
(ministers des Finances et des Affaires mconomiques, 1969-1967).
Figure 1
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Dahomey has not been able to diversify either the exports or the trading
partners and has been constricted by both facte.
Secondly, there has been little formation of capital assets
necessary for investment for economic grovta. Over 50 per cent of the
government expenditure has gone to crivil service salaries; this letTes
little in reserve for capital expenses. Since tae majority of the
population remains on subsistence agriculture standards, it has been
difficult to enforce a program of taxation and savings. whenever an
increase in taxes was imposed on tae small group of vage-earaers (i.e.
the trade unionists), tae result vas more often the overthrow of the
government. Also, because of the political instability, the country
has not attracted foreign investment. Much of the investment and aid
Dahomey has received has been from France; this has given France tremen¬
dous leverage in Dahomey's domestic affairs.1 Moreover, because
Dahomey has come to rely on foreign aid for existence, the state has
accumulated a crippling foreign debt.
By the time of the first all-military budget in 1966, this
pattern vas veil entrenched. Imports in 1965 vers 8,^90,95^,000
CFA francs; exports were 3,366,823,000 CFA francs; the trade deficit
vas 5,12^,131,000 CFA francs or 13.7 per cent voroe than the 196^-65
trade deficit. The budget deficit for 1965-1966 reached 1,800,000,000
(1) Rene Lemarchand, "Dahomey: Coup vithiu a Coup", Africa
Report. Vol.13, U0.6, (June,i960),p.^6.
(2) 2kl CFA francs » 1$ U.S.
i7y,
CFA franca or $8 m. In spite of the 625 m. worth of French aid since
i960, the government debt was well over 8,000,000,000 CFA francs or close
to the annual budget itself. In addition, the civil service salaries
had risen by 60 per cent in six years and tax evasion had cost the
government more than 65,600,000 per year.
when Soglo took power in December 19b5» his first decrees
dealt with the catastrophic economic situation. The Finance and budget
Laws and a 1966-1970 Economic and Social Plan were enacted for the
purpose of increasing tne peasants' income and eradicating the differences
between the regions. Regional and national orgau3 were created to /
implement the plan and were to serve under the direct control of a high
Commissioner of Planning. A special investment fund of 1,073,000,000
CFA francs was proposed to be separate from the regular government
budget.i
By August, 1966, the CRJ recommended the application of strict
austerity measures aimed at absorbing the public debt which was tnen
8,000,000,000 CFA francs. These measures included a 25 per cent tax
on all salaries both in tne public and private sectors, a halt in civil
service recruitment, blockage of civil service promotions, reduction of
family allowances, increase in the price of petrol and a tax on luxury
2
items sucn as cigarettes.
(1) Africa Report. Vol.11, Jo.3, (iarcnl966), p.33
(2) hooert Comevia, "Danor.oy", in .--miee Africaiae (i960),
pp. 265-266.
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There were also cuts in the proposed Anomadegbe-Apithy budget.
Government receipts vera expected to reach 6,301,600,000 CFA francs
(this was a decrease from 8,266,500,000 CFA francs in the 1965 budget)
and expenditure was expected to be 7*6^0,900,000 CFA francs (this was
down from tne proposed 8,266,2*00,000 CFA francs in the 196$ budget).
Moreover, the budget was later cut by approximately 1,000,000 CFA francs.
Soglo and his Minister, Sinsou, spent the year on a series of
aid-seeking missions to the west, particularly to France, the U.S., and
the U.N., who contributed vital capital for the development of water
supplies, palm and cotton production, and other rural projects. Paris
contributed 35,000,000,000 CFA franca to the Bconomic and Social Plan
and also to ease the balance of payments problems.
However, in spite of a few signs of stabilization, tat econ¬
omic situation was still far from prospering by the end of 1966.
Tae budget deficit was reduced to 501,000,000 CFA francs, but the gov¬
ernment was deeper in debt. The trade balance deteriorated as exports
fell core tn&n imports. The percentage of imports over exports
was 31 per cent as opposed to 39 per cent in 1965. In all, the year
was one for emergency measures. However, these measures, particularly
the austerity programs, affected tne civil service and otuer wage
earners who were constant in their demands that tne salary cuts and
taxes b® relieved.
By 1967» there were faint that the economy may have
been arrested from its down-hill spiral. The trade balance remained
unfavourable although there was a slight improvement with exports now
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amounting to 35 per cent of imports. Over 10,000,000,000 CFA francs
vortii of goods entered Dahomey with exports amounting to less than
1,000,000,000 CFA franca. The 1907 budget was also an exercise in
deficit spending altnough the proposed deficit was 372,000,000 CFA francs
as opposed to the 501,000,000 CFA francs in 1966. Revenue was estimated
to be 7*550,000,000 CFA francs with an expenditure of 7*560,000,000
CFA francs with 6l per cent going to civil service salaries. However,
the economy had not yet broken it6 downward course. by the time of
the Kouaadete led coup in December 1967, there was only 50,000,000
CFA franca left in the treasury. The civil service expected
their salaries amounting to 125,000,000 CFA francs (£210,000) at the
end of the month and were 3till demanding the repeal of the ineffective
austerity measures, Dahomey once again was on the verge of bankruptcy.
When the military regime under Alley took j>ower in 1967, they
issued a new budget with expenditure of 8,257*600,000 CFA francs
(£13,8 m.) and revenue of 7*757*3000,000 CFA francs (£12.9 m.). The
proposed deficit of over 500,000,000 CFA francs was to be covered by
freezing some of the expenditure. Thus when Zinsou took office in
iaid-1968, he inherited an abysmal financial £>roblem. ue stated; "Don
an, Mai an, notre deficit s'eleve a plus de deux millards de francs
CFA sur le budget inferieur a huit ailiards de francs CFA."^ Zinsou's
main theme was economic recovery and Dahomey probably benefited mora
(l) Chronologic Politique Africaine. (Hovember-December,1966).
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under his rule than all the previous regimes. ilia international prestige
drew in external aid which the donors had been hesitant to give to a
notoriously fragile military regime. The French, who had cut off all
aid after the 19&7 coup, donated over 700,000,000,000 CFA francs between
July and December 1968. Zinsou &130 nationalized the port authority
under his program to nationalize service industries rather than
economic production concerns.^" There were also some unexpected boosts
to the economy while Zinsou held office. First, the exploration of
off-shore oil drilling began in earnest, althougn under the complete
control of foreigA investors. Secondly, by allowing the Red Cros3
landing privileges for it3 relief flights to Biafra, Dahomey gained on
extra 30,000,000 CFA francs per month in airport tax. however, the use
of Dahomey as a base for flights to Biafra gave the opposition an issue
2
on which to fight Zinsou.
The short-term alleviation of some of the more pressing
economic problems ceuae to an abrupt end wnen Kouandete once again led
a coup in December 1969. By the time the 1970 budget was released,
Dahomey had returned to her former disastrous economic state. In that
year, the proposed budget deficit reached a record 1,U86,873,000 CFA
francs and the public debt soared to 170,^37,000,000 CFA francs.
Therefore, the anny in Dahomey, as the civilian regimes, not
only failed to instigate economic development programs, but al30 was
(1) Africa Confidential. Ho.9, (25 August ,196?),p.
(2) West Africa. (May 17,1969),p.5^9.
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unable to come to grips with the current economic and financial problems.
In the first place, the officer corps was too small, too divided, and
too unskilled to formulate and implement a viable economic program.
Secondly, the shaky political state made Dahomey unprofitable for foreign
investment and what investment Dahomey did obtain only placed tne country
and most importantly
further in the hands of outside powers. Finally/, until the off-shore
oil is exploited, Dahomey has few resources which will pull the country
out of the financial morass. Its only resource at present is the white
collar administrator and he lacks the technical and entrepreneurial
skills needed for economic development and has resisted every measure
aimed at preventing the bankruptcy of the state.
Upper Volta
The economic system of Upper Volta is the least developed
in our study.'1" Over 90 per cent of the population exist on sub¬
sistence agriculture; there are few exports, the main one being cattle
on the hoof to the southern neighbours. The military regime was con¬
fronted with two inter-related problems; the first, to improve the
social services such as health, education, and community development;
and secondly, to increase agricultural production both for domestic
consumption and export. The first problem, the improvement of living
(i) iUi statistics from west Africa {xyoo-iyTu;, Africa neport
(1966-1970), UaronoloMie Folitiuue Afrxcaine (l9bo-1970), and Annee
Africaine (1966-1970).
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standards, was a prerequisite for the further economic development of
the country. Over 96 per cent of the people were illiterate. Serious
health hazards such as bilharzia debilitated the work force. The second
problem, the production of food and cash crops, had been relatively
unenphasiaed, but such developments are essential to avoid dependence
on expensive imports and to provide a money-making export. The three
aims in agriculture were to produce sufficient food in subsistence
areas, a marketable surplus for the urban population and cash crop
export, and finally, to ensure future food supplies and the diversifi¬
cation of other agricultural crops. The military's economic program,
under the very able direction of Lt. Hare Garango, aas made substan¬
tial strides in these areas. As ve stated earlier, the success of
the military has been partially a function of the primitive state of
Upper Volta's economy in 1966. As the economy expands and diversifies,
the military may no longer be able to meet the demands for increased
economic development. In the following discussion, ve shall note that
as the economy improved and passed beyond the crisis situation, the
military began to shift to civilian rule. In Upper Volta, as in the
other states, the military is most adept during crisis periods, but
loses its efficiency in long-term economic development.
when basis ana. took power in early 1966, the economic and
financial situations were nearing bankruptcy. The actual debt vaa
near *»,000,000,000 CFA francs or 50 per cent of the current budget.
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Garango first moved to reduce this debt by instigating austerity measures
sucn as closing embassies, suppressing the administrators' perks,
stopping television service, and reorganizing the civil service recruit¬
ment. ^ The 1966 budget was balanced at 9,13b,700,000 CFA francs. This
vas accomplisned by reducing expenditure and particularly by the cut in
civil service salaries by 20-25 per cent. Also included in this budget
vas an investment fund of 700,000,000 CFA francs. Finally, the army vas
available for recruitment in economic development projects. As
Robert Coeffe, Secretary of State for Defence, stated: "This intention
is not a recent one. The army has since its creation alvays openly
expressed its ardent desire to contribute to the nation's economic
«2
activities in sectors vhere it can be usefully employed. however, there
is no documented evidence available to show that the army itself vas
actively engaged in such projects.
After urgent problems such as the debt, the emphasis vas
placed on the agricultural sector and social services. We can see
evidence of this when we examine tne aid Upper Volta received during 1966.
In March, France not only extended 688 m. CFA francs for economic and
social services, but also guaranteed to import U,000 uons of groundnuts
per year from Upper Volta. More French aid was forthcoming for ground¬
nut production (300 m. CFA francs). Concern was expressed over the
(1) Georges Malecot, "haute-Volta", Annea Africaine
(1966),p.35^.
(2) West Africa (November 19, 19b6),p.1339.
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drought-prone arerus arid the U.fi. contributed for the development of
water works.
In I96T> the budget was cut back and balanced at 8, 37*» *773,000
CEA franca without exterior aid. iiowever, farther austerity measures
were enforced, Gerango dismissed many lov level civil servants considered
to be parasitic.^ Taxes on salaries over 10,000 CFA francs pa. were
increased from 10 to 15 per cent and a 3 per cant tax vas imposed on
salaries under 10,000 CFA francs p.a. Salaries were reduced, family
allowances cut back, taxes were imposed on fish, kola nuts, rents,
2
and a patriotic tax vas created.
During this year, economic planning was emphasised. la March,
/ O
the Soeiete D'Lcoaor.ie Kixte (SOVOLCQM) vas created to corucercialise
agricultural production. In June, a military decree established
four commissions of planning: production/distribution, employment,
finance, and information. An overall economic plan vas announced
1,
in August by Lamitana. It aimed at increasing resources and hooping
down expenses with the idea of increasing foodstuffs, export agricul¬
tural products and improving the distribution system necessary for
this. A 27,000,000,000 CFA franc(i^o a.) fund was created for the
plan.
(1) Jean Martin, "h&utc-Volta", Annes Africaiac (1967) p.279
(2) Jnroaolof ic- - oliti .uo Afrisraiua (Jovfci..ber-Deceraber 1967).
(3) Chronolo .rig Politique Afrlcajne (f'ureh-Apri 1, IQqT).
{k) (Jaroaologie Foxitique Africaiae (May - Juae, 1567) p.36.
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Finally, in 1967, the exploration of mineral resources began
in earnest. Manganese deposits were located at Tasabao, 230 miles north¬
east of Ougadougou, and uranium and copper deposits near Gowa in the
south west.1 Unexploited deposits of gold, chromium, and iron ore were
also being investigated. However, because of thu lack of investment
capital within Upper Volta, the military has turned t»o outside capitalist
states for the exploration and exploitation of these minerals.
Lamizana announced in August 1968 that the army would stay
in power until the economic crisis was redressed. It was in 1968,
also, tnat the economic and financial crisis was coming under control.
Garango r*ix>rted a favourable balance, of payments which would provide
the means to repay loans. There was, furthermore, a budget surplus
of 231»56H,6hU CFA franca (£336,000) from the 196? budget. However,
there still remained liabilities of 22U,650,689,000 CFA francs (£5 m.)
left over from tae fameogo regime. Also, although 53 per cent of
the budget vent to pay administrative personnel, the unions, including
the civil service union, called for increased wages. Garango refused
these pay claims stating! "We cannot accept after all, that 1 per
cent of the population absorbs nearly half of tiie budget, while the
peasants, whose fate is hardly enviable, wait for us to do something
2
for them. If we increase wages, we cannot help them .
(1) West Africa (November 18, 1967), p.1^96.
(2) West Africa (October 25, 1968), p.1288.
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There were several projects aimed at the decentralisation of
the financial advantages. In July 1963, Garan&o announced a fund
which would guarantee loans to small trading and craft industries.1
The purpose, beyond the levelling of differences between the large
towns and the rural areas, was to increase Voltaic trade. The Economic
Development Plan was also proving successful. By July 1963, a reported
69 per cent of the proposed projects had been completed. The investment
for 196'3-19o9 was to be reduced slightly to 7,3000,000,000 CFA francs
(£13 a.). The European Development Fund offered assistance for a £1 m.
dam; other projects such as the Volte* textile factory and the paring
of roadii to Ghana and Mali wore to be completed in 1963. All these
projects aimed at improving Upper Volta*B trade capabilities. The
government also began to invest in food production, particularly in
rice and sugar as there was not enough produced for home consumption.
The Taiwanese directed rice plantations set up on the houda, Kaya, and
iCov plains. The goal was aelf-suffiency in rice production by 1972.
Ground-nut production increased to 3,200 tons although the end of
the French surprix diminished tueir export value. Cotton production
HRS up from 7,500 tons to 17,000,000 tons in 1968.
The military began to direct the course of ra-civilianization
in 1969, as the economy grew stronger. The proposed budget was
k'eat Africa (July 2o, 1963), p. 876.
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balanced at 9,030,537,000 CFA francB. As there had been an increase
of 8.8 per cent in the accounts since 1968, the military began to
relax a fev of its strict austerity measures. For instance, taxes vere
reduced from 15 to 10 per cent for salaries over 10,000 CFA francs
per year and from 15 to 12 per cent for salaries over 30,000,000 CFA
franes per year. The foreign exchange reserves were at one of the
highest levels since independence but the trade balance vas still in
deficit. However, tne greatest hindrance to the stabilization
program was the devaluation of tne franc. As Garango stated!
nles consequences negatives da la devaluation du franc depasa&at les
aspects positifs". 1 More precisely, the franc devaluation placed
an extra and unexpected 1,500,000,000 CFA franc ($6 m.) burden on the
Voltaic budget.
Nonetheless, by 1970, the budget surplus reached SO,000,000
CFA franc3 and the proposed 1970 budget balanced at $1^,6 m. The
newly elected military and civilian cabinet retained Garango as
Finance Minister and thus, his economic policies which had proved
capable of averting national bankruptcy, will be carried over into
the quasi-civilian regime. Upper Volta is not yet an economically
viable and self-sufficient state and the broad economic objectives
remain as stabilization policies including austerity measures and
fiscal reform.
(l) ChroncloKie Politique Africaine (iiepteabsr-October 1969),
p. 28. ""
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The military government in Upper Volta was successful in
averting a total collapse of the economic system of the country. It
has been able to instigate basic economic reforms and development
projects. It is doubtful, however, that the "progressive" role of
Qtruio'a economic policies can be carried over as the economy becomes
and demands for development increase
core complex/ Upper Volta remains on® of the least developed of the
less developed nations.
The military regimes in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and.
Upper Volta inherited grave economic and financial problems. Their
basic contribution to the management, of the economy of these states
was the prevention of total bankruptcy. The military take-overs
reversed the econoiaic crises in the short-term. In the long-term,
however, the record of the juntas, particularly in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
and Dahomey, is hardly impressive. The juntas proved to be as
incapable as their civilian predecessors in directing economic develop¬
ment. Only in Upper Volta, and largely because of the primitive state
of the economy there, did the military government's economic policies
produce results in the expansion of the economy. Even this
remains on a low level. Everywhere else, once the crisis had been
reversed, the economy stagnated.
One further point should be mentioned in regard to the
military's record in handling tee economy. As it became increasingly
obvious that the military could not solve the more pressing economic
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problems facing the country, the population which suffered under these
economic policies grew increasingly disillusioned with the capabilities
of the army as governor. The army was called upon to answer their
demands, was unable to do so, and thus lost credibility as an effective
government. Moreover, the members of the military grew disgruntled with
the inability of the junta members to direct the economy. The junta
lost the support of discontented officers who seised upon the issue of




The eilitary'a disengagement from overt political
rule occurs through the culmination of three con¬
ditions: the disintegration of the original consp¬
iratorial group; the growing divergence of interests
betveen the junta of rulers and those military vho
remain as active heads of the fighting services;
and the political difficulties of the regime* .
These problems which necessitate a "return to the barracks"
of the armed forces have been discussed in the preceding chapters.
The juntas were troubled with dissent both from the ranks and from
the civilian population and continued military rule would result in
the proliferation and intensification of these problems. In short,
the "honeymoon" was over.
The possibility of military disengagement from political
(2)
rule is determined by three pre-conditions . First, the junta must
want to withdraw and the subordinates must be willing to follow their
commanders back to the barracks. However, before the military is
inclined to relinquish political control, it will undoubtedly pre¬
scribe certain conditions which must be satisfied. This leads to
our second pre-condition - the successor regime must be acceptable
(1) S.E.Finer, The Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press,
1962),p.191.
(2) S.E.Finer, "Military Disengagement from Politics" in
The Politica of Demilitarisation (Seminar Papers compiled by
Institute of Commonwealth Studies: London, 1966).
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to the military. The new civilian regime must not consist of
enemies of the interventionists and their policies or friends of the
regime which the army had overthrown. The post-interventionist
civilian regime may be required to grant concessions to the armed
forces such as better pay and career prospects and the military may
also demand access to the political process although it had ostensibly
withdrawn from politics.
As the third pre-condition, the new civilian regime must be
politically viable without military support. Most nations which
have experienced military rule are characterised by a chronic economic
crisis which the civilian political leaders are unable or unwilling to
remedy. With this background, the political leaders are usable to
satisfy the demands of the politicized groups. The weak, narrowly-
defined political institutions, thus, cannot hold the effective
support of the population. The leaders often rely on coercive
measures in order to instigate policies or to maintain their position of
power and prestige. When there is a shift to the use of force, the
political leaders rely upon the armed forces for support, but if the
public grievances coincide with military grievances, the probability of
military intervention increases. Unless the political institutions
are sufficiently developed to implement policies without abnormal
dependence on force and are strong enough to prevent the re-engagement of
the military into the political process, this final pre-condition is not
likely to be met in most, if not all, cases- Although this pre¬
condition depends to some extent on ex post facto judgement, it is
particularly important As long as the situation which precipit¬
ated the first coup still exists, there is a great probability that
19j+.
the military will intervene again. This is due in part to the fact
that staging a successful coup for the army
is rather like losing one's virginity; apart from
anything else it gives one a taste for more. It
also inescapably alters your ffche army's] relation¬
ship with the civilian powers they never quite know
when you might not do it again.^'
From these brief statements concerning the pre-conditions
(2)
of military disengagement, two facts are obvious. ' First, as
x.
long as the civilian institutions remain weak visa via the
military, the military will lose little of its significance by sub¬
stituting a civilian regime in place of its own direct rule. Secondly,
a usual consequence of the withdrawal of one military regime is the
replacement of it, either immediately or within a few years, by
another military regime. With this in Blind, let us turn to an
examination of the process of demilitarisation in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Dahomey, and Upper Volta.
Bhana
It was doubtful that the NLC intended to remain in direct
political control for an indefinite length of time. This was repeatedly
asserted by all the members of the Council. Although in a BBC broad¬
cast Harlley stated: "The NLC has made it dear that it has no ambition
(1) KayeWhitemaa, "The Military Regimes of Togo and Dahomey"
Seminar paper presented at London University, laatitate of Commonwealth
Studies (November 25, 1970},p.10.
(2) O.K.Finer, Man on Horseback.p.190.
195.
vhatsoever of ruling Ghana indefinitely ..."^\ and Ankrah wrote:
"... the NLC has no intention whatsoever of ruling Ghana indefinitely
..(2)
... , nevertheless, one year after the coup "both the NLC and
the Ghanaian people were showing signs of a cautious approach to the
return of civilian rule. In an address in March, 19#T» Brigadier
Afrifa outlined the pre-conditions which the politicians would need
(3)
to satisfy before the return to civilian rule. First the image
of the CPP must he completely destroyed; secondly, the people must he
re-educated about their political rights and familiarised with the
qualities expected from future political leaders; and thirdly, the
immediate factors that led to the coup of 1966 were to be completely
removed. In regards to the first pre-condition, the CPP image had
been effectively destroyed. Not only had there been open rejoicing
of the population after the coup but also the commissions of inquiry
had ensured that Nkrumah and Co. were thoroughly discredited. As for
the re-education of the people about their political rights, Afrifa
was criticized for underestimating the political acumen of the
Ghanaians. Finally, the complete removal of the factors leading to
the 1966 coup was an unrealistic goal in the near future, particularly
(1) Legon Observer. Vol.1, No.5 (Sept.2, 1966),p.l5.
(2) Gen. J.A.Ankrah, "The Future of the Military in Ghana",
in African Forum. Vol.2, No.l (Summer,1966),p.11.
(3) Legon Observer. Vol.11, No.8. (iU—27 April,1967) p.i.
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as the military was not capable of solving the broader economic,
social, and political problems in Ghana. Nonetheless Afrifa stated!
As much as ve would like to leave the scene as soon
as possible, ve would wish to complete our task. We
cannot risk the lives of innocent soldiers in another
revolution, ve therefore want to be certain that the
conditions are satisfactory for a civilian administration
before ve hand over power.^'
Afrifa seemed to imply that the soldiers should take care of the
pressing problems vhile civilian rule could vait.
Several public opinion polls taken in Ghana during this time
pointed out that the people bad a notion of the time limits for the
return to civilian rule. In a poll taken at the University of Ghana,U3
per cent felt that civilian rule should be postponed for at least five
(2)
years . "More impressive evidence came from a national poll of
over 6,000 people in December 1967) ^5 per cent did not want to return
to civilian rule, kh per cent wanted a return in 1970 and 31 per cent
(3)
wanted it in 1971 or 1972, or were uncertain." Thus a large per¬
centage of the population were by no means anxious for an immediate
return to civilian rule. Not surprisingly the government press
supported these sentiments. Remarking on a speech given by Busia
calling for an early withdrawal of the military, the Ghanaian Times
asserted "... every bit of the speech smac&s of a man who is desperate
(1) Legon Observer. Vol II,No.7 (31 March-13 April,1967)»
Supplement.
(2) Legon Observer. Vol.11, No.12 (9-22 Jua®,1967)»p.7.
(3) Robert £.Dowse, "The Military and Political Development",
in Politics and Change in Developing Countries, ed. by Colin Leys
(London! Cambridge University Press, 1969),p.2hU.
for political power.
In general, it was felt that civilian rule should not be
later than three years. The constitutional and electoral lavs would
not be ready in leas than that time and the NLC should be allowed
several more years to take advantage of the confidence it had gained
abroad. However, if it should remain in power longer, it would be
more reluctant to step down. Finally, the cohesion of the NLC
should be the sain criterion for deciding if they should be in for a
to)maximum or minimum period.
During the sussaer of 1967* the NLC initiated the first
moves towards a return to civilian rule. The Siriboe Commission
was appointed to examine and recommend the procedures of elections,
registration of voters, and the criteria for the qualification or
disqualification of voters and candidates. The Commission saw the
main problem of past elections was that the responsibility for reg¬
istration and conduct of elections was vested in the government of
the day. It recommended, therefore, that an independent three-man
body be made responsible for future elections. A five-year disquali¬
fication from public office was proposed for those found guilty of
corrupt and illegal practices. Also, teachers, civil servants, and
employers of state corporations were to be ineligible for running
(1) Legon Observer Vol.11, No.8 (lt-2? April,1967),p.l3.
(2) ibid., Supplement VII.
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for office. However, the Siriboe Commission did not think that all
those with past CPP connections should be banned^.
The first major step toward constructing a new Constitution
was the appointment by NLCD 102 of a Constitutional Committee. This
group was headed by Chief Justice Akufo-Addo and consisted of fifteen
old opponents of Nkrumah. It is not surprising, therefore, that
there was a conscious effort on the part of this commission to
prevent the reversion to the practices of the past regime. Its terms
of reference were to collect the views of all sections of the
community on the type of constitution desired and to visit all parts
of Ghana to collect evidence. It was clear that the NLC wished to
involve as much public participation as possible. The Committee
was to draw up a draft constitution which would include certain spec¬
ified provisions (e.g. the separation of powers), submit this to a
constituent assembly, and then prepare a final draft. The ambiguous
nature of the constituent assembly did not specify that it would be
(2)
representative of the people. Unless some decision was made on
the composition and selection of the assembly, it would appear that
the NLC would have the final say on what was to be included or
omitted from the future constitution. Ankrah wrote that "the main
task of the commission will be to prepare for the approval of the
(1) Vest Africa (February 10, 1968),p.159.•
(2) Legon Observer. Vol.11, No.6 (14-27 April,1967),,
pp.1-2.
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HLC - and thereafter for the entire nation - a Constitution."^ But,
just hov this was to be done vas not clarified.
On January 26, 1966, the proposals of the Constitutional
(2)Commission were published. The power of the executive vas to
be divided to prevent another ukrumah. The President vas to have con¬
trol and supervision over certain departments and organs of government
and have the privilege of appointing some officers of state. He vas
to be a personification of the state and his role vas largely cere¬
monial. however, there vere some inherent defects in this proposal.
The President vas to be chosen by a simple majority in an Electoral
College. If the Electoral College failed to elect a President on the
first ballot, it would be dissolved. The Presidency would then become
the chief issue in the election of a new College. Also, if political
rivalries vere ever to disrupt the legislature, the Parliament would
(3)
be dissolved and the President would be ceded all executive power.
Finally, the President vas to serve eight years. This could present
a crisis if popular opinion demanded a more frequent change in govern¬
ment.
A Council of State vas proposed to aid and advise the
President. This body vas to include prominent Ghanaians and signifi¬
cantly, the Chief Justice and the Officer in Command of the Armed Forces.
(1)Ankrah, p.11.
(2) Address by Akufo-Addo, Logon Observer, Vol.Ill, Ho.3
(2-15 February,1968),pp.12-16.
(3) Logon Observer.Vol.III. Ho.5 (l-lk March,1968),p.9.
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Ike Priae Minister was to be selected from the national
assembly on proposal from the President. His cabinet was to be
selected from the Assembly and also from without on approval of the
Assembly*. All legislative power was to rest in the Parliament which
was to be unicameral legislature with 1^1 members. There were four
forosl qualifications for election! Ghanaian citizenship, minimum
age of 25 years, literacy in English, and a five-year residency in
the constituency.
The independence of the judiciary was heavily emphasised.
The (Superior Courts of the Judicature were the Supreme Court which
had exclusive jurisdiction in the interpretation of the Constitution,
the Court of Appeals, and the High Court of Justice which would
hear administrative complaints and labour/industrial disputes. The
President, on advice of the Council of State, would appoint the Chief
Justice. Finally, there was to be a Judicial Council to aid and
counsel the Chief Justice in administrative functions.
Proposals on financial matters prohibited taxation other
than by Act of Parliament. The Minister of Finance was to submit
all estimates regarding the Consolidated and Contingency Funds to
the Parliament. Also, there were suggestions for an independent
Auditor-General and Audit Service to oversee the accounts of all
public bodies.
In regard to Public Service, there was a recommendation
for an independent Public Service Commission to advise the President
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on appointments to the civil and public services. There were also
proposals for a Police Council, an Armed Forces Council, and a Prison
Service Board. Local government was to consist of two tiersi Local
and District Councils of two-thirds elected
Councils of two-thirds traditional mid one-third elected/and one-
third traditional. Thus, the Commission felt the place of the chiefs
was at the local level, much as it had been during colonial rule.
A Regional Development Council was to integrate regional development
programs within an over-all framework.
Individual rights of privacy, expression, assembly, and
association were guaranteed. There were also clauses to prohibit a
revival of Preventive Detention. Moreover, an Ombudsman was charged
with protecting the rights of the individual citizen. An Electoral
Commissioner was to be elected and responsible for the supervision
of elections and referenda. Finally, the Commission specified
several categories of ex-CPP officials who would be disqualified
from holding public office.
A general view of the proposed constitution demonstrated
the biases which shaped it# * First, there was a reaction
to the evils of the Ukrumah regime. The strict separation of powers,
the determinedly weakened President, and the disqualification prop¬
osals are examples. Secondly, there appears a marked preference
(l) Legon Observer. Vol.Ill, tfo.k (16-29 February,1969),
pp. 3-*».
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for the counsels of old men. The President was to he fifty years of
age at minimum; the compulsory retiring age of the Judges of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals was seventy-five and seventy respect¬
ively. Thirdly, the draft constitution aeened to benefit those groups
which had suffered finder the CPP government} the civil service would,
he aided by an independent Public Service Commission; the arued forces
and police were to be represented in various councils. Finally,
there was no proposal for a constituent assembly. Akufo-Addo
contended, "You will appreciate that the speed, whatever the rate,
of progress to civilian rule is conditioned by the speed of progress
towards a Constituent Assembly."^
In response to the presentation of the constitutional
(2)
proposals, the NLC issued three important decrees. The first,
JJLCD 221 (tnterim Electoral Commissioner Decree 1968) established
the office of an Electoral Commissioner, His functions were to issue
procedural rules and regulations for the registration of electors,
register electors, receive nomination papers of candidates, and
conduct and supervise the elections. However, the final interpret¬
ation was the prerogative of the NLC. The Council appointed a single
commissioner, Mr Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe of the High Court,
although the Siriboe Commission had recommended a three-man commission.
(1) LcgOP OuSerVei". 7ol.HI, No,3 \2—15 February ,1968) p,15«
(2) Ibid., pp.16-22.
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The second was HLCD 222 (Constituent Assembly Decree
1966). Popular elections vere to be held for the 1^0 members of the
Constituent Assembly* Also, nine additional members vere to be
chiefs elected by the House of Chiefs in each region and from the
Accra area. The qualifications for membership vere Ghanaian citizen¬
ship, tventy-five years of age, and English speaking. Disquali¬
fication was based on criminal record, insanity, employment as a
teacher, civil servant or state corporation worker, and past CFP
association. The functions of the Constituent Assembly vere to delib¬
erate on the proposals submitted by the Constitutional Commission and
report their findings to the NLC. The question remained as to whether
or not the NLG vould alter the draft constitution once it was subm¬
itted to them.
The final decree resolved the long debate on disqualification.
SLCD 223 (Election and Public Offices Disqualification Decree) listed
fifteen categories of people who "on or after the first day of June
1 960 ... held office in the CPP..." Those affected vere as follows:
Ministers of State, Regional Corralsionera, District Commissioners,
Regional Secretaries of the CP?, teachers at the kvaae Hkrumah
Ideological Institute, graduates of the Ideological Institute,
special advisors to Hkrumah, Regional Education Secretaries, CPP
Members of Parliament, National Committee members, District Executive
Committeemen, members of the Steering Committee, members of the
Presidential Detail, and members of the ifational, Regional or
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District Executive Committees of the seven integral wings of the
CPP. These people, numbering in the thousands, were barred from
elective or appointive office for ten years. A three-man Exemptions
Commission headed by Apaloo, the Judge of the Court of Appeals, was
established to hear appeals and examine the cases of the CPF
affiliates. Exemptions were to be granted if it could be proved
that while a member of the CPP, the appellant conducted himself in
opposition to Hkrumah or else va3 forced into membership.^
However, the final decision was the discretion of tae NLC.
In the ensuing months, the HLC's plan for recivilianisation
ran into problems and criticisms. First, the registration of voters
had been characterised by & marked lack of enthusiasm among the
people. The Legon Observer contended that this was
an issue of paramount national importance in which
the HLC is showing uncharacteristic obstinacy and
imperviousness to public opinion. Several views
have been expressed to explain why the registration
of voters has been, contrary to all expectations,
so slow and uninspiring throughout the areas of
this country where the exercise has been going on.
One cogent reason put forward is the baa placed on
political activities. It is believed that in the
absence of political activity there is a feeling
of acting in a vacuum without any specific perspectives
and objectives .... Since 1951 people of this country
have registered within the framework of political
activities, and politicians have played a determined,,
if not decisive, role in the success of the exercise.""
(1) Legon Observer. Vol.11, Ho.2k (22 November - 5
December, 19bC),pp.l-2.
(2) Legon Observer. Vol.Ill, No.21 (11-24 Qctober,1968),p,10.
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The feeling vas that politicians, who had a direct interest in
registration, were sore likely to generate enthusiasm and ensure
full registration than bureaucratic orders. Also, since the members
of the Constituent Assembly would probably be re-elected for the
Parliament, voting on political lines would be assumed anyway.
Therefore, it vas argued that political parties were an immediate
necessity.
In view of the lack of interest in the elections of delegates
to the Constituent Assembly, the KLC issued on October 23, 1968, two
new decreest the Constituent Assembly (No.2) Decree 1966 (NLCD 299}
and Constituent Assembly (No.2) Decree 1968 (Amendment Decree
These revised the functions and composition of the Constituent
Assembly. The new Assembly was to have 150 members: forty-nine
delegates elected by electoral colleges formed from the existing
local councils; ninety-one delegates representing various occupat¬
ional groups; and ten appointed by the NLC. The Council promised
to lift the ban on political parties as soon as the Constituent
Assembly convened. The 31-meaber National Advisory Council was
dissolved to allow the members to enter politics.
However, the new proposals created new difficulties. The
public wanted to know how the various groups represented would be
determined, and how the ninety-one delegates would be divided up.
(1) Legon Observer. Vol.Ill, No.23 (8-21 November,1968),
pp. 1-2,
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What was most disturbing was the narrow basis of representation. As
one critic put itt "... the two decrees disfranchised about 90 per
c ent of the Ghanaian electorate."^
The Exemptions Commission was also under attack. The fact
that "the fundamental political question had been left to the vagaries
(2)
of quasi-judieial process.•• was a basic fault in the precept
behind the commission. It was the exemption of Koala Gbedemah that
eventually led to the repeal of Disqualification Decree 223. The
decision to allow a former Minister of the Nkrumah government to hold
public office aroused considerable criticism. Mr Joe Appiah, former
opposition MP, issued a statement criticising the decision. He stated
that "a situation when ... Mr Gbedemah, the creator of the CPP and
for years the ex-President's most trusted friend, is exempted calls
(3)
for serious examination.' Shortly afterwards the Pioneer pub¬
lished a long editorial calling for the abolishment of Decree 223 and
criticisiig the military council's application of it. Even Brigadier
Afrifa admitted that the disqualification decree made little sense
and stated that the Ghanaian people should now be responsible for
(h)
who would or would not hold office. Therefore, on February 18,
(1) Legon Observer. Vol.Ill, Ho.26 (20 Deceaber-2 January,
1969),p.20.
(2) Legon Obscarver. Vol.Ill, Ho.2i* (22 November-3 December,
(1968)p.l.
(3) West Africa (November 23, 1968), p.1389.
(k) Africa Report. Vol.lfe, No.2 (February,1969),p.36.
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1969, the NLC repealed NLCD 223. It was replaced by the Elections
and Public Offices Decree 1969 vhich limited disqualification to
152 people including Nkrusah, tventy-three ex-Ministers, nine
(1)
GPP members, and three ambassadors.
The NLC appeared to be guiding the transition to civilian
rule in order to impose a new regime vhich would be acceptable to
the army. A general feeling of unease vas developing about the
transitional period to civil rule. As one commentator put it:
"... the programme for the return to civilian rule has been modified
in such a way that not a few people are expressing great concern
about its propriety,if not its desirability. Might it be a move
to pack the Constituent Assembly with favourite children who will
(2)
lend their support to a 'fait accompli1 ?'
On January 6, 1969, the Constituent Assembly met in Accra.
General Ankrah told the Assembly to ensure the freedom and liberty
of the people, eliminate the possibility of a dictatorship, and
(3)
prevent the abuse of the Constitution. A Speaker, Mr R.S.Blay,
was elected and four committees (Privileges, House, Business, and
Standing Orders) were formed. By July, the bulk of the proposals
for the draft constitution had been deliberated. Nearly all of the
(1) Africa Report. Vol.lU, Nob 5 & 6 (May-June,1969),pp 50-51.
(2) Legon Observer. Vol.XII, No. £5 (6—19 December, 1966) p.^»,
(3) Legon Observer. Vol. IV, No.2 (lT "30 January,1969),p.26.
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Constituent Commissions recommendations vere adopted, either intact
or vith minimal amendment. Some nev provisions vere added such as
a National House of Chiefs.^ The most heated arguments
arose over the inclusion of Article 7l(2)(b)(ii). This disqualified
to sit in Parliament for five years anyone vho had been declared
"by the report of a Commission of Inquiry to be incompetent to
(2)
hold public office..,* This clause was quite clearly intended
to embarrass Gbederaah vho had not been able to account for a small
amount of his assets before the Annie Jiagge Commission. This
clause vas written into the Constitution over the minority protests
in the Constituent Assembly vho felt that it gave ad hoc bodies the
(3)
right to condemn men to political death.
In total, the new Constitution provided for division of
powers vith strong restraints on the Prime Minister and great
emphasis on the judiciary. The underlying thene vaa the prevention
of a nev Jfkrumah. The Preamble readsi *... We the chiefs and
people of Ghana having experienced a regime of tyranny ... having
solemnly resolved never again to allow ourselves to be subjected
to a like regime ..."^
On July 18, the Constituent Assembly adjourned after the
Third Reading of all chapters of the Constitution, The question
(1) West Africa (July 26, 1969),p.853.
(2) Article 7l(2)(b)(ii), The Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana. 1969, p.58
(3) West Africa (August 23), p.1006.
(U) Preamblei The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.1969.p.i.
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regained as to who would promulgate it. The assembly- had sent
a resolution to the NLC ashing that it be allowed to enact and
promulgate the Constitution, but the NIC remained silent, saying
only that the matter was under active consideration.^ Some
felt that neither the Constituent Assembly nor the HLC had the
right to promulgate the new Constitution. They believed that the
Assembly was not truly representative and that the NLC "had no
authority in a democratic framework, to ratify a Constitution for
the country.
When the Constituent Assembly re-convened on August 12, the
Speaker announced that the Assembly would enact the Constitution
and the NLC would promulgate it. The following day, Nana Agyeman
Badu gave notice of a proposal to establish a three-man Presidential
Commission consisting of NLC members. This was rejected on the
grounds that it waa introduced after the Third Reading. Many then
signed the Constitution and left.^
Meanvhile, several related events were taking place. Afrifa
began a series of visits to army units praising the men for their
valour during the covrp and urging them not to intervene in political
parties. Also, several promotions within the armed forces were
CD West Africa (July 26, 1969),p.6?^.
(2) uegon Observer. Vol.IV.No.lb (l-lk August,1969),p.6
(3) began Observer, Vol.IV,Bo.18 (27 August - 11 September,
(1969),p.1.
(D West Africa (August 23, l?69),p.l006.
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announced, Brigadier D.C.K. Arienu, Acting Army Commnder, vas »'JUie
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff; Lt, Col, J.R.E. Acqiuah, Director of
Military Intelligence, va3 promoted to Brigadier and given coizwand
of the Second Infantry Brigade; Brigadier A.K.Kattaa vas posted to
the Washington habassy.It appeared as if the IfLC leaders
were ensuring the support of rank and file of the array and were
phasing out the older or unsafe officers either into desk jobs or
to overseas posts. Also, the radio and television coverage during
%at week eras slanted in favour of a three-nan Presidential Commission,
All signs pointed to the fact that several 3LC personnel were trying
to keep a presence in the future civilian government.
On August 18, the HLC agreed that the Constituent Assembly
vould both enact and promulgate the new constitution under the
Constituent Assembly (Amendment) i960 Decree, However, the condit¬
ions of the decree were subject to the further consideration by the
Assembly on the provision that anyone holding office under the '1LC
should continue to do so for six months under the new Constitution
and reconsideration of the motion suggesting a Presidential
Commission for three years. Afrifa stated that "decisions following
(a)
these reconsiderations would be final." The Assembly assented
to the triumvirate clause. But, "does the JftC not appear to have
(1) Weat Africa (August 23, 1969),p.1036.
(2) Legoa Observer, Vol.IV, fto.16 (27 August-lX September,
1969),p.12.
211.
played an unhealthy role in a situation when the Assembly was given
the honour of promulgating a Constitution which provides for a
(1)
Presidential Commission of three of it3 members?" Afrifa,
after consultation with his commanders, accepted the Chairmanship
of the troika in which Iiarlley and Gen. Ocran would also serve. As
J.A.Pensah put it: "the father figure (i.e. the President) has
vital responsibilities, functions and powers; he needs least of all
(2)
to be an ugly hydra-headed monster. Nonetheless, the
Constitution was ratified on August 22nd 19^9 • The stage was set
for elections.
On Hey 1, 19^9, the ban on political parties was lifted.
©ic Political Parties Decree prescribed the character of political
parties by requiring regional representation and restricting
tribal preponderance among the founding member®. Political parties
were regarded a3 public bodies and as such, a system of registration
was established to ensure that the details of the organisation
were known. Also, there were to be no financial contributions from
(3)
alien3, Immediately after the lifting of the ban, political
parties proliferated throughout Ghana. By the end of May, 110 leas
than sixteen had been formed. Two of these were banned: the Junior
Civil Service Association on the ground# that the civil service should
(1) Ibid,. n.?-
(2) Legoa Observer. Vol.IV, Ho.19 (12-25 SepteEbar,1969).
(3) Legon Observer. Vol.IV, Ho.10 (9-22 May,1969),p.3.
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not be engaged in party politics and the People's Progressive
Party on the allegation that it was backed by ftkruman!1^ Others
were either swallowed tip or merged with larger parties. The
parties which did remain in the race were the Progressive Party
(PP) under K.A.Buaia; the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) under
Obedemah; the United Nationalist Party under Joe Appiah; the All
People's Republican Party under de Graft-Johnson and P.K.K.Quaidoo;
and the People's Action Party (PAP) under Imoru Ayarna. But, "as
the campaign progressed, it was clear that the small parties, like
those who had abandoned the struggle earlier, could not match the
dynamism of the two major units [PP and HALI both of which were
(2)
impressively organised and financed."
The manifestoes of the parties and the campaign issues were
virtually the same; ell promised to extend the welfare services
and rehabilitate the economy. The PP placed emphasis on Busia's
long-time opposition to Ifkrumah; the NAL stressed the organisational
genius of Gbedexaah. Basically, the campaign focussad on the past
(3)
and on personalities. '
The election was held on August 29, 19&9* Sixty per cent
of the potential voters were registered and 6l per cent of these
actually voted. Therefore only 36 per cent of the eligible voters
(1) Won Observer. Vol.IV, No.22 [27 October = C November
1969),P.3.




participated^ Busia*s PP won 59 per cent of the popular vote and
75 per cent of the seats in Parliament. The overall results of the
(2)election were as follows:
Party Seats
Progressive Party 105
National Alliance of Liberals 29
People's Action Party 2
United Nationalist Party 2
All People's Republican Party 1
Independents 1
There were numerous reasons for this outcome. First was the
prominent position that Busia played throughout the NLC regime.
He was head of the Political Committee, the Electoral Commission,
and was active in the Constituent Assembly. As Chairman of the Civic
Education Centre, he had always made it clear that he would form a
political party. Thus, many of his supporters would have registered
to vote. Busia had been the ostensible choice of Afrifa and other
leaders in the NLC. Those who were reported to have favoured
Gbedemah had been forced out of the Council, notably Ankrah and
Nunoo. Also there were rumours that the NLC would only hand over
to a civilian government led by the PP. This, coupled with the
(1) Legon Observer. Vol.IV. No.19 (12-25 September,1969) p.2.
(2) Legoa Observer. Vol.IV, No,18/1 (September 5, 1969) p.3.
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military's obvious determination to retain 3esse political power
for the next few years, understandably persuaded many Ghanaians that
prudence, if nothing else, dictated their support for the man with
the JSLC's tacit approval. ^
Secondly, the inclusion of Article Tl(2)(b)(ii) had an
impact on the elections. After its acceptance by the Constituent
Assembly, Busia wanted it amended to include appeal, but this con¬
firmed suspicions that his refusal to concede this earlier was a
/ <*) \
result of deliberate election strategy. Article 71 placed in
doubt the position of Gbedemah. This, plus his efforts to reverse
the findings of the Annie Jiagge Commission, inhibited many potential
supporters of the MAL from registering to vote when the future of
their party leader was uncertain.
There was also residual bitterness over the CPP. Busia, a
traditional opponent of Hkrumah, capitalised on this sentiment;
Gbedemah, with old CPP connections, was in jeopardy. The PAP which
attracted old CPP support did win two seats in Nzima. There is
a question as to whether this was due to CPP support in Hkrumah's
birthplace or the manner in which the NLC with Susie's advice
(3)
had handled the mine strike there.
Perhaps the division of support along tribal lines was one
of the more disturbing aspects of the election. The PP was backed
(1) E.Card and B.Calloway, "Ghanaian Political The
Elections and After", Africa Report. Vol.15, So.3. (Msreh#1970),p.lfc.
(2) Ryan, p.53.
(3) Legon Observer. Vol.IV, So.lS/l (September 5,1969) p.5.
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by a new coalition between the Ashanti and other Akan-speaking
people; the NAL received its support in the Ews centres of the
Volta Region. One organisational cause of ethnic voting blocs
was that the constituencies had been delineated along ethnic lines
since the days of indirect rule, iioreever, the shortness of the
period between the lifting of the ban on political activity and
the elections meant that in order for any party to have any chance
of winning, it would require over-whelming support in at least one
region. "Theban itself nay hare forced would-be political leaders
to start planning their activities in their own areas and presust-
(l)
ably with members of their own tribes." For example, Joe
Appiah, an Aahanti, headed the UUP. However, it became known as
the Qa party, especially after the removal of Ankrah and Uunoo from
the HLC. Appiah vaa defeated in his own constituency (775 out of
10,533 votes) largely because of sentiments that he had sold out
(2)
to the Gas.
When the election results for the major parties are broken
(3)
down into regions, tbe ethnic basis is explicit:








(1) heson Observer.Vol.IV> .Vo.l9 (12-25 Sept.1969) p.3.
(2) Ryan, pj<9.
(3) Legon Observer, Vol.lV.No l8/l(Sept.5, 1969),p.3.
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One rationale for the Akan voting bloc van the growing anti-Eve
sentiment. They claimed tae dwes had gained dominance in various
corridors of economic, political, administrative and military pover
since me coup. The controversial Gbedemah, with his CPP background,
also made the Akan cocoa farmers who had suffered under likrumah
turn from the HAL to the PP. The overall PP support was 35 per
cent in the constituencies which it won. Although the HAL's backbone
was in the Volta region, It also von some seats in the Eastern
Region in the areas peopled by those allies of the Eves who feared
Akan domination. However, the HAL*a record was modest. Overall,
75 per cent of the votes cast in those areas were for Gbedemah's
(1)
party, but in six districts it fell below 75 per cent.
The election results exposed a dubious national unity.
The political divisions between the HAL and the PP were much akin
to thwae in the 195^ and 1956 elections. The clock had been turned,
back.
Ghana returned to civilian rule on September 3, 1969. Less
than a year later, the military presidential triumvirate stepped
down. On August 31, 1970, Busia sponsored Edward Akufo-Addo, a
former Chief Justice and Chairman of the Constitutional Commission,
for the presidential election held by the ihO members of Parliament
(1) L.Card and B.Calloway, p.13.
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and 2U chiefs. Ee won the election by 123 to 68 votes. Therefore,
both the Prime Minister and the President were members of the PP.
In the preceeding discussion of the return to civilian
rule in Ghana, we have seen that the first of the two pre-conditions
for de-militarisation were met. First, the junta appeared to be
ready to withdraw from politics and their subordinates also were
willing to return to their barracks. From the beginning, the military-
leaders stated repeatedly that they had no intentions of remaining
h. political power indefinitely. However, there was an attitude of
caution exhibited both by the military and at least a large minority
of the population.
The first move for a return to civilian rule began in the
summer of 19^7 with the appointment of the Siriboe Commission to
study and recommend procedures for elections. From this time for¬
ward, the HLC can be seen directing the path of re-civilianization
in so far that the future regime would be acceptable to the military.
Moreover, the military was able to retain an amount of constitutionally
recognized political power. Certain aspects of this attitude of
the military should be re-iterated. First, the Constitutional
Commission, the Constituent Assembly, the Constitution, the Electoral
Commissioners and the Disqualification Decrees were characterised
by a atroner anti-ifkrumah stance. l-Joreover, all these were subject
to the control of the NLC. The Constitutional Commission was made
up of fifteen anti-llkrumah members who were charged, in Ankrah's
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words: to "prepare for the approval of the KLC - and thereafter for
(1)
the entire nation - a Constitution." The Electorol Commissioner
was to establish rules and regulations for the conduct of elections
which were subject to the final approval of the HLC. The Disquali¬
fication Decrees left the final decision for exemption up to the
discretion of the NLC. The Constituent Assembly was to answer
and submit its findings to the ftEC. Also, the Constituent Assembly
was criticised as being packed by the favourite children of the HLC
including 10 members appointed by the junta. The most blatant inter¬
ference by the military in the drawing up of the Constitution was
the deal in which the fiiLC allowed the Constituent Assembly to enact
and promulgate the new Constitution in exchange for including the
motion for a Presidential Commission consisting of members of the
HLC. Although the military troika dissolved itself within one year,
it does not diminish the fact that the aray was able to retain a
large amount of overt political power.
Secondly, the Disqualification Decrees were considered a
move on the part of the military to prohibit the formation of a
civilian government which would consist of friends of the Lkruaah
regime or enemies of the military government. These decrees, although
modified considerably, acted in accordance with the findings of the
(l) Ankrah, p.11. (italics author's)
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Commissions of Inquiry and with Article 71(2) of the Constitution
to prevent old CPP associates froa participating in the nev government.
The case of Aoisla Gbedeoah is moat notable. Long before the lift of
the ban on political activity, Gbedeiaah had been found guilty by the
Annie Jiagge Commission of Inquiry of obtaining his wealth by
illegitimate means. He was fined $1»1,000 and refused an appeal.
However, these findings were not made public until Gbedezaah declared
hie intentions of forming a political party. Gbederaah was originally
disqualified by NLCD 223 but later exempted by the Apaloo Commission.
Ee was again disqualified under the Political Party Decree, but
public resentment led to an amendment of the decree and Gbedemah was
again exempted. The final attack on Gbedemah cane after his victory
inthe General Elections at his constituency in Keta. When the
Constitution was ratified ia September 19<S9» it was made retroactive
to August 22 or just prior to the General Election. Article 11(2),
which amcJig other pointd,disqualified from public office any
public officers who had acquired money unlawfully. Thus, Gbedemah
was refused his seat in Parliament because of his past record with
the Annie Jiagge CoBunission of Inquiry.^^ This was considered
by many observers to be moBt unfortunate since it was assumed that
Gbedeai&h would have made an excellent opposition voice.
(l) Africa Report. Vol.15, Ho.2 (February 197C),p.ll.
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Thirdly, the liLC'a promotion of Busia vas another sienna of
directing the pattern of civilian rule. The SLC had appointed
Suaia Chairman of the Centre of Civic Education, Political
Commission, Electoral Commission, and he had Been active in the
Constituent Assembly. Ituaia was the ostensible choice of Afrifa,
and Ankrah and IWOO who had supported Gbedemah had been forced out
of the ILC. As ve have stated before, the promotion of Busia
combined with the ITLC's determination to retain political pover
for some time persuaded many Ghanaians that prudence called for them
to support the PP and Busia,
Thus, the anti-hkrvuaah attitude and the KLC influence of the
Constitutional Commission, the Constituent Assembly, the
Constitution, the Electoral Commissioner, and the Disqualification
decrees, the ITLC support of Busia and attache on Cbedemah, and the Pres¬
idential Commission made up of the HLC all assured that the po3t-
iiitervecticrcistcivilian regime would be amenable to the inilitaiy.
Was the third pre-condition met in Ghana? Immense problems
remained in Ghana and it ml doubtful that the new civilian regime
vas politically viable without military support. "With the weakened
executive and the enormous emphasis placed on the division of
powers, the framework envisaged by the Constitution may lead to
political inaction and this would prove to be inadequate to deal
with the myriad problems of a developing nation."^ The success
(1) E.Card ana B.Calloway, p.15
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of civilian government depended to some degree on Busia's
political abilities which, were dubiou3 at best. The ethnic tensions
which emerged during the elections may also hinder the political
process of a united country. Not one cabinet or sub-cabinet
member was an Ive. Gbedemah was disqualified only a day before the
opening of Parliament which compromised the role of a loyal oppos¬
ition. The Parliament would also be immobilized by the lack of
any extensive debate during the campaign about social, economic,
and political issues. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly,
the economy continued to deteriorate with the fall of world cocoa
prices and the heavy burden of the debt. Although the army no
longer held a constitutionally sanctioned role in the government,
once the thread of legality had been broken, it could easily be
broken again.
Buaia'a regime lasted until January 1972 when the military
once again took control of the political institutions. In brief,
the background to the coup was the economic crises which had gripped
Ghana since the aid-sixties.^"^ Ghana's debt had rescued record
heights, and the short-term loans were mo3t pressing. These
amounted to £>368,000,000 and being short-term, the interest rates
were as high as 9 per cent in some instances. The internal debt
(l) Africa Perort, Vol.17, Wo.U, pp.19-22.
was over $600 million which added to the inflation in the country.
Added to this, foreign aid had only equalled the level of the debt
payment. Coispounding Ghana's inability to pay her debts was the
drop in the world cocoa priees. This cost Busia much support in
the Akan areas where most of the cocoa is produced.
Meanwhile, the trade union in Ghana, the "Yade Union Congress
(TUC); vent on numerous strikes in opposition to the government's
policy. The situation broke open when B.A. Bentua, leader of
the TUC, denounced the 1971 budget. At this point, the govern¬
ment disbanded the TUC and called in the artsy to occupy the TUC
buildings.
It was, however, Busia'3 attempt to limit the privileges of
the army that led directly to the 197? coup as had similar policies
of SIkrunah led to the 1966 coup. In the 197? budget, several of
the traditional perks of the amy officers, such as vehicle-
maintenance allowances, were abolished. The austerity budget also
attempted to reduce military costs and increase the productivity of
the army - steps the military deeply resented. The budgetary
allocation to the Ministry of Defence was cut by 10 per cent. To
make matters worse, Busia devalued the cedi by kk per cent in the
summer of 1971. This hit the economic elite of Ghana, including
the officers. With hoarding and profiteering, inflation went
up and in terms of real income, those who had been living on European
standards experienced a loss as much as 25 per cent.
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Busia reali-eu thai troubles way bo forthcoming from salitary
quarters and maue mov©3 to forstall tide by shifting many of the top
solitary personnel. Be was too late auu on January 13, 1972
the ailitary was once again in control of the government of Ghana.
Sierra Leone
"Bellow citizens, I want to wake this quite clear
that we the senior officers do not intend to izapose
a Military Government on the people of this our
beloved country ... we are soldiers and want to reaain
soldiers and politics is not our ambition. we will hand
over to the politicians as soon as the situation becomes
favourable. The national Reformation Council will do
all in its power to bring about a civilian government
in the shortest possible tirae".'^'
With these words, Major Charles Blake assured the people of Sierra
Leone that the array did not intend to remain in power indefinitely.
However, on the return of Juxon-Sadth to head the HRC, the prospects
for a quick return to civilian rule dirainished. The pre-conditions
for demilitarisation expressed, by the HRC vera an end to corruption,
the rehabilitation of the economy, and the abolition of tribal
conflict - all of which were beyond the capacity of the array to
bring about.
The first move by the HRC towards re-civilianisation was to
establish a Civilian Advisory Council headed by University of Sierra
(1' Report of the hove-^hvin GoB.Hiifc.sion of Inquiry into cue
Conduct of the Ip67 General Elections in Sierra Leone and the Govern¬
ment Statement hereon {Freetown: Sierra Leone governraent Printer),p.5.
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Leone Vics-ChaiicejJLor Davidson iucoI and. later replaced by the
Pro-Vice-Chancellor S.T.Hatturi. This council was charged to draw-
up a new constitution and to advise the 1«RC on the process of a
return to civil government. Few APC supporters were included and
the council vac biased to the southern and eastern regions.
There is little evidence that this council was able to accomplish
much in regards to re-civilianisation.
In hay,1967, the Dove-Edwin Commission vac founded to
"inquire into the Conduct of the late general election held on the
(2)
17th and 21st days of March, 19&7 ••• This Commission was
to nave considerable influence both on rffiC rule mid the process
of its withdrawal from politics. When the investigations of the
Dove-ndwia Commission were published in January IS63, the JRC was
forced into a position in which it had to take definite action.
The report of the Commission found that the results of the
1967 elections were SLPP, twenty-two seats plus air unopposed;
AFC, 32 seats, and Independents, four. It concluded that:
The 3LPF Government used corrupt means in order to win
the elections ... the APC won the Elections on their
own merit .... When the Governor-General ... appointed
Mr Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister he was constitutionally
right ... and Then Brigadier Lans&ua said he had taken
over and placed the Governor-General and Mr Siaka Stevens
under house arrest he actually seizeu power iron a duly-
constituted government ...3
(1) Chris Allen, "Sierra Leone Politics Since Independence",
African Affairs. Vol.67 (October, 1963),p.326.
(2) Africa Report, Vol.12, No.7 (October,1967),p.56.
(3) Keport of the Dove-Edwin Commission, p.
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The NRC White Paper, published with the Dove-
Edwin Commission Report, was in agreement with the findings that
the elections were rigged and corrupt. However, Juxon-Sraith had
j ustified the military rule on the fact that both political parties
were guilty of malpractices during the elections, that the appointment
of Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister was unconstitutional, and that
civil war was imminent at the time of the coup. The NRC statements
vere set forth to maintain these myths. The report reads:
... both parties were to "blame for the disturbances
that took place in certain areas and the difference
of culpability of both parties was just one of degree..
... there was a sudden upsurge of tribal feelings
when the announcement of the final results was delayed.
This would haverdeveloped into a tribal war if the
National Reformat^on/nad not stepped in on the 23rd
Marejt, 19^7 ... In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the National Reformation Council is of the
view that the Governor-General did not exercise his
deliberate judgement, free from outside pressure, in
appointing to Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister on the
21st day of March 1967 ••• it is the considered view
of the Council that the occasion for the Governor-
General to exercise his discretion had not yet arisen
on the 21st March, 1967* when he purported to exercise
this discretion. This untimely action o? the Governor-
General gave rise to an increasing tension throughout
the country. The situation was aggravated when the
senior officers of the Royal Sierra Leone Military
Forces realized that Brigadier Lansana wanted to impose
Sir Albert Marg&i as Prime Minister on the people of
Sierra Leone. This would have led to chaos -and blood¬
shed in the country. The National Reformation
Council's intervention on the 23rd day of March, was a
rescue operation and was not intended to impose permanently
a military government on the people.
(l) Dove-Edwin Gom;f)i«sion, pp.2-k.
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In spite cf these efforts at rationalisation the fiRC realised that
Muagr people were becoming suspicious about the willingness of the
HRC to hand over to a civilian government. In the White Paper, the
Council stated:
The Hational Reformation Council appreciates the
earnestness of local aspirations for a return to
civilian rule at possible time ...
The hational Reformation/is strongly of the view
that any return to civilian rule should be done
in an atmosphere of mutual trust and goodwill on
the part of ell concerned, d)
Thus, by KBC Decree on January 16, 1968, a new Civilian Rule Committee
was formed and chainaanned by Sarif Easmon. It consisted of
representatives of paramount chiefs, local government authorities,
religious bodie3, the banned 8LPP and AFC with the exception of
Albert Ifargai, the National Advisory Council, the Medical Association,
the r * • v: "- .: i on the Chamber cf Ccrs-erce, end the n -cc>.o-"al
Independent candidates of the 1967 election. The Committee was to
advise the !IRC on the method and procedure for handing over power to
a civilian government. While it was not formally charged with
drawing up a new constitution, Juxon-Smith described it as a "pro
(2)
test constituent asBtsrbly". 7 The Civilian Rule Committee was to
deal with the following questions: whether or not there should be
an election before the handover, who should appoint the Prime Minister,
and would there be a coalition government of the PIPP and APC.
(D ibid.. £.5.
(2) West Africa, (March 2, 1968),p.32^.
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The Civilian Rale Committee did not meet until the end of
February and then only six times. Its most important recommendation
vas that there ves no need for elections before the return to civilian
rule^ This vas a direct contradiction of the wishes of the liRC
who filt that elections vere necessary and who did not want power to
be handed to an APO-baaed government. "It looks therefore, as
though the Committee and the Chairman [of the IfRC] are working to
very different time scales, since, if taare is to be no general
election, a return to civilian rule could, and probably should, coincide
with the beginning of the next financial year [i.e. July 19681;
while if there is to be one ... it night not take place for a very long
(2)tine.* Although some felt that a return to civil rule in
July would be too soon since sows Commissions of Inquiry vere still
sitting and there was still need of rigorous economic control, many
were growing increasingly dubious over the credibility of the NRC
promises.
There vere several factors which made a hand-over to a
civil srovernment unpalatable to the NRC. First, among the officers
on the Council and non-HIC officers, there were strong forces which
opposed an iPC administration which was alone acceptable to the majority of the
electorate and which the Dove-Edwin Commission had shown to be the
(1) West Africa (March 3ii» iyob),p.3op.
(2) seat Africa (March 2t 1968),p.32i*.
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rightful victors of the 1967 Elections. Also, the three Majors who
led the !!arch 23rd coup feared that an APC government would either
dismiss or imprison then. Many of the officers were unwilling to
give up prospects of rapid promotion and higher pay which military
rule provided. Finally, Juxson-Saith and his compatriots seemdd to
enjoy ruling Sierra Leone.^ A voluntary return to civilian
rule was an obscure prospect.
On April 18, 1968, a group of SCO's and warrant officers
overthrew the unpopular NRC. The leaders of the counter-coup stated
that their iranediate aim was to restore civilian rule. A fourteen-
inan Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) replaced the defunct
NBC. The ACFM recalled Colonels Bangura and Genda, and a National
(2)
Interim Council (NIC) was established under the former. The NIC
promised that it would restore civilian rule "within the earliest
possible time in accordance with the Constitution as it stood in
(3)
March 1967." As such, the SIC was acting as an ad hoc
Constituent Assembly. During the following days, eighty-five
members of the former government and officers were detained,
the Press Law was repealed, all officers vere demoted to their pre-
NRC rank, and the office and powers of the Governor~G®neral vere
(t)
revived. Governor-General Sir henry Ligbtfoot listen was
f l ^ »•»_ -aofl- ■» — p • ****** •




invited back to Sierra Leone but as he va3 in ill health the NIC
appointed Chief Justice Tejan-Sie as acting Governor-General. He,
in turn, requested that all successful candidates for the March 1967
General Flections assemble in Freetown. When the first session of
the House of Representatives met on April 26, 1968, Siaka Stevens
was chosen as Prime Minister. His cabinet of fourteen ministers
included four SLPP members in such posts as Education, Health,
Works and Social Welfare and two Independent members. It was an
attempt to absorb the SLPP into the active government but an actual
coalition was never established.
Let us sum up the preceding discussion of the return to
civilian rule in Sierra Leone by examining the facts in view of the
three pre-conditions to de-militarisation. The first pre-conditions
(i.e. the willingness of the military to return to the barracks)
was not met by the Juxson-Smith junta. Although Juxson-Smith had
stated that the NRC would hand over power to the civilians in ths
shortest time possible, the subsequent actions of the regime proved
the contrary. On the other hand, the NCO*s and Warrant Officers
wasted little time in handing back power to a civilian government.
The reasons for the different timetables were in part due
to the fulfilment of the second pre-condition. The NRC acted
to direct the course of the return to civilian rule particularly to
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prohibit tne ascendancy of the APC. There are several examples of
this. First, the Civilian Advisory Committee was biased to the south
ana east while including few APC supporters. Secondly, there was an
attempt on the behalf of the NRC to upstage the bove-hdwin Commission
Report by publishing a Government "White Paper with the report. The
government justified its takeover by declaring that trie country was
on the verge of collapse from a tribal war in .4arch 1967 and that
both the APC and 3LPP had contributed to the disturbances. This
contradicted the Keportfe findings that the APC nad von the election
fairly. Finally, when the NBC seemed to ignore the recommendations
of the Civilian Rule Committee, there was a growing doubt that the
NRC intended to hand over power to the APC. However, the NIC did
consider the APC as an acceptable government. This was due, in the
first place, to the fact that the lower ranks were unhappy with the
Juxson-Saiith regime. The NRC had enjoyed many prerogatives in
their position of power while the enlisted men received none of
these benefits. Secondly, the APC had promised to offer the enlisted
men improvements in pay and living conditions.
The final pre-condition, that of the creation of a viable
national government, was not met in Sierra Leone. The first year
of APC rule was one of difficulty. There were problems which the
APC government was compelled to solve before the political process
was truly in the hands of the civilians. First, it was necessary
to hold elections in twenty-five constituencies in vhich the 1967
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Election results had been declared invalid. Most of these vere
ex-SLPP seats in the south and the east and included Albert Margai's
constituency.^ The violence vhich erupted during the elections
vere largely due to the SLPP-APC antagonisms, but vere also reinforced
by ethnic conflicts and a Creole-Men&e clash at Njaia. Stevens post-
(2)
poned the elections indefinitely and declared a state of emergency.
He also relied heavily on the army and police to quell the riots over
the elections.
The second problem concerned the army officers in jail.
After the 1963 coup, the army had only tvo officers and both of these
had been recalled from abroad. A majority of the subordinate officers
vere eventually released, but their future role remained uncertain.
In August, eighteen men, including Lansana, L.K.Hugh (the former
Commissioner of Police), Majors Kai-Samba and Blake, and Lt. Norman
(3)
vere charged vith treason. After a fifty-six week trial,
these men were sentenced to death and in 1971# Lansana was finally
executed.
The military continued to hover in the vings while the
political situation in Sierra Leone has deteriorated in the past tvo
years. Stevens began to consolidate his power. He detained the
(1) West Africa (Sept. 28, 1968),p.1150
(2) West Africa (Nov. 23, 1968),p.1365
(3) West Africa (August 3, 1968),p.906.
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Ministers of Finance and Information, Dr Forna and Ibrahim Taqi,
who still remain under arrest. A state of emergency was declared
in 1970 and still remains in effect. When an opposition party,
the United democratic Party, broke away from the APC, Stevens
detained its leaders and banned the party. However, it was the
attempted coup in April 1971 which opened the door for Stevens to
establish a strong presidential system. The coup and assassination
were
attempts /allegedly led _ by Col. Bangura (aead of the Sierra Leone
army since 1966). Stevens used the coup attempts to conclude
a defense pact with neighbouring Guinea and called in Guinean troops
to restore order and bolster his regime.^ Stevens also seized
upon this opportunity to declare Sierra Leone a republic on
April 19, 1971, and establishing himself into a strong presidential
position. There has been speculation that by the time of the next
general elections in 1973, Stevens will have declared a one-party
(2)
state in Sierra Leone. However, in order for Stevens to
maintain power until that time, it will take more than the presence
of Guinean troops which has displeased many Sierra Leoneans.
(1) West Africa (April 2, 1971),p.355
(2) Africa Report (June 1971) Vol.l6,Io.6.p.8»
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Dahomey
There have been four separate returns to civilian rule
in Dahomey during the past decade. In each instance peculiar sets of
circumstances both within the aray and among the civilian political
elite conditioned the process of re-civilianixation. We will discuss
each instance separately in the following section.
After Soglo intervened in the polities of Dahomey in 1963,
there was no question that the army would stay in power. Soglo had
set up a provisional government with Apitby, Ahoaadegbe, and Mags
as his ministers. In spite of the lack of reconciliation among these
nen when Maga was arrested for subversive activity, Soglo was still
sufficiently in coitaa&nd of the army to push through the return to
civilian rule by January 196!;. There were two steps in this re-
civilianiaation of politics: first, the drawing up of a new constitution
and secondly the elections.
Immediately after the seizure of power, the junta appointed
a nine member commission which drew up a constitutional draft delineating
(l)
a restricted executive end recognition of the rights of opposition.
However, the military government rejected their proposals, maintaining that
they did not respond to the wishes of the masses. In fact, the
military was in favour of a strong executive system. The sixty member
(l) Maurice A. Glele, Maissance d'un Etat-hoir (Pariaj^
R.Pechon and R.Durant-Auzias for Libraric Generale de Droit efc de Juris¬
prudence, 1969},p.287.
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Coamisaiop Constitutionelle. appointed by the military in late November
1963, then drew up a constitution which was a compromise between an
orthodox Presidential system and a classical parliamentarian regime.^
Under the 19&b Constitution, the President and the Vice President 3hored
executive power with the President as head of state and the Vice-
President as head of government. Legislative power was vested in a
National Assembly elected every five years by universal suffrage.
The proposed constitution called for a one-party state; the party
was to be the Parti PgHnocratique Dnhomen (PDD)^ A Senior
Council was recommended to act in a consultative capacity to enable
"the nation as a whole to benefit fro® the experience, traditions,
(3)
and wisdom of the past."
The proposed constitution met criticism from the students
and trade unions. Paoletti, leader of the UGTD, opposed this
presidential system. Ke later denied that the amalgamated unions
were opposed to Apithy and Ahoaadegbe, the leaders of the provisional
government, and eventually retracted his opposition to the draft
constitution. The constitution was to be placed before the electorate
on December 15, but this was postponed until January 5 following the
arrest of Kaga and two of his former ministers on charges of subvers¬
ion. The Soglo Constitution, as it was later termed, was accepted
(l) West Africa (December lfc. 19^3).v.lh07,
West Africa (January Ut 196*0,p. 11.
(3) Weat Africa (December lk, 1963) ,p.lfcQ7.
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by 99»80 per cent of the electorate (92.06 per cent of the electorate
participate! in the referendum.)^ ^
The presidential and legislative elections took place under
Military supervision on January 19th. 99.98 per cent of the vote
was cast for the list presented by the PDD. Ahooadegbe became
President and Apithy, Vice-President. "In theory, the partnership
•solved* Dahomey's leadership crisis, but the dual-executive - difficult
in the bc3t circumstances - could not paper over the long-standing
(2)
personal and political animosities between the two men."
The dual executive lasted until November 1965 when Soglo
once again moved into the breach. Another civilian government
was attempted by the appointment of Speaker of the National Assembly,
Congacou, a3 head of state in accordance with Articles 17 and 35
(3)
of the Soglo Constitution. . Congacou promised that he would set
up a commission to reform the constitution and to create a presi¬
dential system of government. He was unable, however, to form a
working coalition among the three power centres and Soglo moved back
into the breach that December.
bogie's quasi-civilianised regime was overthrown in 1967
by the younger generation c? officers lead by Major Maurice Kouandste.
(1) Uleie, p.25^«
(2) Rene hemarchand, "Dahomeyj Coup within a Coup".Africa
Report. Vol.13, No.6 (June 1966),p.50.
(3) Glele, p.290.
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The reasons for this coup, as we discussed in Chapter II stemmed from
the discontent the younger officers felt with Soplo. Alley became
the chairman of the military government largely because of his prestige
outside the aray rather than his support within the army. Heedless
to say, Kouandete was unhappy that he had been replaced by Alley
as head of the junta and Alley was uneasy that another coup-maker,
potentially more of a threat than he, had emerged in the array. This
feu<» between Alley and Kouftndete was to form the hc.ckrround tc the
return to power of elected civilians in June 1966 and later to the
emergence and collapse of the Zinsou regime froa July 1968 to
December 1969.*1*
While leader of the junta, Alley, recognising the lack of
support froa the younger officers, acted on the assumption that his
power was limited. On the other hand, Kouandete used his position
as spokesman for the jeunea cadres to strengthen his power. Kumerous
re-shufflings within the junta, particularly the replacement of Captain
Hackeme by Captain Matthew Kerekou, were designed to strengthen
' ' (2)
Konandete's position. Kouauade'te and the jeuaes cadres filled
every post in the government with array people (except for the Minister
of Finance). Many of the ministers, in spite of their lack of exper¬
ience, were younger officers including three captains and four lieuten¬
ants and the members of the Revolutionary Coimittee were even sore
(1) K.Whiteman, "The Military Regimes in Togo and Dahomey"
unpublished seminar paper presented at Institute of Commonwealth Studies
(November 1970),p.1^. Quoted with author's permission.
(2) West Africa (February 10,1968),p.17^.
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junior. This brought into question Xouandete•a sincerity in
wanting the stray back in the barracks. His subsequent record makes
him appear more a political officer. As Whitemail proposes I "Kouandete**
dislike of political manoeuver and politicians may have caused him
sincerely to want to take the army from politics. Yet this same
contempt seems to have lead him to take political actions".^
It was Alley, therefore, wno announced the deadline for the return to
civilian rule within six months and who guided through the new
constitution at the end of March.
The first step to the return to civilian rule was the
creation of a new constitution. Alley appointed a thirty-three man
committee headed by Ignacio Pinto, President of the Supreme Court to
draft the constitution. This draft was submitted to Alley in early
March 1966 . It called for (l) a strong presidency limited by the
right of the individual to appeal to the 3upreme Court for rulings
on the constitionality of presidential actions, (2) a National Assembly
to be paid according to the number and length of sessions each delegate
attends, (3) a judiciary with a guaranteed independence from executive
and legislative interference, and (k) the institution of a single
(2)
political party to be known as the Parti National Unique (PHU).
Alley announced his preference for the strong Presidency
on grounds that "a principal cause of our regression was the lack of
(1) Whiteman, p.15.
(2) Afrique Contemporaine.Ho.37 (1968),p.15.
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firmness among our leaders". He also defended the idea of a
single party as "the only means we have to insure the unification,
cohesion, and stability we need so ®uch since success in the economic
(2)
and social fields depends above all on political stability." On
March 31, 1968, the draft constitution was submitted to e national
referendum. It was approved by 8^6,521 votes to 71,695 with
19^,300 abstentions. Most of the "no" votes were in Abomey, Ahomadegbe's
fief.*3*
The second stage in the return to civilian rule was the
election for the Presidency. The major problem revolved about the
position of Maga, Apithy, and Ahomadegbe - the Big Three. In April,
the jeunes cadres, probably under the leadership of Kouandete, excluded
the ex-Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and Ministers from the election
by a sixty to thirty vote. Although the Supreme Court overturned this
ban, the junta ignored the decision on the grounds that the new con-
(U)stitution did not come into effect until a new government was formed.
The ban, as we shall see, resulted in the election disaster since the
Big Three were able to rally their forces to cause a 75 per cent
boycott of the elections.
Nevertheless, Alley pressed forward with the presidential
nominations, and elections were scheduled for early May. The military
(1) Lemarchand, p.5^.
(2) ibid
(3) West Africa (April 6, 1968),p.1*09.
(M West Africa (April 27, 1968), p.500.
239.
presented, a hand-picked list of candidates who "began campaigning on
April 21st. The five candidates, all nonentities on the Dahomean
political scene, included Dr Basile Adjou Moumouni, a WHO doctor;
Paul Hazoume, a minor politician; Eustache Prudencio, a teacher; Karim
de Silva, a publisher; and J.B.Viernin, a company director. ^
The May 5 election, pulling only one-fourth of the vote,
was a fiasco. Dr. Basile A&jou Moumouni was technically the victor,
yet he was hardly the man to work effectively with the jeunes cadres.
He had spent most of his life outside Dahomey as a WHO doctor and as
he was U6, he was considered too old by the young officers. Moreover,
Adjou found support only in the Southwest (he was rumoured to be
backed by Ahomadegbe) and his emergence as President would have caused
an uproar in the southeast and north. Finally, he had little backing
(2)in the military. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
junta declared the election void.
After the elections, there was total confusion in the rank3.
Alley appeared to he in favour of doing a deal with the Big Three and
bringing them back. Kouanaete refused. This set off a curious
cabinet reshuffle in mid-May when a number of soldier-ministers were
(3)
replaced by officers of the Ouidah paracommando unit. Then





involving some men of the Ouidah unit, which was a hot-bed of
intrigue and loyal to no one by now, the plot vis supposedly to
✓ , (1)a33asainate Kouandete and his followers. Therefore, Alley was
implicated and his reputation damaged. Again Alley lost favour when
his planned meeting for Ahoaadegbe, Apithy, and Maga in Niamey never
materialized. Alley's promise of a return to barracks by June lTth
was? impossible. He had stoked his reputation on this promise and
had lost. On the other hand, Kouandete's ascendancy in the army
seemed proven when the array invited Dr Boil© Zinsou to bo President.
Kauandete was in favour of this compromise and with the army near
to collapse from internal rivalries and with pressure from the
unions and France so intense, this "fourth man" of Dahomean politics
seemed the ideal compromise. Furthermore, it was rumoured that Zinsou
arranged with Kouandete that he would be appointed head cf the army it
Kouandete supported his candidacy. This was agreed upon by the
(2)
younger officers if only to exclude the Big Three.
Therefore, Zinsou was appointed President for five years and
given one month to form a government. His appointment finally united
Apithy, Aboraadegbe, and Maga. These men and fioglo called a press
conference to express their collective opposition to Zinsou.




the elite, hut he lacked any grass-roots support. After hie inaugu¬
ration en July 17th, he announced that he would hold a referendum
on July 28th to approve his appointment. He won a 7k per cent wo4i"
vote in spite of the urging* of the Big Three to their followers to
(1)
boycott the referendum. The vote gave Zinaou
a somewhat illusory mandate to rule, hut by this
tine, raost Dahomeans had become so bored by political
convulsions that he could count on a considerable supply
of negative good-will. It also enabled Zinsou to feel
he was not merely dependent on Kouandet£*s whims.
Therefore, on July 31st, the Coralte Revolutionaire Militaire dissolved
itself stating "we can now go back to our barracks, convinced that
we have laid down a precise framework in which the new President
(3)
will function, as we set out to do on December 17 » 1967#
Zinsou's task was to bring an element of sanity into
Dahomey * s finances. During his seventeen months in power, he was
able to offset serious union unrest and to counter opposition,
but he was not able to control the Alley-Xbuandete feud. Kbuandete
led the coup ousting Zinsou in December 1969, but as we have discussed
earlier, de Oousa was chosen to lead the latest military directorate.
(H)
As Whitera&n put it, all was not sweetness and light.* De
Souza released Alley as a symbol of the officer's esprit de corps
which left Koaaad^te ill at ease. There was talk of restoring Zinsou
(1) Vest Africa ~ (Augus# 31,1968),p.907.
(2) Whitman, p.15.
(3) Africa Report. Vol.13, bo.7 (October,1968),p.U8.
(H) whiteaan, p.l6.
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although Kouandete refused to accept this. The array was more
divided than ever. On January 10tht a confrontation developed between
the Kouandete and the de Souza-Sinzogan camps. Kouandete arrested
Sinzogan and called him before a "States General" of officers. He
also placed other officers under surveillance and surrounded the
building in which the Sinzogan hearing was being held with armed
troops. Paratroopers were brought in from Quid&h and as one corr¬
espondent reported, "every army faction at the meeting had its own
armed troops ready to intervene.After six hours of discussion,
a compromise was reached: the three men of the Directorate, de
Souza, Sinzogan, and Kouandete, would forget their disputes and
cooperate and a committee under Lt. Col. Vodonou, a neutral, was
appointed to organize elections before March 31st. This was considered
a victory for the Big Three who had all been called back from exile
and a defeat for Zinsou.
The general elections for the President and delegates to
the National Assembly were scheduled from March 9th to March 31st.
A deposit fee of £1,500 for presidential candidates limited the field
to four: Apithy,Ahomadegbe, Maga, and Zinsou. Each formed a political
party and issued party newspapers,The Big Three began rnanoeu-
vering in the accustomed manner in their respective political feifs,
(1) -flfHop Ttanort. Vol.15, (April,1970),p.6.
(2) West Africa (February 21, 1970),p.212.
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and the campaign carried a conspiratorial air. She election itself
was disastrous. In Borgou in the north, violence erupted leaving
six dead and over five hundred, injured. This was enough for the
military directorate first to suspend and later to cancel the elec¬
tions. De Souza announced on March 29th:
Malgre 1* engagement pris eolennelleaent par
tous les candidate de respecter la loi electorale,
de precher la non-violence k leurs partisans, les
elections sont, pour une categorie de Dahcnaeens,
l'occaaion de dechelner leurs instincts: devies
humainea sont aneanties, l'insecurite des citoyens
est devenue une realite. lies,votes sont entach^B
d'irregularitmm flagrantes•^'







Naga, who was trailing behind heavily in the southern areas (winning
only 25#000 votes in those four departments), vas then in the
position of likely victor since he could count on the vote in the
remaining department of Attacora which had 190,000 electors
(i)
registered. Thus, the decision to annul the election results
infuriated maga's supporters. One stated: "La decision du diractoire
est une injustice dont nous soianes las aeules victimes." '
\ f h s 11. i rvrrs \ • oO
\U.j V V - iq.1 » «W tWf | Ah.
(2) ibid.. p.29
(3) west Africa (April k, 1970),p.375.
(k) Jeune Afrique. Ho.k85 (April 21, 1970),p.2k.
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Thus, an assembly of chiefs, notables, and leading politicians from
the north met in Parakou and this was interpreted as a threat of sec¬
ession. As Pascal Chabikao, a spokesman for liaga stated: "Le mot see-
(1)ession ne nous fait pas peur." There vezs rumours that an arrsy of
the north vas being set up under Captain Ibrahim Chabi, one of
Kouandete's ministers in 1968 and that secessionist flags vere being
raised in Parakou. There was also talk of merging northern Dahomey
with Niger. Meanwhile, large numbers of southerners vere fleeing
from the north and an anonymous tract entitled "A Citizen's Revolt"
(2)
vas published in Cotonou threatening northerners in the south.
The military directorate vas facing a large scale crisis-
civil war. Kbuandete, a northerner, vas obliged to issue a state¬
ment denying any part he might have with the northern secession plan.
This was probably true for it was unlikely that Kbuandete would have
associated himself with the traditional political leaders such as
(3)
Mags. There was also talk of a "Ghanaian" solution in which
Alley would lead a transitional government. This never materialized
in view of the suspicion with which Alley wsb regarded by the other
officers. When questioned, Alley answered, "Quelle situation?
(k)
Celle du pays? Mais c'est l'affaire du directoire militaire ..."
The real pressure fell to Ahomadegbe, Apithy, and Mage to work out
a compromise among themselves.
(1) Jeune Africue So.fc8*» (April.U, 1970),p.30
(2) West Africa (April !»,1970),p.37^.
(3) Whiteman, p.l7«
(k) Jeune Afriquc Bo.485 (April 21,1970)p.2l».
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The final agreement which produced the Presidential Commission
or a troika of Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga was apparently a deal
arranged by these political leaders themselves. Under this arrangement,
Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga would serve on a rotating basis of two
years as President of the Presidential Commission* The Commission
was to be the supreme organ of the state and could be called together
by demand of its President or by the other two members. Decisions
must be unanimous, but if one member refused to vote three times,
a majority decision would rule.Maga was to be the first
President of the Commission in view of his moral victory in the March
elections and he led the country back to civilian rule when the
Commission was inaugurated on May 7, 1970.
As Dahomey returned to civilian rule with a carefully
balanced political leadership, the military also was organized to
counter-balance the power of any one leader. Alley was made
Secretary-General for Defence and Kouandete was appointed as his
Deputy. Hacheme was made head of the Service Civique and Vodounou
was made Controller of the National Defence. Finally Chasm© was
appointed as head of Security until the post was transferred to a
12)
civil servant in October 1970.
It is difficult to discuss the process of re-civilianlzation
in Dahomey in view of the frequent re-entry of the military into the
(1) Chronologic Politique Africaine (May-June 1970),p.Uo-l»3.
(2) Whitemail, p.17.
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political arena over the past decade* There are, nonetheless,
some clear examples of the pre-conditions for the abdication of the
military junta which were met or not met in the various cases.
The first pre-condition is the willingness of the military
to withdraw from polities* Each military junta in Dahomey stated at
the beginning that it did not intend to remain in power for an indefin¬
ite period of time. Soglo, in 1963 and 196?, appeared eager to
hand power back to the civilians and wasted little time in doing so.
However, in both instances, the army intervened again within a short
time. The third Soglo regime was becoming more and more guasi-
civilianized, but ended abruptly by the Kbu&ndete led coup. Here,
in spite of Kouandete's announcements that he had intervened to
bring civilian rule back to Dahomey, the fact that Houandete and his
jeuaes cadres filled almost every post in the government made their
sincerity doubtful. It was Alley who forced through the elections
which eventually led to the Zinsou presidency. After the final
coup which ousted Zinsou, the military government was facing an
impending civil war and was willing to abrogate its responsibility
by bringing back the old politicians to work out & compromise. It
was, by this time, difficult to speak of the army as a monolithic
unit. Divided internally, the military was no longer able to
impose its control over the country.
The military governments of Dahomey also attempted to
shape the successive civilian regimes to their specifications.
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After the 1963 coup, Soglo pushed through a strong executive system
of government in the belief that a strong central authority could
exercise control over the country. The 1964 Constitution, termed
the Soglo Constitution, reflected this approach with the instigation
of a bi-cephalous executive* Maga, accused of plotting against the
military junta which had overthrown him, was prevented from holding
office and it was left to Ahomadegbe and Apithy to form the civilian
government* During the return to civilian rule in 1965, Soglo
directed the formation of the new civilian government by adhering to
the 1964 Constitution and appointing Oongaeou as executive. It
was, however, the return to civilian rule in 1968 which was most
shaped by compromise and maneouver within the armed forces. Here,
the determination of the jeunea cadres to exclude the older polit¬
icians, led to the fiasco of general elections. Einsou was finally chosen
as head of the new government after various intrigues, plots and deals
with the army. After the final retreat of the military from overt
political rule in 1970, the military itself was unable to effectively
direct the formation of the new civilian government. The country
was on the verge of civil war and the army itself was as divided as
the country. It was left to the Big Three to work out a compromise
government and the army apparently had little to do with it.
Thus, civilian rule has returned to Dahomey. But, has
the third pre-condition been met? Have the conditions which resulted
in the army's engaging in overt political activity been removed?
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For the first year of the Presidential Commission arrangement was a
year of relative stability in Dahomey. However, the economic situation
was going from bad to worse and the benefits from off-shore petroleum
now being exploited will probably not be felt for several years.
In June 1970, Maga presented a budget with a recurrent deficit of
£300 million, the largest of Dahomey's continuous deficits. The French
met half of this but there was feeling among the Dahomeans that what¬
ever the government gave away would be taken away through some means
as stepping up direct taxation. The trade unions were quieter with
the repeal of the 20 per cent tax on all workers. Meanwhile, the
students and intellectuals were happier with the promised University
of Dahomey which was finally opened in early 1972.^" There was,
however, an underlying sentiment of disquiet in Dahomey.
Dissatisfaction that all the old ills have been visited
on them in a dose three times as strong is particularly
acute among intellectuals, trade unionists, young
people - namely those people who have chosehDahomey's
government so many times in the past. The major
asset for Maga is that the shock of having been on the
abyss of civil war in April is currently holding back
reckless political activity.^
In spite of the sceptimism that the present arrangement in Dahomey
would survive the first transfer of the post of president of the Presiden¬
tial Commission, Maga did hand over the position to Ahomadegbe in May 1972.
This was not without a background of intrigue both within the military and
among civilian political activities beginning in early 1972.
(1) We3t Africa (February 11, 1972), p. 1$7.
(2) Whiteman, p. 19.
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There had been acts of military indiscipline in early
February 1972 at Cuid&h, the home of past coup-makers. However, it was
on February 23, that the situation came to a head with another coup
attempt led by Kouandete. There was considerable confusion surrounding
the events which included an unsuccessful assassination attempt on
de SiOuza, the Army Chief of State, and the overthrow of the Presidential
Commission. It was not until several months later that a final account
was revealed.1 It seemed that the coup attempt was actually a coup
within a coup. The first coup was planned by Kouandete. Since he no
longer held an operational command and could not act alone, he had
proposed the assassination plan to Captain Lucien Glale, brother of
Zinsou's former Minister of Sural Development and Co-operation Adrien
Glele and Commander of a unit in Cotonou. Glele and a former
/ /
supporter of Maga, Capt. Pierre Boni agreed to go along with Kouandete's
plan to assassinate de Souza but their real aim was to eliminate Kouandete
(who merely wanted to be head of state) and bring back Dr. Zinsou.
Y/hether or not Zinsou was brought into their plans is unknown, but
his brother Rene was involved.
However, due to the confusion of events, rumours were rife that
Maga was behind the coup attempt in order to stay in power. These
rumours were given substance by the fact that several of Maga•s body¬
guards were among the assassination squad members and that Maga was
scheduled to leave for France on that day and thus out of sight of
accusrers. xne rumours were spread, about by Ahomadegbe, who was due
(1) West Africa (April 21, 1972), p. 477.
(2) West Africa (May 19, 1972), p. 6^2.
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to take over Maga's position. His supporters, the Groupements de
Vigilance Republicains (GVR), better known as the Groupements des
Voyous Retrouv^s. were busy propogating these ideas.^ Moreover, the
delay in bringing the twenty-two accused soldiers to court-martial as
• •• • / / / , ,
well as the two accused civilians, Adrian Glele and Rene Zmsou to trial
gave rise to speculation that Maga did not intend to give up his
, 2
presidential post. Nonetheless, Maga was very concerned to assesst his
intention to step down and even went nortu to quell disturbances there and
in fact did hand power over to Ahomadegbe on May 7» 1972.
How that Ahomadegbe has taken over as president of the
Presidential Commission, many are pointing to a probable change in the
character of the commission's proposals. Maga was reportedly a bland
personality and took care not to offend the other members of the
Commission. On the other hand, Ahomadegbe is known to be abrasive in
his approach. 'fhere may be moments of stalemate if Maga and Apithy
veto his proposals. Meanwhile, the military appears to be too divided
to act as a unit to promote the interests of any one section or politician.
De Souza appears to be a force behind the maintenance of the Presidential
Commission arrangement. Whether or not the stability of political
activity can continue depends to a large extent on the economic and
financial conditions in Dahomey and on how successful the triumvirate
arrangement can restrain and constrain the individual ambitions of the
politicians.
(1) West Africa (April 21, 1972), p. H77.
(2) In May 1972, several of the military plotters were
sentenced to death, including Lt. Col. Kouandete and Capt. Lucien Glele.
The trial of Adrien Glele and Rene Zinsou was repeatedly postponed when
the civilian magistrates refused to hear the case until given
reassurances that the sentences would be served.
Upper Volta ' »
Political activity has been banned in Upper Volta after
the Koudougou riots in December 1966. From that time until the ban
was lifted in late 1969, civilian political activity remained under¬
ground. Party leaders were, however, called together to advise the
junta on specific political issues (eg. the trial of Yameogo).
During 1968, the military set several dates for the return to civilian
political activity, but it was not until rumours began to circulate
that the army intended to stay in power until 1972, that Laiaizana
officially lifted the ban. Lamiaana hoped that this would allow
sufficient time for the political parties to organise before the
announced election date of late 1970.^ ^ Ee wanted to avoid a
"campaign atmosphere". Military missions were sent throughout the
country to explain why the amy was allowing the resumption of
political party activity. Laiaiz&na stated: "This is when we are
inviting all citizens not to systematically return such and such a
(2)
politician for tribalist and regional reasons.
Several political parties merged after the ban was
lifted. The Union Pesocratique VoltaiQue-Passecblemcnt Democraticue
Africain (UDV-EDA) was the strongest and beet organized. The
conservative UDV-RDA, with its power base in the Bobo-Dioulasso
region and among the Mossi, claimed 80 per cent of the electorate.
(1) Chronologic Politique Africaine (September-
October ,1969 ),p•27*
(2) Vest Africa (May 10,1969),p.5^0.
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La plupart des cadres de l'UDV-RDA etaient restes
en place dans 1'administration du pays, ce qui donn&it
un a vantage considerable a leur parti. Le soutien
des partis freres RDA des pays africains voiains a
ete Important ainsi que celui deschefferies et en
particulier celui de 'l'empereur des Mossi'^'
The president of the UDV-RBA vas Gerard Oudraogo. A veteran
politician and long time opponent of Yameogo, he was than serving
the military administration as a senior official in the Foreign
Ministry. The party's General Secretary was Joseph OtTdraogo, a
former Minister and trade union leader.
The Mouveaent de la Liberation Rationale (MLN) was the
chief rival of the UDV-RBA. It was a socialist party calling for
(2)
a "neutralism positif". Its supporters were mainly young Paris-
trained intellectuals and although it had begun an energetic
campaign to broaden its base of support, it found little following
among the peasantry. Joseph Ki-Zerbo, a leading academic and
Minister of Education from 1965 to 1969 was its leader. Another
prominent member of the MLS was Pierre Damiba who had served as
Minister of Planning under the military regime.
The Parti Fepublic&in Africaia (PRA) under the leader¬
ship of Br Biongold Traore had a small pocket of support in the east,
but its largest base of support was found in the western regions.
The Groupement d'Action Populaire (GAP) was lead by Br Siue Nouhou,
(3)
and was formed from splinter fractions or the i'i»v-Ei?A. ' '
(1) Afrique Contemporaine (1971) Ho.53.p.l6.
(2) ibid
(3) African Review (July,1970),p.7.
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As the political parties began to organize their support,
the junta began to work on a draft constitution. A ConaultatiTe
Committee was appointed by the junta to advise and submit a draft
constitution to the public for a general referendum. The Comm.ttee
of fifty was made up of twenty from the rural areas, two from
women'3 associations, three from industry and commerce, four ex-
servicemen, five from the trade unions, two chiefs, three from
regional bodies and five from the array.^ In May 1970, Lasizana
submitted a draft constitution to this body which would have given a
preponderant role to the military. The proposed constitution
stipulated that the President must be a member of the armed forces
chosen by the officers for an unspecified duration. Although the
Prime Minister could be a civilian, the army was guaranteed rep¬
resentation in the nation's political life. This was interpreted
by the trade unions, political parties, and traditional chiefs as &
betrayal of the long-standing promise of a return to civilian rule.
Two factors ware involved in the military's move to block
(2)
a civilian government from achieving complete political power.
First, the army wanted assurances that the country would not return
to the previous disastrous state. There was no hint that the
political factions were any closer to co-operation at that time than
they had been in 19^5. The Midi's leader, Ki-Zerbo, was being challenged
(1) West Africa (.March lfc, 1970),p.7.
(2) Le Monde Weekly Section (May 13, 1970).
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lagr the young leftist intellectuals. The GAP and the PHA were on
opposite ends of the political spectrum and did not constitute a major
rival to the UDV-RDA. However, the UDV-RDA was troubled over questions
of leadership. The military feared that a constitution allowing
for a civilian President would lead to an UDV-RDA man, but to achieve
that the UDV-RDA would need to agree on a single candidate. If the
accord was narrow, the government would be fragile. This, the junta
reasoned, would lead to a slackening of economic controls and the
reappearance of instability. Secondly, as we stated in Chapter III,
in spite of the degree of cohesion maintained in the military, certain
young officers had acquired a taste for power. The strong hierarchy
and internal discipline of the amy would end if these officers were
given a chance to embark on adventures to serve their own ends.
Loadxana felt it better to promote the best qualified officers him¬
self into the political posts stipulated by the constitution as
reserved for the military.
There were arguments against this proposed constitution.
The chiefs, who had earlier threatened to form their own political
party if they were not granted the respect they felt their due,
wanted an hereditary Senate. The UDV-RDA, who had the strongest
possibility of winning the elections, now saw success slipping through
their fingers. However, both the MLH and the youth saw advantages
in the proposed military President. The MLH considered the military
government as a less conservative force than the UDV-RDA and the
255*
young favoured the army for the same reasons. Finally, there were
those who did not want Ki-Zerbo of the MLIf to become Prime Minister
because he was not a Mossi and came from the some village as Laciaana.
The military maintained that the role of a military
President would he one of conciliation, independent of political
parties. Laaiz&na had emphasised the neutrality of the military
throughout his rule. He stated in an interview, "the army has to
he neutral, above party politics. It cannot constitute a
political group. There is a spirit of absolute neutrality among
all the men of the arrry".^ Whether or not this was totally
accurate, Lamiaana believed that the participation of the military
in the civilian government would "strengthen the guarantee of this
(2)conciliation indispensable during the transitional period".
nonetheless, public criticism of the proposed constitution
was vehement enough to force the military to make drastic modifications
of their proposals. The only original provisions concerning the
military*# relationship with the civilian government remaining in
the revised constitution were that the head of the army would
serve as Fresident for four years only and one-third of the govern¬
ment posts would be filled by military men during that time. The
Constitution called for the election of the members of the National
Assembly for five years by universal suffrage. The Hational Assembly-
(1) West Africa (October 2fc,1970),p.l239
(2) African Review (July,1970)p.6
2$6«
would then elect a Prime Minister who would appoint and dismiss
members of the Cabinet with the approval of the President. ^ The
political parties endorsed the final draft of the Constitution in
spite of some theoretical differences of opinion. A3 Gerard
OuTdraogo of the UDV-HDA atatedt
We have endorsed the constitution but with the
proviso that the military government pulls the army
bach into the barracks as soon as possible and fulfills
its pledge given lest,November to hand over to civilians
by the end of 1270.
The draft constitution was submitted to a national referendum
in June 1970. With the backing of the political parties, the
vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the constitution. 99.7H per
cent of the registered voters participated with 93*^1 per cent in
favour aau only 1.59 per cent voting 'non". Garaago, the Minister
of Finance stated:
ha Haute Yolta a choisi une politique de 'continuite et
ouverture* en R->r>roOT&nt mass Ivorent le rifwisdsi du
1^ juin 1>/Gj}re voyant le retour a ua regime coast-
itutionnel.
According to the new constitution, elections for the Rational
Assembly were to be held within six months. The elections were
held on December 20, 1970 under the supervision of the Ministry of
Security and Interior. Over 95 per cent of the registered voters
(!})
participated. The results were as follows:
(1) Financial Times (August 6, 1970)
(2) West Africa (October,2k, 1970)
(t) Chronologic Politique Africaine (May-June,1970),p.51.






Those elected under the UDV-RDA banner included Commandant
Daouda Traore, Minister of Interior and Security, Joseph Oudraogo,
the old mayor of Ougadougou and head of the party, Joseph Conombo,
another ex-mayor of Ougadougou, and Kaleck Zonome, the current minister
of Foreign Affairs. The PRA deputies included the Minister of Youth
and Sports, Moise Tankanade. The MLN deputies included Ki-Zerbo,
end Pierre Dandba, Minister of Planning. It wis an overall
success for the UDV-RDA; the independent candidates had little success
except in the Kaya zone.
There vere several reasons for the UDV-RDA victory.First,
the party had strong links with the rural chiefs in a country in
which 90 per cent of the population is in the rural areas and
maintain a strong allegiance to traditional rulers. Many of the UDV-
RDA men vere linked to the royal families (eg. Joseph Ou ciraogo vas
(2)
related to the king of the Mossi kingdom of Yatenga) and four¬
teen customary chiefs vere successful UDV-PDA candidates for the
National Assembly. On the other hand, the MLN committed political
suicide in the rural areas by campaigning against the traditional
rulerr..
fa) Africa (February 20,1971),p.215.
(2) West Africa (December 19, 1970),p.1^05.
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Secondly, the PDA branded the MLFJ as likely to instigate a
Keita type socialism. This vent dovn badly in the border areas vhere
trade had suffered during the Keita era in Mali and vhieh had been
influenced by the economic refugees from Mali. The MLN was described
in Mossi as 'ko-tid-ri' or 'grow your harvest so ve can share it*.
This was a direct allusion to Mali co-operatives vhere peasants
had stood in line for handouts.
Thirdly, the opposition parties vera split. The young
leftists considered their leaders to be MMbersof the bourgeoisie and
overcome by religious myths. The official MLN policy was to tone
down allusions to scientific socialism and refer instead to
Voltaic socialism. Also, compared to the UDV-RDA candidates vho
had been involved in political activity for years, the MLN candidates
were not veil known. The other opposition party, the PRA, was also
divided, partly over the issue of whether or not to merge with the
MU. Its old leader ,, Nazi Boni, vho had been able to cover over
the internal erACks, had been killed in an auto accident in 1968.
The opposition's major attack on the UDV-BDA was that it was
the party overthrown in 1966. The UDV-RDA countered by claiming
that the former malpractices had been the work of a single man,
Yameogo, who was rot allowed to mm for political office. The
complete victory of the party in Koudougou, the home of Yameogo,
Bhowed that this explanation had been accepted.
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Thus, the UBV-RM had a clear advantage. It also benefitted
from the divisiveaess of the opposition. Moreover, it was likely
that the independent deputies would join its ranks, particularly
since they were largely former UDV-RQA members. When the government
vas formed tvo months later, .Gerard Oucdraogo of the JDV-RDA became
the Prime Minister. lie won forty-seven of the fifty-seven votes
with ten abstentions.^ Bight of the fifteen members of tae
cabinet were also UDY-itLiA members. Ihs appointment of tvo PRA
members to the Cabinet pointed to a UDV-PhA coalition. With five
of the ueputies military officers in accordance to the constitution,
(2)
the six MLS members are toe only opposition in toe national Assembly.
upper Volta is presently governea by a quaai-civiliaaized
regime with bamisaaa serving an President until 19?^ in accordance
with the constitution. Althougu tne military maintains a consti¬
tutionally sanctioned role in the government, ve are still able to
discuss the process of recivilianimation with reference to the three
pre-conditions. first, is tne junta in Upper Volta willing to
abdicate the power it nas enjoyed over the past six years? The
military, as of yet, is not willing to withdraw completely from
tne political life of Upper Volta. iaere appears to be no motive
of personal ambition on the part of Lamizaaa (indeed he is held in
great esteem in the country) and there are only minor signs of
(1) West Africa (February 20,1971)* p.232.
(2) ibid., p.215.
partisanship among sections of the army. Moreover, Lamizana has
repeatedly stated that the military presence in the new Government is to
rid the transitional process by acting as national arbiter. Eow
willing he will be to give up this position is open to question.
Secondly, the military has attempted to restructure the civilian
government to insure that it would be acceptable to the military. The
first constitutional proposals drawn up by the junta allowed for wide
powers of the military in the government. This was later modified to
grant the Military transitional status in the present government.
In relation to the above two points, we should note the difficulties
arising from a transitional civil-military regime. There has been
comment that the transitional phase has gone on too long as conflicts
have arisen between the military and civilian members of the cabinet.
The soldiers want the government to run efficiently and thus have little
patience with the endless debates among the politicians. The crunch
came earlier this year over the cabinet debate over the budget. Two
items on the budget caused a split to develop between the civilian and
military cabinet members: the allocation of defence funds and the
payment of salaries to traditional chiefs. The civilians wanted to cut
defense expenditure and to increase the chiefs' salaries. Yameogo had
stopped payment to traditional ruler3, but the military junta had
reinstated their salaries by 50 per cent and felt tne remainder should
be made up by local contributions. Therefore, the miliaary ministers
opposed the increase of chiefs' salaries as well as the cut in the
defence allocation. The matter was discussed during the cabinet meeting
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and the military assumed the issue closed. However, when the budget
was presented to the national Assembly, the items remained unchanged and
were adopted. This resulted in the walk out by the military cabinet
ministers who refused to meet again with the civilians.^ At the
time of writing, this problem, which the military now considers a matter
of principle, remains unsolved. It points out the difficulty of a
transitional period.
Added to these problems, the conditions leading to the original
military coup have not been completely eradicated. There are several
problems remaining. First, what will be the future of a viable
opposition in the Hational Assembly? With the UDV-RDA and PRA coalition,
the MLH appeara to have a difficult ta3k in remaining an effective
political party. Secondly, there is also trouble growing between the
government and the National Assembly. Since the deputies receive no
salary for their attendance in the National Assembly, they feel they
should be more independent and active in controlling the executive.
There is, moreover, a rivalry between the President of the National
Assembly and Secretary-General of the UDV-RDA, Joseph Oudraogo, and the
Prime Minister and President of the UDV-RDA, Gerard Oudraogo. The
Prime Minister wants to preserve his power in the UDV-RDA. Unlike
Joseph Oudraogo, he comes from a remote area of Upper Volta and has few
supporters in Ougadougou, so he must satisfy the National Assembly in
order to keep his power. However, he must also satisfy the military
as he is ultimately responsible to Lamizana. ilia task is impracticable
and he has had serious difficulties. The final problem besetting
(1) West Africa (February 25, 1972), p. 216.
(2) ibid.
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Upper Volta is economic. The junta has introduced a measure of
financial health in Upper Volta and has generated a degree of economic
activity, particularly in agriculture. This has been accomplished
through the able management of the Minister of Finance, Hp.re Garango,
and considerable goodwill and aid from foreign nations. However,
in spite of massive efforts to rescue Upper Volta from destitution,
the country remains one of the poorest in the vforld.
**■»#** *♦*»**
In summary, we have 3een that the possibility of military dis¬
engagement from overt political control comes through the culmination
of three conditions. First, there was a disintegration of the original
coup-makers. Secondly, there was growing dissent within the army
organization. hirdly, it wa3 increasingly obvious that the military
regime was unable to deal with the problems of a developing nation.
These three phenomena were evident in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey,
and less so in Upper Volta. The stability brought on by the shock
effect of military action against the former regime soon deteriorated.
However, before the juntas did withdraw/ from overt political control,
three pre-conditions were to be satisfied. First, the armies must be
willing to withdraw. In Ghana, the NIC repeatedly asserted its desire
to leave the political scene in spite of the cautious ap roach to the
return to civilian rule. In Sierra Leone, Juxson-Fmith and his junta
were not willing to leave political office, and it was not until the
warrant Officers overthrew the NRC that the soldiers moved out of
political control. The earlier juntas of Soglo in Dahomey were
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basically interim governments. Later the military was firmly entrenched
in the political life of Dahomey and changes of regime were effected
largely through internal military feuds. Only after the threat of
civil war did the army leave the political scene to the civilians.
In TJpper 7olta, where the military government has been the most
acceptable to the civilian population, there has been much caution and
delay in the return to civilian rule which is still incomplete.
Secondly, the successor regime must -be acceptable to the military.
Here the juntas have been openly manipulative in the formation of the
civilian regimes. In the case of Ghana, the NLC promoted Bu3ia through
the Centre for C'ivic Education, the Political Committee, etc.; directed
the compilation of the new Constitution} and insisted on retaining a
constitutionally sanctioned role in the successor regime via the
Presidential Triumvirate. In Sierra Leone, the NRC,in 3pite of the
findings of the Dove-Edwin Commission that the AiC had justly won the
1967 General Election, refused to hand over power to a non-SLPP
government. The Warrant Officers did return power to Siaku Stevens as
they had be n promised benefits from an APC government. In Dahomey,
the various juntas worked both subtly and in a more open fashion to
shape the civilian regimes. For example, Logic wa3 instrumental in
drawing up the 1964 Constitution, later to be known as the Poglo
Constitution. The jeunos cadres under the leadership of Xouandete
eliminated the old politicians and hand-picked acceptable candidates for
the i96S elections. .hen tills policy lead to the election boycott, the
junta itself appointed Zinsou to form the new civilian regime. Lamizana
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of Upper Volta has guided the transition to civilian rule while the
military continues to play an official role in the governing of the
country. Therefore, in all four cases, the military governments have
carefully directed the process of re-civilianization. It lias felt it
necessary in order to protect itself from reprisals if friends of the
ousted regime regained power and in order to retain a preponderant
voice in the successor government thereby guaranteeing the army's
privileged position.
The final pre-condition for the re-civilianization of politics is
the creation of a civilian regime viable without the sup ort of the
military. At first glance, it would appear that this condition has not
been met in these four countries and that the civilian governments set up
by the departing military juntas have been in fact allowed to rule only
by courtesy of the military. Ghana, with deteriorating economic
conditions and the lack of an effective opposition party in Parliament,
once again fell to military rule in early 1972. Sierra Leone remains
under a State of Emergency while Stevens relies on the army of
neighbouring Guinea to bolster his position and to counter-balance the
dissident forces within the country and the amy. Dahomey, quiet for
the past years after reaching the brink of civil war, was able to
achieve its first constitutional change of government in May 1972
although this was accompanied by a final abortive coup d'etat. Upper
Volta is presently governed by a quasi-civilianized government and there
is evidence of a growing divergence of the military and civilian members
of government under the transitional 3et-up. <e see, therefore, that
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the period of military rule did not solve the problem which had led to
milii:ary intervention in the first place. There still remains the
question of creating viable political institutions which command the
effective sup ort of the population. is long as the pre-conditions
of the original coups remain, there is a greater probability that the




Military intervention has become a common feature in many new
African states. In order to study this phenomenon, we have chosen to
examine the role of the armed forces in Ghana, Sierra Leone, Dahomey, and
Upper Volta in view of three separate, but inter-related areas of
questioning we proposed in the introductory chapter. First, were there
characteristics common to all developing nations which increase the
probability of military intervention? If so, what were the final
precipitants contributing to the coups? In Chapter II, we found a basic
pattern of economic, social, and political problems which appeared common
to these nations and which brought the military to the forefront in the
political arena. However, we also noted that there were final motives
behind the military usurption, motives which were often identified as
being the self-interest of the military or sections of the military.
Secondly, once the military has taken over political control, were there
specific properties of the military organization in these four states
which either aided or limited the junta's ability to govern? In
Chapter III, we considered three areas of £iroblem3 facing the military
governments which stem not only from the character of the military
apparatus but also the economic, social, and political environment in
which it operated. These included the lack of legitimacy of the
military government, the lack of administrative abilities, and the
presence of internal dissent within the armed forces. We discussed
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incidences of each and the methods deployed hy the junta in attempting to
overcome these problems. We also used the discussion of the military's
economic policies as a gauge to measure the strategic contribution of the
military government to economic development. As we noted, the military's
record was hardly impressive. Finally, why did the military government
choose to withdraw from overt political control? What conditions were
set before the armed forces finally returned to their barracks^ In
Chapter V, we saw that the military moved toward re-civilianization as it
was increasingly obvious tnat the junta could not overcome the problems
inherent in military governments. However, in all four states the
juntas attempted to direct the return of civilian rule along lines the
military felt suitable in order to protect its privileged status.
This thesis discussed the above questions. We have noted that
except for specific characteristics)the record of the military governments
in Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Dahomey followed a basic pattern: in no
case was the military able to provide leadership for the development of
these states. However, Upper Volta appeared to be the exception in most
fit •
cases. We proposed that/primary reason for this was the social, economic
and political milieu of Upper Volta. Of the four states here, Upper
Volta appeared to have the lowest level of development of the "modern"
sector. The social structure remains largely traditional. The Mossi
Lmperor maintains a strong influence over a large percentage of the
population with the Bobo as the only other major tribal grouping. Its
economy, based on the export of cattle and migrant workers, was relatively
undifferentiated and, as a result, there are few new groups based on
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new forma of economic activity. Apart from a small but active trade
union movement, there were few groups actively engaged in politics and
making demands upon the central authorities. The army in such a state
played a progressive role as in Upper Volta while in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
and Dahomey, the army's limited political abilities were over-extended.
However, it is appropriate here to note other factors which would
have had an effect on the role of the junta in Upper Volta. One, the
army there has a long tradition of military discipline and hard work.
This derives from the military tradition of the Mossi and, more recently,
from the fact that this area was a major reservoir for recruitment into
the French army. Thus, the Voltaic army has maintained a higher degree
of cohesion throughout its role a3 government than in the other three
case studies. Moreover, although the army is small, there is a large
association of veterens who carry considerable influence, particularly
in the rural areas. Secondly, events surrounding the coup Of 1966 gave
the army a certain amount of moral authority. Hot only was the army
called to power by the trade unions but Yameogo also offered to step
down in favour of the military. Thirdly, the armed forces transferred
itself intact to politics. Lamiaana, as head of the army, simply became
President while there was no exile of potential rivals within the military.
Finally, and perhaps of greatest note, has been the personalities involved.
Lamizana, insisting on neutrality of the military, has exhibited no
personal ambition. Furthermore, Marc Garango, Minister of Finance, has
led the economic recovery of Upper Volta with considerable results.
Perhaps for this reason, the military government in Upper Volta was
\ V
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accepted with the most grace of all states examined here although there
appear now to he difficulties developing between the military and civilian
members of government under the transitional system.
Before we conclude, one final question remains. What are the
benefits of military government in West Africa?1 First, it is often
held that military intervention was desirable in that it prevented the
total break-down of the state. When military activity is a result of
a high incidence of social conflict, particularly among the politically
active groups, the military coup curtails other forms of direct action
techniques (e.g. the riot, the demonstration, the strike) by removing
the object of these activities, the civilian regime. Thus, there is
short-term stability in the political system. However, we have seen
that this stability is not maintained by the military governments. The
juntas, limited in their political skills, were soon faced with opposition
not only from the civilian population but also from within the military
organization.
A second rationalization of military mile is that military
governments create greater material prosperity. It is true that the
juntas acted to prevent the total collapse of the economy^ the coup was
a shock-action which allowed for the re-scheduling of debts, the intro¬
duction of strict austerity measures, and so forth. However, except
for the case of Upper Volta, the military was able to do little more
than place the economy on a "care and maintenance" basis. After this,
the economy stagnated. Moreover, in these states, the military
(l) 8.E. Finer, Man on Horseback (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962),
pp 2U2-2U3,
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governments tended to favour Western capitalist investment and markets,
thus perpetuating many of the problems besetting the financial and
economic structure of West African states. It has been suggested that
this was a manifestation of the identification that St. Cyr and
Sandhurst-trained African officers felt with their counter-parts in
France and Great Britain.1 Beyond the impact of prior training on the
military leaders' economic policies, there also existed a vide range of
political and societal factors such as class and group interest
(particularly in maintaining the privileges of the military) and ethnic
and regional cleavages which influenced the relationship of the military
to the economic system. And, as we saw in Chapter IV, the military's
economic policies were generally ineffective in dealing with the
problems of economic development.
A third justification of military coups is that the army
provided an ideal modernizing agent in these states. Thus we find the
proposition that since armies are often the most Westernized,
achievement oriented, rational organizations in developing states, the
military would become the dynamic centre for demanding change. Once
again, however, we have shown that the armies in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
Dahomey, and to a lesser extent, Upper Volta, have been limited in
giving direction to social, economic, and political development both by
their own characteristics and by the circumstances in which they operated.
The record of the military governments in We3t Africa as a modernizing
force is hardly impressive.
(l) Robert M. Price, "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in
Hew States: Reference - Group Theory and the Ghanaian Case",
World Politics. Vol. XXIII, iio. 3 (April 1967), pp. 399-^30.
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It has been suggested, however, that the creation of a national
armed service in which all males would serve would provide a modernizing
force in new nations. As Montesquieu wrote, the ability to direct
military operations and the talent for government evolve at the same time
in a people's history;^" both are manifestations of a common will to
maintain unity. Rapaport proposed a similar argument: "the
sustaining sentiment of a military force has much in common with that
which cements any group of men engaged in politics - the willingness
of most individuals to bride private or personal impulses for the sake
of general social objectives." In the army, the quest for unity is
regarded as an effort to instill respect for authority by a refined
system of supra and sub-ordination, leadership, and obedience. In the
state, the law performs the same unifying function as does discipline in
the army. In short, "if it is possible to teach a man to be a good
soldier, he can also be taught to be a good citizen." However, when
the "Hation-in-Aros" hypothesis is applied to the African situation, its
short-comings are apparent. It is difficult to envisage the armies
of tropical Africa in terms of Mao's People's Liberation Army on two
counts: first, the overthrow of the colonial regimes was accomplished
through nationalist political parties, not armed combat; secondly,
(l) Quoted by David Rapaport, "A Comparative Theory of Military
and Political Types" in Changing Patterns of Military Politics, edited
by S.P. Huntington (Hew York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1962),p.79.
lo\ ry TO
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(3) ibid.. p.30.
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the armed forces of these states were regarded as representatives of the
colonial power. Moreover,
few states could afford to create a national service
which required each citizen to enrol in a
disciplined organization, notably because of the
heavy costs involved in making it nation-vide;
but also because of the risks such an organization
might bring to the delicate balance of the political
system.^
So far, with the possible exception of Guinea and Tanzania, the majority
of African states have refrained from experimenting with the idea of a
people's army. Oddly enough, the Republic of Liberia successfully
organized a people's militia to forestall foreign intervention as early
as 1909. In general, however, the Ilation-in-Arms has little validity
to the states under examination here.
Returning to our final question, even if it could be shown that the
military control of a nation did offer short-term benefits, one over¬
riding consideration must be voiced. Are not the short-term benefits
overbalanced by a long-term catastrophe? As we stated at the out-set,
in these states experiencing military rule the political institutions
were not able to answer the demands nor retain the support of the
politically active 3ector3 of the population. This set the scene for
the original military usurption. Furthermore, once the military ha3
intervened, the potential development of these institutions is
jeopardized. We may, unfortunately, see the institutionalization of the
coup d'etat and other forms of military blackmail in West Africa. In an
(l) J.M. Lee, African Armie3 and Civil Order (London:
Chatto and Windus for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p.lUl.
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indefinite period of time, the political development of Ghana, Sierra
Leono, Dahomey, and Upper Volta may be subject to the threat of militaiy
interference. As in Yeat*s "Second Coming",
"the falcon cannot hear the Falconer."
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF EVENTS
October 28, 1963: Soglo seizes political control from liaga in
Dahomey.
January 1964: Ahomadegbe-Apithy bi-cephalous government
inaugerated in Dahomey.
November 19» 1965: Soglo seizes political power in Dahomey and appoints
Congacou as head of state.
December 22, 1965: Soglo seizes complete political power in Dahomey.
January 3» 1966: Lamizana seizes political control in Upper Volta.
February 24, 1966: Military seizes political power from Nkrumah in
Ghana and establishes NRC,
December 1966: Political activity suspended in Upper Volta
following Koudougou riots.
March 21, 1967: Lansana seizes political power in Sierra Leone
following General Elections.
March 23, 1967: Majors Blake, Kai-Somba, and Jumu seise political
power from Lansana and establish NRC.
April 1967: Abortive coup in Ghana led by Lt. Arthur.
December 17, 1967: Kouandete seizes political power from Soglo in
Dahomey.
December 21, 1967: Alley chosen to head military junta in Dahomey.
April 18, 1968: NCO's and ./arrant Officers seize political power
from NRC in Sierra Leone and establish NIC.
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April 26, 1968: Siaka Stevens appointed as Prime Minister and
Sierra Leone returns to civilian rule.
July 17, 1963: Zinsou appointed President in Dahomey following
boycott of elections on Kay 5th.
July 23. 1968: Referendum in Dahomey endorses Zinsou.
July 31, 1960: CRM dissolves itself and Dahomey returns to
civilian rule,
August 22, 1969a Constitution ratified in Ghana with stipulation for
3-man military president.
September 3, 1969: Busia inaugerated as President and Ghana returns
to civilian rule.
December 8, 1969: Kouandfte seizes political power from Zinsou and
de Souza chosen to lead military junta in Dahomey.
March 1970: Threat of Civil Jar in Dahomey.
Kay 7» 1970: Apithy, Ahomadegbe, and Maga form Presidential
Commission in Dahomey with Maga as Chairman for two years.
Tune 14, 1970: Draft constitutions stipulating transitional military
president endorsed by referendum in Upper Volfca.
August 1970: Edward Akufo-Addo chosen President in Ghana
following disolution of Military Troika.
March 1971: Guinean troops called in to support Siaka Stevens
in Sierra Leone after alleged coup attempt.
April 19, 1971: . ierra Leone declared a republic with Siaka Stevens
in position of a strong presidency.
January 13» 1972: Military seize power from Busia in Ghana.
/ ✓
February 1972: Attempted coup led by Kouandete in Dahomey.
May 13» 1972: Ahoraadegbe takes position as Chairman of




Ghana; ALRP - All People's Republican Party.
Cpp - Convention People's Party.
HADECO - National Development Corporation.
ML - National Alliance of Liberals.
KLC - National Liberation Council.
PAP - People's Action Party.
?P - Progressive Party.
UNP « United Rationalist Party.
UP - United Party.
Sierra Leone: 'PC - All People Cor.gr«»s;
NIC - National Interim Council.
HRC - National Reformation Council.
SLPMB - Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board.
SLPP - Sierra Leone People's Party.
Dahomey CKV - Comite Milit&ire de Vigilenee.
CRM - Comite Revolutionaire Hilitaire.
✓ /
CRN - Comite Renovation Rationale
FDD - Parti Democratique Dahomeen.
PDU - Parti Dahomeen l'Unite .
P13U - Parti -lational Unique.
PAD - Parti Republicain du Dahomey.
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HDD - Rassemblement Benocratique Dahozaoen.
y /
HDD - Union Democratique Dahomeenine
UGTD - Union Generale de Pravailleura Dahomeens.
Upper Volta: GAP - Grouperaent d'Action Populaire.
J.A.C.- .Joint Action Committee.
HLN - Mouvement de la Liberation Nationals.
PDU - Parti Democratique Unifie".
PHV - Parti National Valtaique.
PRA - Parti Republicain Africain
PRL - Parti Republicaine de la Liberte.
c:070LC0M -Societe d'Economie Mixte.
NOV - KDA - Union Democratique Voltaique -
Ptaamemblement Democratique AfricaSm
